2017 ANNUAL OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT

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Based on this extensive experience, we offer a broad base of specialized knowledge regarding the legal and business issues faced by our clients, as well as the ability and commitment to handle matters efficiently and in a results-oriented fashion.
OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS

Class action lawyers in California wield two powerful tools: the Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 – 17209 (“UCL”); and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code sections 1750 – 1784 (“CLRA”). The UCL forbids “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” conduct in connection with virtually any type of business activity. With its sweeping liability standards and broad equitable remedies, the UCL has long been a weapon of choice for plaintiffs’ lawyers. The CLRA is more defined in structure, but no less potent. The CLRA applies to any “consumer” transaction involving the “sale or lease of goods or services” and authorizes recovery of actual, statutory and punitive damages. The CLRA, which explicitly prohibits 24 separate business acts or practices, provides for streamlined class certification and dispositive motion proceedings.

Decisions from California and Federal courts in 2016 provided important direction in areas of liability, reliance and causation, preemption, injunctive relief, and other issues under the UCL and CLRA.

First, the trial courts are constantly fleshing out what is an “unfair” business practice under the UCL. In Bickoff v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the United States District Court, Central District of California, determined that it was not unfair for a bank to foreclose on an overdue construction loan where it could show, contrary to the borrower’s claims, that it had not guaranteed permanent financing. In Abramson v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., another Central District court found that a timeshare “points” system was not unfair, even if it allegedly made it more difficult to reserve higher quality rooms. In both Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc. and McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., courts found that the UCL does not require candy companies to disclose on packaging that their chocolate products may contain cocoa beans picked under child or slave labor conditions, drawing a distinction between the deplorable conditions themselves and the companies’ duties to disclose on candy wrappers. But in In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach

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1 The research in this Overview is current through January 31, 2017. The purpose of the Overview is to provide information and perspective. As a result, we sometimes reference unpublished and/or noncitable opinions to demonstrate reasoning, illustrate trends, etc. The authors thank Stroock special counsel Shannon Dudic, associates Holly Farless, Erick Kuykman and Donny Simkin, paralegal Andrew Aquino and librarian Evelyn Egbeighu for their invaluable assistance with this year’s Overview.


3 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a) (stating prohibited practices), 1761 (definitions).


5 No. 14CV1065 BEN (WVG), 2016 WL 3280439, at *15-16 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-55965 (9th Cir. July 6, 2016); see also Harris v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 5:16-cv-00645-CAS(KKx), 2016 WL 3410161, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2016) (not unfair for bank to record notice of default against secured real property prior to completion of borrower’s loan modification application).


7 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-15444 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2016).

8 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).
Litigation, the court allowed members of a health care plan who alleged their personal information had been hacked to pursue a UCL claim against health insurance companies based on “California’s public policy of protecting consumer data.”

Second, the gatekeeping concepts of reliability and causation were stretched to allow a consumer to challenge a retailer’s alleged “bait and switch” scheme in Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC. In that case, a clothing retailer advertised a 40% off sale, but customers alleged they were not informed that certain goods were not included in the sale until they reached the register, where they faced the dilemma whether to buy the goods anyway, knowing at that point the goods were not on sale. After the trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the retailer, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed and remanded, allowing the UCL claim to proceed. The court reasoned that if a consumer is “influenced by the momentum to buy,” there is a factual question whether they suffered economic injury caused by the false advertising. A dissent in Veera challenged whether the plaintiff could show reliance: “I see the majority’s ‘momentum to buy’ theory as both a departure from well-settled principles regarding reliance in ordinary fraud actions and as a dilution of the Prop. 64 requirement that the plaintiff suffer economic injury as a result of the defendant’s improper conduct.”

Third, courts continue to define the contours of preemption of UCL and CLRA claims. In In re Fontem US, Inc. for example, plaintiffs’ claims regarding omissions of material fact regarding e-cigarettes were preempted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act with respect to product labeling, but not with respect to off-label warning requirements under California’s Proposition 65. In Fisher v. Monster Beverage Corp., the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, determined that the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act preempted plaintiff’s claim that a drink manufacturer failed to warn consumers about caffeine content, but in Monster Beverage Corp. v. Herrera, the Ninth Circuit applied the Younger abstention doctrine and the Anti-Injunction Act to allow UCL claims filed by a city attorney to proceed in state court against the same manufacturer. In People ex rel. Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. the federal Airline Deregulation Act preempted a UCL action for enforcement of California’s Online Privacy Protection Act’s privacy policy requirements for an airline’s consumer

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11 Id. at 921-22 (finding that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to standing and causation when they were “lured” into a store by signs proclaiming a 40% off sale, but, after learning at the register that the sale did not apply to every item in the store, chose to purchase certain items at full price).
12 Id. at 926 (Bigelow, P.J., dissenting).
14 656 F. App’x 819, 823 (9th Cir. 2016).
15 650 F. App’x 344, 346 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Younger abstention doctrine applied because “[t]here was an ongoing state proceeding when the district court considered the motion to dismiss at issue,” and that application of the doctrine was appropriate because “the People of California have a strong interest in ensuring that a company providing consumer products is doing so in a manner consistent with the state’s unfair business practices laws”).
mobile application. In Roberts v. United Healthcare Services, Inc., the California Court of Appeal, Second District, held that UCL claims for misrepresentation in a medical insurer’s marketing materials were preempted by the Medicare Act, possibly teeing up a split with two other California appellate districts that have held otherwise regarding the scope of preemption with respect to Medicare.

Fourth, several cases focused on the availability of injunctive relief for UCL and CLRA claims in the face of consumer awareness of the challenged practice. In In re Fluidmaster, Inc., the court dismissed claims for injunctive relief under the UCL and CLRA because there was a disconnect between the alleged harm and the requested relief, such that prohibiting further sales and requiring notices regarding design modification would not reduce the probability of the plaintiff’s future harm due to allegedly faulty plumbing hoses. In Le v. Kohls Dep’t Stores, Inc., the court allowed plaintiff to seek injunctive relief to prohibit an alleged deceptive pricing practice, finding that the plaintiff’s general awareness of the practice did not deprive him of Article III standing. But in Strumlauf v. Starbucks Corp., consumers alleging that their lattes were underfilled (a First World problem) lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because, in light of their allegation they would not have purchased the drinks on the same terms had they known the drinks were underfilled, the court reasoned they could not allege a threat of repeated injury. And in Moss v. Infinity Ins. Co., the court dismissed an insured’s UCL claim to the extent that it was based on an alleged breach of contract, reasoning that the restitutionary remedy available under the UCL was “entirely inconsistent” with the primary remedy sought by the insured, which was the payment of damages.

Litigation trends included more cases challenging claims relating to food products and nutritional supplements, complaints about “slack-fill” in packaging, and false price referencing in retail stores.
Other important cases involved when the “learned intermediary” doctrine applies in UCL suits, when principals may be liable under the UCL for the actions of their agents, whether subsequent purchasers can be consumers under the CLRA, and whether timeshares or an online authentication program are “goods” or “services” under the CLRA.


26 Andren v. Alere, Inc., No. 16-cv-1255-GPC (NLS), 2016 WL 4761806 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2016) (if medical device was prescribed to plaintiff by doctor, California’s “learned intermediary” doctrine would apply because the manufacturer’s duty to warn users of risks associated with the device runs to the physician, not the patient or public).


28 In re Fluidmaster, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 951 (homebuyers allowed to pursue CLRA claims against manufacturer of water supply lines).

29 Abramson, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (questioning whether a dispute regarding a timeshare involved “goods” or “services” under the CLRA).

30 Rojas-Lozano v. Google, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1116-17 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (Google’s reCAPTCHA identification program was not a “good” or “service” under the CLRA).
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THE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE UCL

A. Conduct That Constitutes “Unfair Competition”

“Unfair competition” is defined in the UCL as any one of the following wrongs: (1) an “unlawful” business act or practice; (2) an “unfair” business act or practice; (3) a “fraudulent” business act or practice; (4) “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising”; and (5) any act prohibited by sections 17500 through 17577.5. These definitions are disjunctive, and each of the wrongs operates independently from the others. “[I]n other words, a practice is prohibited as ‘unfair’ or ['fraudulent'] even if not ‘unlawful’ and vice versa.”

The UCL’s reach is imposing: “The Legislature apparently intended to permit courts to enjoin ongoing wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur.” The “cleansing power” provided to a court by the UCL can pose a formidable challenge to defendants.

31 The full text of section 17200 reads as follows:

As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.

32 Unless specified in the complaint, the UCL does not necessarily include violations of section 17500 et seq. See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar, 134 Cal. App. 4th 659, 660-67 (2005) (seeking to enjoin attorney from bringing “shakedown” UCL claims against small businesses). The court explained:

We cannot agree with the Attorney General that ['et seq.'] is elastic enough to stretch all the way to section 17500. Section 17200 begins part 2 of division 7 of the Business and Professions Code, and deals with unfair competition, while section 17500 begins part 3 of the same code and deals with representations to the public. The Legislature evidently thought that false advertising was sufficiently distinct from unfair competition so as not to be lumped even in the same part of a division. Nor does the body of the complaint contain any references to section 17500 or the false advertising law. The complaint thus did not give fair warning that [defendant] was subject to being enjoined from filing false advertising suits under section 17500 as well as unfair competition suits under section 17200.


33 See Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999); see also Lepton Labs, LLC v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1242 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that complaint need not specify which prong a UCL claim is brought under).


B. What Constitutes A Business Act Or Practice?

The first three “wrongs” in the UCL require proof of a “business act or practice.” Although no reported case explicitly defines the term “business” under the UCL, if the issue were presented, courts may well construe the term broadly, as they otherwise have construed the UCL. With respect to the terms “act” and “practice,” the UCL has been interpreted to encompass most business conduct. Even a one-time act has been deemed sufficient to allege a UCL claim. However, the UCL seemingly does not apply to securities transactions.

C. Who May Be Sued Under The UCL?

Unlike some other states’ unfair and deceptive practices statutes, the UCL does not expressly exempt from coverage any specific industries, such as those that are highly regulated. Rather, it applies to any “person,” as defined under the UCL. Governmental entities do not fall within this definition and cannot be sued under the UCL. Furthermore, the law is not settled
on whether the UCL applies to claims brought on theories of indirect liability, such as vicarious or aiding and abetting liability, agency, or franchisor liability. In Daniels v. Select Portfolio Services, Inc., the court allowed appellants—borrowers under a deed of trust—to amend their UCL claims against several principals based on the alleged conduct of an agent, reasoning that the trustee of the securitized trust that owned the loan could potentially be liable under an agency theory for the fraudulent misrepresentations of a loan servicer.

D. Who May Sue Under The UCL?

The UCL expressly permits claims to be brought by any “person,” which it defines to include “natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and other organizations of persons.” The ability of corporate plaintiffs to bring UCL claims may be limited under certain circumstances, however. In Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., plaintiff attempted to bring an unfair and deceptive UCL claim against three manufacturers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment arising out of a third-party claim that the equipment infringed patents held by the third party. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the UCL claim and the Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the UCL claim was “based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contract,”


43 246 Cal. App. 4th at 1188.


and that prosecution of a UCL claim could “deprive [other companies that had purchased the same equipment] of the individual opportunity to seek remedies far more extensive than those available under the UCL,” in violation of due process.46

The California Courts of Appeal also have renewed the UCL’s effectiveness in competitor actions. In Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Services,47 the Court of Appeal analyzed “the reach of the UCL in the commercial context following the enactment of Proposition 64.” There, plaintiff alleged that defendant used personnel not licensed by the state bar to provide legal services for expungement of criminal records, a service that competed with plaintiff’s law practice, deprived it of market share and forced it to incur expenses to compete. Plaintiff alleged that the provision of legal services by other than California lawyers violated the UCL. Defendant claimed plaintiff suffered no injury cognizable under the UCL because he did not transact business with defendant.

The court held that, “having alleged that he had been forced to pay increased advertising costs and to reduce his prices for services in order to compete, and that he had lost business and the value of his law practice had diminished, [plaintiff] succeeded in alleging at least an identifiable trifle of injury as necessary for standing under the UCL.”48 The court rejected the argument that, under Proposition 64, “a plaintiff must have had business dealings with the defendant in order to have standing under the UCL.”49 Even without “direct business dealings,” plaintiff’s allegation that “he suffered losses in revenue and asset value and was required to pay increased advertising costs specifically because of the unlawful business practices of [defendant]” was potentially a sufficient “allegation of causation” at the demurrer stage.50 However, the court was careful to limit its holding to business competitor lawsuits, and not the consumer context, holding only that “a business competitor who adequately alleges that he or she has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of the defendant’s unfair competition is not necessarily precluded from maintaining a UCL lawsuit against the defendant just because he or she has not engaged in direct business dealings with the defendant.”51

E. Proposition 64 And The UCL Standing Requirement

When Proposition 64 became effective on November 3, 2004,52 it imposed two significant restrictions which apply only to actions filed by private individuals or entities.53

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46 Id. at 135 (citing Rosenbluth Int’l, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1073, 1078 (2002)).
48 Id. at 561.
49 Id. at 563-64.
50 Id. at 564.
51 Id. at 565.
52 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a) (“An initiative statute or referendum approved by a majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise.”).
53 In addition, Proposition 64 placed certain restrictions on the use of monetary penalties recovered by public enforcement officials—i.e., those penalties must be used in the enforcement of consumer protection laws. This change in the law will not impact private UCL actions, where monetary penalties are not available.
First, amended section 17204 states the standing requirement:

Actions for any relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court of competent jurisdiction . . . by a person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.

(Old language stricken, new language in italics.)54 The UCL previously granted broad standing to “any person,” allowing the filing of “representative,” “private attorney general” or “general public” actions by plaintiffs who had no dealings with the defendants or the transactions at issue.55 These actions were brought without regard to any procedural standard, or notice or due process requirements.56 Many such actions were frivolous and abusive.

Second, as a result of Proposition 64, the UCL requires that private cases involving aggregated claims comport with California’s class action standards. Amended section 17203 provides:

Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition. Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of section 17204 and complies with Code of Civil Procedure

54 Proposition 64 also amended California Business & Professions Code section 17535 (governing the relief available in false advertising lawsuits) to impose the same standing and class action standards as those contained in the revised section 17204, as follows:

Actions for injunctive relief under this section may be prosecuted . . . by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation of this chapter. Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of this section and complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but these limitations do not apply to claims brought under this chapter by the Attorney General, or any district attorney, county counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor in this state.

(Old language stricken, new language in italics.)


section 382, but these limitations do not apply to claims brought under this chapter by the Attorney General, or any district attorney, county counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor in this state.

(New language in italics.) California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class litigation. Section 382 does not itself set forth the specific requirements necessary to maintain a class action, and California courts therefore have interpreted section 382 to impose the requirements that usually apply in other state and federal courts—commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation and superiority.

1. The Impact Of Clayworth And Kwikset On The Standing Requirement


In Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., retail pharmacies brought UCL claims against pharmaceutical companies for alleged price fixing. Defendants challenged the plaintiffs’ standing, arguing that they did not suffer a loss of money or property because they passed on the overcharges to customers. According to defendants, plaintiffs had no remedy to pursue. The California Supreme Court rejected this position, making clear that the issues of standing and remedies are separate: “That a party may ultimately be unable to prove a right to damages (or, here, restitution) does not demonstrate that it lacks standing to argue for its entitlement to them.” “The doctrine of mitigation . . . is a limitation on liability for damages, not a basis for extinguishing standing.” In short, looking at the language and intent of section 17204, the Court found that plaintiffs need not prove “compensable loss at the outset” in order to have standing.

In connection with this conclusion, the Court also explicitly held that a UCL plaintiff seeking only injunctive relief can have standing. The Court noted that “[s]ection 17203 makes injunctive relief ‘the primary form of relief available under the UCL,’ while restitution is merely ‘ancillary.’”

59 49 Cal. 4th 758, 764 (2010).
60 Id. at 765.
61 Id. at 789.
62 Id. (citing Pool v. Oakland, 42 Cal. 3d 1051, 1066 (1986) (“The rule of [mitigation of damages] comes into play after a legal wrong has occurred, but while some damages may still be averted.”)).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 790 (quoting Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 319).
Accordingly, under Clayworth, a plaintiff’s right to seek injunctive relief is not dependent on the ability to seek restitution. Likewise, the availability of a remedy is not relevant to standing.65

b. **Kwikset: Plaintiff Must Suffer An “Economic Injury” That Is “Caused By” A UCL Violation.**

In *Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court*,66 plaintiffs alleged that defendant violated the UCL and the False Advertising Law when it marketed and sold locksets labeled “Made in U.S.A.” when, in fact, the locksets contained parts from or were partly manufactured abroad. Plaintiffs alleged that they purchased the locksets based on the labeling and would not have done so if they were not so labeled. According to defendant, plaintiffs lacked standing because, in essence, they received the benefit of the product, which was usable and not defective.

The California Supreme Court commenced its discussion by stating, “Proposition 64 should be read in light of its apparent purposes, i.e., to eliminate standing for those who have not engaged in any business dealings with would-be defendants and thereby strip such unaffected parties of the ability to file ‘shakedown lawsuits,’ while preserving for actual victims of deception and other acts of unfair competition the ability to sue and enjoin such practices.”67 The Court then observed, “Proposition 64 accomplishes its goals in relatively few words.”68 Less than two dozen are at issue here: standing under the UCL extends to “a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.”69

Against this background, the Court found that “the plain language of these clauses suggests a simple test.”70 A UCL plaintiff must: “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.”71

With respect to injury in fact, the Court emphasized that “[t]he text of Proposition 64 establishes expressly that in selecting this phrase the drafters and voters intended to incorporate the established federal meaning. The initiative declares: ‘It is the intent of the California voters in enacting this act to prohibit private attorneys from filing lawsuits for unfair competition where they have no client who has been injured in fact under the standing requirements of the United States Constitution.’”72 The Court explained that, “under federal law, injury in fact is ‘an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”

“Particularized” in this context means simply that ‘the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’ Accordingly, with respect to standing under the UCL, the Court held:

There are innumerable ways in which economic injury from unfair competition may be shown. A plaintiff may (1) surrender in a transaction more, or acquire in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have; (2) have a present or future property interest diminished; (3) be deprived of money or property to which he or she has a cognizable claim; or (4) be required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise have been unnecessary. Neither the text of Proposition 64 nor the ballot arguments in support of it purport to define or limit the concept of ‘lost money or property,’ nor can or need we supply an exhaustive list of the ways in which unfair competition may cause economic harm.

The Court also noted that “lost money or property—economic injury—is itself a classic form of injury in fact.” The Court then went on to “offer a further observation concerning the order in which the elements of standing are best considered”.

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73 Id. at 322-23 (alteration marks omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
74 Id. at 323 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
75 Id. (citation omitted).
76 Id.; see also Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 811 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that “several courts have held that the unauthorized release of ‘personal information’ does not constitute a loss of money or property for purposes of establishing standing under the UCL,” but holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a loss of money or property based on potential unpaid compensation where Facebook used plaintiffs’ Facebook profiles to endorse third-party products and services); In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 985 (allegations that defendants did not adequately protect plaintiffs’ personal data as promised, thus causing benefit of bargain damages, represent economic injury sufficient to satisfy UCL standing in the data breach context); Arroyo v. TP-Link USA Corp., No. 5:14-CV-04999-EJD, 2015 WL 5698752, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015) (dismissing claims with respect to products that plaintiff did not purchase or whose marketing material he did not view); Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 456 (2013) (plaintiff’s failure to satisfy conditions to bring claim under predicate statute underlying UCL unlawful claim barred standing under UCL); Turcios v. Carm Mox Labs., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 638, 644 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (plaintiff lacked standing to assert CLRA claim, and UCL claim based on violation of Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, because “Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that his alleged economic injury occurred as a result of” purchasing chapstick that he would have bought regardless of label); Thompson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 217 Cal. App. 4th 719, 732 (2013) (denying class certification of CLRA and UCL claims alleging overcharges in connection with renewal of auto club memberships where plaintiff renewed membership despite knowledge of shorter term); Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (plaintiff cannot establish economic injury caused by an alleged omission of information where information about alleged defect was previously published in an internet news article); Svenson v. Google Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 717, 730 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (plaintiff lacks UCL standing because plaintiff failed to “allege[] any facts showing that Defendants’ business practice—disclosing users’ Contact Information to third-party App vendors—changed her economic position at all”); Two Jinn, Inc. v. Gov’t Payment Serv., Inc., 233 Cal. App. 4th 1321, 1334-35 (2015) (pre-
Because, as noted, economic injury is itself a form of injury in fact, proof of lost 
money or property will largely overlap with proof of injury in fact. If a party has 
alleged or proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any 
nontrivial amount, he or she has also alleged or proven injury in fact. Because the 
lost money or property requirement is more difficult to satisfy than that of injury 
in fact, for courts to first consider whether lost money or property has been 
sufficiently alleged or proven will often make sense. If it has not been, standing is 
absent and the inquiry is complete. If it has been, the same allegations or proof 
that suffice to establish economic injury will generally show injury in fact as well, 
and thus it will again often be the case that no further inquiry is needed.78

Kwikset therefore not only states the test for evaluating the issue of injury sufficient to confer 
standing, it sets the order of the analysis.79

litigation investigation expenses cannot be used to establish economic injury under the UCL); but see 
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. LT Napa Partners LLC, 234 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1280-82 (2015), review 
denied, No. S225790 (Cal. June 10, 2015) (holding that the expenditure of resources to investigate 
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing was different from the pre-litigation expenses discussed in Two Jim, 
Inc., and could establish economic injury under the UCL because the expenses were incurred prior to 
and independent of the litigation); Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022 (“California law permits litigants 
to pursue claims under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL if they show that the deceptive practice caused 
pecuniary loss”); Robinson v. U–Haul Co. of Cal., 4 Cal. App. 5th 304, 317 (2016) (economic injury 
requirement satisfied for UCL claim for malicious prosecution when plaintiff incurred court costs and 
attorneys’ fees in defense against malicious prosecution); Rojas-Lozano, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 
(plaintiff did not suffer economic injury because she failed to allege that she would have changed 
her behavior if she had known that transcribing part of a reCAPTCHA would facilitate Google’s profit 
earning).

77 Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 325.
78 Id. (citations omitted).
79 See also Henderson v. Gruma Corp., No. CV 10-04173 AHM (AJWx), 2011 WL 1362188, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (finding that purchase of guacamole dip constitutes a “nontrivial” injury and 
concluding otherwise would prohibit majority of product-based actions, thereby “thwart[ing] the 
purposes of California’s consumer protection statutes”); Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosmetics, Inc., 640 
F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged an economy injury where 
defendant manufactured, marketed and/or sold products without a prescription, federal or state 
approval and proper labeling and, as a result, plaintiff “lost sales, revenue, market share, and asset 
value”); Glen Oaks Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Re/Max Premier Props., Inc., 203 Cal. App. 4th 
913, 919-22 (2012) (finding that homeowners’ association had suffered “injury in fact” and “lost money 
or property” for, among other things, investigative costs associated with repairing and replacing 
damaged property); Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 82 (2013) 
(holding allegation that plaintiff’s “home was sold at a foreclosure sale is sufficient to satisfy the 
economic injury prong of the standing requirement of section 17204” and granting plaintiff leave to 
amend to allege a “causal connection” between defendant’s “allegedly unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent 
conduct and Lueras’s economic injury”); Sarun v. Dignity Health, 232 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1167-70 
(patient’s partial payment of hospital bill, and receipt of an invoice showing a balance due, established
c. The Causation Requirement: “As A Result Of”

Courts have interpreted the phrase “as a result of” to mean “caused by.” The “causal connection is broken when a complaining party would suffer the same harm whether or not a defendant complied with the law.” Further, allegations must indicate how an injury resulted from the unfair competition. But, as explained below with respect to Tobacco II, in the context of claims based on fraudulent conduct, the phrase does not impose a “tort causation requirement,” which would require a showing of actual reliance on specific misstatements.


81 Troyk v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1349 (2009); see also Allergan, 640 F.3d at 1383 (“While a direct business dealing is certainly one way in which a plaintiff could be harmed, the California courts have also recognized claims under the UCL where a direct business dealing was lacking.”).

82 Brownfield v. Bayer Corp., No. 2:09-cv-00444-JAM-GGH, 2009 WL 1953035, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2009) (finding “conclusory” allegations did not confer standing); Klein v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., Nos. CV 08-0659 AHM (VBK), 2009 WL 151521, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2009) (on claim for imposition of excessive insurance premium, plaintiff did not allege “that [Defendants’] conduct caused him to pay more than he would have had Defendants been licensed [by the California Insurance Commissioner]”); Lorenzo, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 (plaintiff did not allege that he would not have purchased a cell phone or related service had he been aware of defendant’s misrepresentations); McGough v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C12-0050 TEH, 2012 WL 5199411, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2012) (finding that alleged unlawful conduct did not cause foreclosure; instead, plaintiff’s default caused foreclosure); Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1355, 1363 (2010) (holding that the “as a result” analysis in Tobacco II applies to unlawful claims based on misrepresentations and deception; causation in a UCL action should “hinge on the nature of the alleged wrongdoing rather than the specific prong of the UCL the consumer invokes”); see also Kane v. Chobani, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (reiterating that reliance is a required element in claims premised on misrepresentation and deception brought under the unlawful prong of the UCL), order vacated on other grounds by Kane v. Chobani, LLC, 645 F. App’x 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2016); Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc., 244 Cal. App. 4th 982, 1013 (2016) (UCL standing causation prong sufficiently pleaded by allegations of unconscionable mortgage loan agreements, because plaintiffs would not have lost their loan security had defendants not enforced the allegedly unconscionable loan agreements through foreclosure proceedings); Bishop v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 651 F. App’x 657, 658 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing district court’s dismissal for lack of standing because plaintiff adequately alleged that he relied on defendant’s misrepresentation, without which he would not otherwise have purchased defendant’s product, even though the only alleged misconduct was a failure to include disclosures required under the Food Labeling Laws).

83 Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 325, 327; contra Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (where UCL claim was based on allegedly misleading communications, “California courts require evidence of reliance before they will find that causation and ‘injury in fact’ have been proved”).
Some courts have interpreted “caused by” broadly. For example, in *Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC*, the court held that if a consumer is “influenced by the momentum to buy” to proceed with a purchase despite learning of false advertising as to the price before consummating the transaction, then that is sufficient to create a question as to whether they suffered economic injury “caused by” the false advertising.\(^{84}\) The court described this as a type of “bait and switch” in which the consumer relies on the deceptive advertising price (40% off) when choosing the item to be purchased and becomes so “invested in the decision to buy” that he or she continues with the transaction “despite his or her better judgment.”\(^{85}\) Notably, there was a dissent in *Veera* which challenged whether the plaintiff could show reliance, given that she knew the 40% discount representation was false before she purchased: “I see the majority’s ‘momentum to buy’ theory as both a departure from well-settled principles regarding reliance in ordinary fraud actions and as a dilution of the Prop. 64 requirement that the plaintiff suffer economic injury as a result of the defendant’s improper conduct.”\(^{86}\)

\(84\) *Veera*, 6 Cal. App. 5th at 921-22 (finding that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to standing and causation when they were “lured” into a store by signs proclaiming a 40% off sale, but, after learning at the register that the sale did not apply to every item in the store, chose to purchase certain items at full price).

\(85\) *Id.* at 921.

\(86\) *Id.* at 926 (Bigelow, P.J., dissenting).

\(87\) *Kwikset*, 51 Cal. 4th at 324 (citing *Troyk*, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 1348 n.31 (“We note [the] UCL’s standing requirements appear to be more stringent than the federal standing requirements. Whereas a federal plaintiff’s ‘injury in fact’ may be intangible and need not involve lost money or property, Proposition 64, in effect, added a requirement that a UCL plaintiff’s ‘injury in fact’ specifically involve ‘lost money or property.’”)); see also *Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp.*, 718 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “when a consumer purchases merchandise on the basis of false price information, and when the consumer alleges that he would not have made the purchase but for the misrepresentation, he has standing to sue under the UCL and [False Advertising Law] because he has suffered an economic injury” and rejecting defense that plaintiff would have purchased product anyway); *Jue v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, No. C 10-00033 WHA, 2010 WL 889284, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010) (where complaint failed to show that defendant’s alleged failure to provide its employees “suitable seating” was linked to plaintiffs’ loss of compensation, or any other money or property, the court found the named plaintiff lacked standing under Article III and the UCL); *Two Jinn, Inc. v. Gov’t Payment Serv., Inc.*, No. 09CV2701 JLS (BLM), 2010 WL 1329077, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010) (where plaintiff alleged that it lost potential customers, court found plaintiff’s injury to be “mere conjecture” and, thus, insufficient for standing under Article III, which requires an injury in fact to be “concrete and particularized and [actual or imminent”).

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\(d\). **UCL Standing And Federal Courts**

After *Kwikset*, in any given case, one must consider whether a plaintiff can meet both Article III and UCL standing requirements for purposes of litigating in federal court. As noted by the Court in *Kwikset*, “because economic injury is but one among many types of injury in fact, the Proposition 64 requirement that injury be economic renders standing under section 17204 substantially narrower than federal standing under [Article III], which may be predicated on a broader range of injuries.”\(^{87}\) Accordingly, a plaintiff could have Article III standing, but lack UCL standing, depending on the facts at issue. Conversely, a plaintiff who has suffered an injury...
in fact (and thus has UCL standing) could lack Article III standing to seek injunctive relief in federal court if they have no intention of buying the challenged product again.  

The Supreme Court further clarified federal court standing in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, holding that a “bare procedural violation” of a federal statute is insufficient for a consumer to establish standing unless the consumer can allege a “concrete and particularized injury” to the statutorily-protected interest (although the injury need not be tangible and the violation of procedural right or risk of injury may be enough to establish standing). While there are significant ramifications to Spokeo that are beyond the reach of this Overview, including its impact on CAFA and possible remand of cases to state court, Spokeo promises to be a significant factor in sorting out who has standing to pursue claims in federal court.

2. Tobacco II And The Standing Requirement

a. The Decision In Tobacco II

In Tobacco II, plaintiffs based their UCL claims on the allegation that the defendant tobacco companies had engaged in 40 years of deceptive advertising regarding the health effects of cigarette smoking. After Proposition 64 was enacted, defendants successfully moved to decertify the class, arguing that plaintiffs could not establish that each class member spent money to purchase cigarettes as a result of particular cigarette advertisements.

On review, the California Supreme Court’s majority opinion, relying principally on the plain language of Proposition 64, concluded that only the named plaintiff must have standing to bring a UCL claim on behalf of a class. The Court also concluded that the ballot materials suggested that the initiative was intended only to prevent “shakedown” lawsuits against small businesses, not to “curb the broad remedial purpose of the UCL or the use of class actions to effect that purpose.” More importantly, though, the majority rejected the argument that all class members must have the same injury as the named plaintiff in order for a UCL class to be certified, reasoning that Proposition 64 did not undermine prior cases holding that individualized proof of

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88 See e.g., Opperman v. Path, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 962, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief if he has not alleged a real or immediate threat that he will be wronged again); but see Le v. Kohls Dep’t Stores, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d at 1110 (plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief against defendant’s alleged “company-wide, pervasive, and continuous false advertising campaign,” despite plaintiff’s general awareness of the misleading price advertising, because otherwise no plaintiff could ever seek injunctive relief under the UCL) (internal quotation marks omitted).

89 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Spokeo involved a plaintiff who complained that a report on the website Spokeo.com contained inaccurate consumer reporting information about him when it misreported that he worked in a professional field and had a graduate degree, when he actually was unemployed. Interestingly, when ruling on Spokeo’s motion to dismiss in 2011, the trial court allowed the plaintiff’s Fair Credit Reporting Act claim to proceed while dismissing his UCL claim for failure to allege economic injury or harm to his employment prospects as a result of Spokeo’s conduct. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306, 2011 WL 11562151, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011).

90 46 Cal. 4th at 308-9.

91 Id. at 314-16.

92 Id. at 317.
deception, reliance or injury is not required in UCL cases. In doing so, the Court emphasized that the UCL is designed to protect the public from fraud and other unlawful conduct, and that “the focus of the statute is on the defendant’s conduct” rather than injury to class members.

Further, addressing what named plaintiffs must plead and prove under the UCL in false advertising cases, as referenced above, the Court rejected the suggestion that Proposition 64’s “as a result of” language “introduced a tort causation element into UCL actions.” Instead, in order for class representatives to establish standing, they must allege “actual reliance,” but within the framework of existing law under, and the traditional broad scope of, the UCL. Therefore, the Court stated:

While a plaintiff must show that the misrepresentation was an immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct, the plaintiff need not demonstrate it was the only cause. It is not necessary that the plaintiff’s reliance upon the truth of the fraudulent misrepresentation be the sole or even the predominant or decisive factor influencing his conduct. It is enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so had been a substantial factor, in influencing his decision. Moreover, a presumption, or at least an inference, of reliance arises wherever there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material. A misrepresentation is judged to be “material” if a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question, and as such materiality is generally a question of fact unless the fact misrepresented is so obviously unimportant that the jury could not reasonably find that a reasonable man would have been influenced by it.

93 Id. at 320-21.
94 Id. at 324.
95 Id. at 325.
96 Id. at 326-28. See In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that named plaintiff could establish standing due to defendant’s failure to warn of the risks associated with certain ingredients in electronic cigarettes but could not establish standing for failure to disclose the names of those harmful ingredients because plaintiff had admitted that even if the names of the ingredients were disclosed he still would have purchased the defendant’s e-cigarettes); Major v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 5:12-cv-03067-EJD, 2015 WL 859491 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2015) (denying class certification for a deceptive advertising claim because the named plaintiff admitted that she did not detrimentally rely on the defendant’s advertisement of “no sugar added” as indicating its products were “low calorie,” which is the deceptive practice contemplated by 21 C.F.R. § 101.6(c)(2) under which she sought to have the class certified), appeal filed, No. 15-15880 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 2015).
97 Id. at 326-27 (internal quotation marks, alteration marks and citations omitted); see also Hale v. Sharp Heathcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 1381-82 (2010) (concluding that Tobacco II’s reliance requirement was applicable under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL where the underlying conduct was alleged misrepresentation); Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F. 3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that plaintiff could not represent class as to time periods in which he did not have standing); see also Machlan, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 960 (discussing differences in standing on UCL claim in state and federal courts and remanding UCL action to state court, holding that claim for injunctive relief under UCL was not justiciable in federal court); Opperman, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 978 (holding “[i]f a plaintiff
In some circumstances, an omission may be considered material for purposes of establishing a claim under the FAL. If the defendant “made a statement, but omitted information that undercuts the veracity of the statement,” then the plaintiff may bring an FAL claim. However, if the defendant “did not make any statement at all about a subject,” then the plaintiff cannot claim that an omission was a material misrepresentation made under the FAL.

b. Distinguishing The Individual Reliance vs. Reasonable Consumer Standards In Evaluating UCL And CLRA Claims

It is worth noting that the “reasonable consumer” standard applied for UCL class certification purposes, “unlike the individual reliance requirement . . . is not a standing requirement.” The “reasonable consumer standard” is used in determining what constitutes a “material misrepresentation” in a class action context. In this respect, courts avoid subjective inquiries into each class members’ experience with the product. Instead, they focus on a defendant’s representations about the product through a single, objective “reasonable consumer” standard. Under this standard, “a misrepresentation [is] material if a reasonable [person] would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.” The fact that some consumers may have purchased the product for other reasons does not defeat a finding that the product was marketed with a material misrepresentation, which establishes an injury. Although individual reliance is not required, in

sufficiently alleges exposure to a long-term advertising campaign as set forth in Tobacco II, she need not plead specific reliance on an individual representation,” and setting forth a six-factor test to prove a Tobacco II type ad campaign); In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (finding an inference of class-wide reliance appropriate for plaintiffs’ California UCL and CLRA claims for purchase of cooking oils labeled “100% Natural” that were allegedly made with genetically modified organisms); but see Haskins v. Symantec Corp., 654 F. App’x 338, 339 (9th Cir. 2016) (Tobacco II’s exception to the individual reliance requirement of UCL standing does not extend to “misrepresentations [that] were not part of an extensive and long-term advertising campaign like the decades-long campaign engaging in saturation advertising targeting adolescents in Tobacco II.”); Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC, 5 Cal. App. 5th 154, 184 (2016), review granted, 388 P.3d 818 (Cal. 2017) (allegations of misleading statements were insufficient to plead reliance when plaintiff did not allege that she actually saw the statements or that they influenced her conduct).

98 Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1023.
99 Id.
100 Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2015) (district court erred when it evaluated consumer standing requirement under a “reasonable consumer standard”).
101 Dei Rossi v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 2:12-CV-00125-TLN, 2015 WL 1932484, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015); see also Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“California courts have held that reasonable reliance is not an element of claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.”).
102 Dei Rossi, 2015 WL 1932484, at *7.
104 Dei Rossi, 2015 WL 1932484, at *7 (holding defendant’s nationwide marketing campaign and prominent display of the energy star logo on all its appliances created a presumption of material reliance by the class upon those representations); but see Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 12-06133 CRB,
order to survive a motion for summary judgment courts have held that plaintiff’s deposition alone is not enough to prove a reasonable consumer could be deceived.105

c. **Tobacco II, Article III Standing And Commonality In Class Actions**

Following Tobacco II, tension has developed between UCL and Article III standing requirements in class actions, and especially when an issue of commonality arises. For instance, in Webb v. Carter’s, Inc.,106 the United States District Court for the Central District of California held that, in federal court, all class members must have Article III standing. The plaintiffs in Webb brought claims under the UCL and CLRA, alleging that they lost the benefit of their bargain by purchasing a defective product—children’s clothing that purportedly contained toxic chemicals that could cause adverse skin reactions.107 Finding that Tobacco II “does not establish that absent class members in a federal class action need not have Article III standing,” the court stated that “[Tobacco II] did not, and could not, hold that uninjured parties could be class members in a class action brought in federal court, despite their lack of Article III standing.”108 “Tobacco II therefore does not persuade the [c]ourt that a class action can proceed even where class members lack Article III standing.”109 Accordingly, because the majority of the children who wore the clothing at issue suffered no adverse effects, the court found that the proposed class members suffered no cognizable injury supporting standing and denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.110

When the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp.,111 however, it held that class certification under Rule 23 does not require proof that all unnamed class members have standing under Article III. Plaintiffs alleged that they were induced by the website presentations and practices of Ticketmaster and a rewards program provider, Entertainment Publications, Inc. (“EPI”), to purchase EPI’s services when they intended to purchase tickets only

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2014 WL 2702726, at *15 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014) (denying class certification where expert offered no objective criteria, such as survey data, to show that defendant’s “all natural” label would be material to a reasonable person), appeal filed, No. 14-16327 (9th Cir. July 15, 2014).


107 Id. at 498.

108 Id. at 497-98 (emphasis in original).

109 Id. at 498.

110 Id. at 498, 500; see also In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d at 1050 (holding that named plaintiff could not establish standing due to defendant’s failure to disclose the names of harmful ingredients in electronic cigarettes because the named plaintiff had admitted that even if the names of the ingredients were disclosed he still would have purchased the e-cigarettes. He thus could not establish pecuniary loss attributable to his reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation in failing to disclose the names of the harmful ingredients).

from Ticketmaster. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on their UCL claims, finding that “individualized proof of reliance and causation would be required.” The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that, “[u]nfortunately, the district court did not have the benefit of [Tobacco II]... when it ruled, and that case makes all the difference in the world.” It noted that “[Tobacco II] decidedly did not change the California rule ‘that relief under the UCL is available without individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury.’” The Ninth Circuit further expressed that “our law keys on the representative party, not all of the class members, and has done so for many years” and reaffirmed that, “‘[i]n a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements... Thus, we consider only whether at least one named plaintiff satisfies the standing requirements...’”

Further, in Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant’s argument that, because Tobacco II focuses only on the standing of the named plaintiff, a proposed class might well fail Article III’s test—i.e., some unnamed class members might not have suffered an injury in fact. In Mazza, plaintiffs represented a nationwide class composed of all consumers who had purchased or leased Honda’s Acura RL vehicles equipped with a Collision Mitigation Braking System (“CMBS”). Plaintiffs alleged that Honda’s advertisements misrepresented the characteristics of the CMBS and omitted material information about the CMBS’s limitations, in violation of the UCL, the CLRA and the FAL. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.

The Ninth Circuit granted Honda’s interlocutory appeal and vacated the certification order, finding that the district court erred in concluding that common issues of law and fact predominated. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that individualized reliance issues precluded certification because each class member could not be presumed to have relied on the alleged misleading advertising given the limited scale of Honda’s advertising campaign.

In explaining its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[I]t is likely that many class members were never exposed to the allegedly misleading advertisements, insofar as advertising of the [CMBS] was very limited” and “[a] presumption of reliance does not arise when class members were exposed to quite disparate information from various representatives of the defendant.” Unlike the advertising campaign at issue in Tobacco II, which continued for

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112 Id. at 1017.
113 Id. at 1020.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1021 (quoting Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007)).
117 666 F.3d 581, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2012).
118 Id. at 585.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 587.
121 Id. at 585, 588.
122 Id. at 585, 595-96.
123 Id. at 595-96.
many years and delivered a consistent message, Honda’s advertising took place over one year in the form of TV commercials and magazine advertisements. Honda later advertised through product brochures and video kiosks at Acura dealerships and a website designed for Acura owners. Honda’s advertising campaign thus “[fell] short of the ‘extensive and long-term [fraudulent] advertising campaign’” examined in Tobacco II. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, absent a Tobacco II-like advertising campaign, “the relevant class must be defined in such a way as to include only members who were exposed to advertising that is alleged to be materially misleading.”

On the other hand, in Opperman v. Path, Inc., a district court held that the plaintiffs’ allegation of a Tobacco II-like advertising campaign was sufficient to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. In Opperman, plaintiffs represented a putative class composed of consumers that owned one or more of three Apple products at issue (the iPhone, iPad, and/or iPod touch) during the class period. Plaintiffs alleged that Apple engaged in a Tobacco II-like advertising campaign, whereby it “consciously and continually misrepresented its iDevices as secure, and that the personal information contained on iDevices—including, specifically, address books—could not be taken without owners’ consent.” Defendant Apple moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ UCL and CLRA claims for failure to prove either reliance, or that the alleged misrepresentations had “been part of an extensive and long-term advertising campaign” under Tobacco II. The district court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a Tobacco II advertising campaign.

In reaching this conclusion, the district court applied Tobacco II’s six-factor test. In order to plead an advertising campaign in accordance with Tobacco II, the following factors must be met: (1) plaintiffs must allege “[the individual named plaintiffs] actually saw or heard the...
defendant’s advertising campaign,” (2) “the advertising campaign must be sufficiently lengthy in duration, and widespread in dissemination, that it would be unrealistic to require the plaintiff to plead each misrepresentation she saw and relied upon,” (3) “the plaintiff must describe in the complaint, and preferably attach to it, a representative sample of the advertisements at issue so as to adequately notify the defendant of the precise nature of the misrepresentation claim….,” (4) “the plaintiff must allege, and the court must evaluate, the degree to which the alleged misrepresentations contained within the advertising campaign are similar to each other,” (5) “each plaintiff must plead with particularity and separately, when and how they were exposed to the advertising campaign, so as to ensure the advertisements were representations consumers were likely to have viewed, rather than representations that were isolated or more narrowly disseminated,” and (6) “the court must be able to determine when a plaintiff made his or her purchase or otherwise relied on defendant’s advertising campaign, so as to determine which portion of that campaign is relevant.”

Having considered these six factors, the district court held that plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as a whole, were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

The court then went on to address Article III standing to seek injunctive relief. It held that plaintiffs were unable to allege a real or immediate threat that they would be wronged again, as required to prove injury in fact to satisfy the Article III standing requirement. Specifically, the court noted that “it is clear that a Plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must allege at least a willingness to consider purchasing the product at issue in the future.” Because the plaintiffs in Opperman failed to make any such allegation, the court held that they lacked standing to seek injunctive relief.

Both Mazza and Opperman demonstrate how the issues of standing and commonality have become intertwined. Other courts have engaged in similar reasoning. For instance, in Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., the Court of Appeal noted: “Tobacco II held that, for purposes of standing in context of the class certification issue in a ‘false advertising’ case involving the UCL, the class members need not be assessed for the element of reliance. Or, in other words, class certification may not be defeated on the ground of lack of standing upon a showing that class members did not rely on false advertising.” But the court also stated that there is “no language in Tobacco II which suggests . . . that the . . . Court intended . . . to dispatch with an examination of commonality when addressing a motion for class certification.” Accordingly, the court stated that, when examining commonality, a “proper criterion for . . . consideration” is whether the UCL claim would involve “factual questions associated with [proposed class members’] reliance” on allegedly false representations.

Referencing Tobacco II, and affirming denial of

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133 Id.
134 Id. at 983.
135 Id. at 987.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 988.
139 Id.
140 Id.
class certification, the court emphasized that “we do not understand the UCL to authorize an award for injunctive relief and/or restitution on behalf of a consumer who was never exposed in any way to an allegedly wrongful business practice.”

Similarly, in *Avritt v. Reliastar Life Insurance Co.*, the Eighth Circuit, affirming the district court’s denial of class certification, noted that “it is not clear that the California Supreme Court’s discussion of standing in *Tobacco II* was meant to have any bearing on whether a plaintiff can satisfy the class certification requirement that common questions of law or fact predominate.” The Eighth Circuit went on to find that, despite the uncertainty of UCL jurisprudence, “there is reason to doubt that the holding in *Tobacco II* goes as far as . . . eliminating any need to show that unnamed class members relied on any misrepresentations or were actually injured.”

California courts have established other limitations for purposes of standing in the class action context for non-purchased products under the UCL. For example, to prevail on such claims, plaintiffs must detail why the products are substantially similar to those actually purchased. In *Astiana*, the court found sufficient similarity where the plaintiffs challenged the same kind of food product (i.e., ice cream) as well as the same labels for all of the products—i.e., “All Natural Flavors” for the Dreyer’s/Edy’s products and “All Natural Ice Cream” for the Haagen-Dazs products. There, the court found that though the ice creams may ultimately have had different ingredients, plaintiffs were not prohibited from bringing their claims because they challenged the same basic mislabeling practice across different product flavors. Similarly, in *Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co.*, the court held that the plaintiff, who purchased several flavors of at-

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141 *Id.* at 980; see also *Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., Inc.*, 272 F.R.D. 517, 539–41 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ( likening the case to *Cohen*, but denying plaintiff’s motion for class certification because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) were satisfied); *Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp.*, No. 08-04878 CW, 2010 WL 4807095, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (distinguishing *Cohen*, the court approved a narrower class, including only California residents who actually received alleged deceptive advertising; also, noting that, on UCL fraud claims, “material misrepresentation results in a presumption, or at least an inference, of individualized reliance”). In April 2010, the California Supreme Court declined to resolve this split in rulings over *Tobacco II*’s impact on class certification issues. See *Weinstat v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc.*, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1218, 1224 (2010).

142 615 F.3d 1023, 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).

143 *Id.* at 1034.

144 See, e.g., *Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co.*, 912 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012); *Stephenson v. Neutrogena*, No. 12-cv-00426 PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105099, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2012) ( dismissing claims based on products not purchased because the purchased products were not “similar enough to the unpurchased products such that an individualized factual inquiry was not needed for each product”); *Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc.*, No. C-11-2910 EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012) ( noting that in most reasoned opinions, “the critical inquiry seems to be whether there is sufficient similarity between the products purchased and not purchased”); *Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co.*, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1005–06 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (relying on *Astiana* for the same proposition); *Arrovo*, 2015 WL 5698752, at *4 ( dismissing plaintiff’s UCL and CLRA claims because plaintiff conceded he never viewed the non-purchased products’ marketing materials and failed to plead how non-purchased products were substantially similar to those models purchased).

home smoothie kits labeled “All Natural,” had standing to bring claims on behalf of purchasers of other flavors because the products were sufficiently similar and because the “same alleged misrepresentation was on all of the smoothie kit[s] regardless of flavor . . . .”146

II. LIABILITY UNDER THE UCL

A. Claims For “Unlawful” Conduct

1. The Liability Standard

Put simply, a practice is “unlawful” if it violates a law other than the UCL. The UCL “‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats these violations, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under [the UCL].”147 “Unlawful” claims have been predicated on numerous laws and regulations existing at various levels of government, including: federal statutes;148 federal regulations;149 state statutes;150 state

146 888 F. Supp. 2d at 1006.
regulations; prior case law; standards of professional conduct; and common law doctrines. To plead a UCL claim based on an “unlawful” practice, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of the underlying law and, given Proposition 64’s standing requirement, should be required to allege facts demonstrating the resulting harm.

Historically, courts have imposed some limitations on the broad “borrowing” of underlying law that is permitted on unlawful claims. However, the California Supreme Court...
issued a pair of decisions in 2013 making clear that federal and state statutes that have no private right of action and that, indeed, bar private rights of action can nonetheless serve as a basis for a UCL “unlawful” violation.

In Rose v. Bank America, N.A., plaintiffs alleged a claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL based on alleged violations of TISA, a statute that Congress had amended to remove any private right of action, but left a section permitting states to maintain laws that are consistent with TISA. The California Supreme Court allowed the claim to stand, reasoning that “Plaintiffs are not suing to enforce TISA, nor do they seek damages for TISA violations. Instead, they pursue the equitable remedies of restitution and injunctive relief, invoking the UCL’s restraints against unfair competition. Doing so is entirely consistent with the congressional intent reflected in the terms and history of TISA. Congress expressly left the door open for the operation of state laws that hold banks to standards equivalent to those of TISA.” The Court further reasoned that “[t]o forestall an action under the [UCL], another provision must actually ‘bar’ the action or clearly permit the conduct.”

The same day that it issued Rose, the California Supreme Court also handed down its opinion in Zhang v. Superior Court. In Zhang, the Court held that plaintiffs may sue insurers under the UCL based on violations of state insurance laws even though the insurance code precludes a private right of action. Plaintiffs had alleged “causes of action for false advertising and insurance bad faith,” which the court reasoned “provide grounds for a UCL claim independent from” the Insurance Code sections that otherwise bar private claims. The Court held that while private actions under the insurance code section at issue are barred, “when insurers engage in conduct that violates both the [Insurance Code section] and obligations imposed by other statutes or the common law, a UCL action may lie.”

1441, 1447 (2011) (holding that the UCL could not be used to redress violations of the Truth in Savings Act (“TISA”) because Congress’ repeal of the statutory right of consumers to enforce TISA bars all private actions; the UCL cannot be used to “plead around” this bar), rev’d, Rose v. Bank of Am., N.A., 57 Cal. 4th 390 (2013); but see Stop Youth Addiction, 17 Cal. 4th at 563–66 (UCL action not barred simply because it was predicated upon a statute that does not expressly provide a private right of action); AICCO, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 90 Cal. App. 4th 579, 597 (2001) (plaintiffs allowed to plead around the bar to private causes of action under California’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act (“UIPA”) by recasting as UCL action); Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1103–06 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff should not be permitted to use UCL claims as an end run around the prohibition of private rights of action under the UIPA and reasoning that predicate statute must actually bar the action or clearly permit the conduct), aff’d sub nom. Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004); Mansner, 2008 WL 5114619, at *7; Hawaiian Gardens Casino, 170 Cal. App. 4th at 477 (allowing claim based on California Labor Code provisions that did not provide for a private right of action).

158 57 Cal. 4th 390, 393 (2013).
159 Id. at 397.
160 Id. at 398.
162 Id. at 369.
163 Id. at 384.
Notwithstanding the decisions in Rose and Zhang, however, the Northern District of California held in Newton v. American Debt Services, Inc. that the violation of an FDIC consent order cannot form the basis of a UCL claim for “unlawful” or “unfair” conduct. The court emphasized that the FDIC entered its consent order pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818, which precludes a court from “affect[ing] by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order [issued under this section], or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside such notice or order.” The court determined that allowing a plaintiff “to ‘borrow’ the FDIC Order as predicate authority for a UCL violation, and thereby ... litigate her claims that [the defendant] acted unlawfully by contravening that Order, it most certainly would ‘affect ... enforcement’ of the Order.” Potentially limiting the scope of its ruling, however, the court noted, “What [12 U.S.C. § 1818] bars is enforcement of an FDIC cease and desist order itself (as distinct from the substantive regulatory law being enforced).”

2. Defenses Specific To Unlawful Claims
   a. Defense To Underlying Violation

An affirmative defense to a violation of the underlying law is also a defense to the attendant unlawful claim. Similarly, a defendant’s full compliance with the underlying law is a defense to an unlawful claim. As discussed below, however, a statute of limitations defense to the underlying claim will not defeat a UCL unlawful claim. Furthermore, at least some equitable defenses have been held not to apply to unlawful claims.

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164 75 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
165 Id. at 1058.
166 Id. at 1059.
167 Id.
168 See Hobby Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Younger, 101 Cal. App. 3d 358, 372 (1980); see also Aquino v. Credit Control Servs., 4 F. Supp. 2d 927, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (dismissing UCL action where plaintiff failed to “set forth any factual allegations that the defendant’s approach violated any state or federal provisions”); Metro Publ’g, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 861 F. Supp. 870, 881 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (dismissing UCL claim after underlying trademark infringement and dilution claims were dismissed); Fabozzi v. StubHub, Inc., No. C-11-4385 EMC, 2012 WL 506330, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (plaintiff’s claim, based on defendant’s failure to disclose, was defeated where the underlying statute did not contain a disclosure obligation and, thus, was not breached).
169 See McCann v. Lucky Money, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1382, 1397-98 (2005) (holding that California law did not require money transmitters to disclose wholesale rate of exchange; disclosure of retail rate was sufficient); Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 329 (1985); Hawkins v. Kellogg Co., No. 16-cv-0147-JAH (JMA), 2016 WL 7210381, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016) (dismissing UCL claim because defendant’s use of partially hydrogenated oil (PHO) was permitted until June 2018 per FDA regulation and subsequent congressional ratification, and thus not a violation of the federal laws predating the UCL claim), appeal filed, No. 17-55035 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2017); but see Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 530-31 (stating that defendant’s substantial compliance with the underlying law is not a defense).
b. Change In Underlying Law

A defense may arise by virtue of a change in the underlying law or repeal of the underlying law before the plaintiff obtains final judgment on an unlawful claim.171

B. Claims For “Unfair” Conduct

1. The Liability Standard

The “unfair” prong has been interpreted to allow courts maximum discretion to address improper business practices,172 and no certain definition of “unfairness” in the consumer context has yet been formulated.173 In the past, courts frequently used one of two tests. The first “involves an examination of [the practice’s] impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer.”174 In brief, “the court must weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim . . . .”175 In the second, courts adopted language from FTC guidelines, which define “unfair” conduct with reference to section 5 of the FTC Act.176 Under this test, a business act is

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171 See Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist. v. Mann, 18 Cal. 3d 819, 829 (1977) (recognizing California’s general rule that “a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with a repeal of the statute”); Californians For Disability Rights, 39 Cal. 4th at 233 (finding that Proposition 64 applied to then-pending actions).


173 See Mui Ho v. Toyota Motor Corp., 931 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1000 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“California courts and the legislature have not specified which of several possible ‘unfairness’ standards is the proper one.”); Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., No. 10-CV-01455-LHK, 2010 WL 3910169, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (“California law is currently unsettled with regard to the correct standard to apply to consumer suits alleging claims under the unfair prong of the UCL.”).


175 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 45 Cal. App. 4th at 1104 (citations omitted); see also Hutchinson v. AT&T Internet Servs., Inc., No. CV07-3674 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 1726344, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (applying the test); In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d at 990 (applying balancing test and allowing UCL claim under unfair prong for data breach claims because of “California’s public policy of protecting customer data,” notwithstanding defendants’ contention that plaintiffs failed to allege that the data breach was immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers) (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1227).

176 See Hutchinson, 2009 WL 1726344, at *8 (noting that California courts have adopted the FTC guidelines established in F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972)); but see Vasic, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 1043 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has rejected the use of the FTC test in the consumer context because it focuses on ‘anti-consumer conduct’ as opposed to ‘anti-competitive conduct.’”) (quoting Backus v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 909, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-16658 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 2016)).
“unfair” when it “offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”

Over the years, many courts have criticized these definitions of “unfairness” as vague and amorphous. Indeed, in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Telephone Co., the California Supreme Court rejected the definitions in the context of a non-consumer claim, and criticized their use in consumer cases, as well. In so doing, the Court sympathized with “the need for California businesses to know, to a reasonable certainty, what conduct California law prohibits and what it permits.” The Court then articulated a “more precise test” for determining what is “unfair” in litigation involving competitors, drawing from principles of federal law pursuant to section 5 of the FTCA. However, the Court did not articulate a test applicable to the consumer context.

The various criticisms of the consumer definitions, including by the California Supreme Court in Cel-Tech, seemingly have spurred the Court of Appeal to attempt to remedy the situation. As an initial matter, certain courts have confirmed that, where a claim of unfairness is predicated on public policy, such public policy must be “‘tethered’ to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.” Moreover, in In re Firearm Cases, the Court of Appeal, 20 Cal. 4th at 185 (“We believe these definitions are too amorphous and provide too little guidance to courts and businesses.”). Id. (“An undefined standard of what is ‘unfair’ fails to give businesses adequate guidelines as to what conduct may be challenged and thus enjoined and may sanction arbitrary or unpredictable decisions about what is fair or unfair.”). Specifically, the Court adopted the following test for “unfair” business practices involving competitors:

When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor’s ‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.

Id. at 187. In addition, the Court stated that “[o]ur notice of federal law under section 5 means only that federal cases interpreting the prohibition against ‘unfair methods of competition’ may assist us in determining whether a particular challenged act or practice is unfair under the test we adopt.” Id. at 186 n.11.

Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 4th 845, 854 (2002) (stating that Cel-Tech “may signal a narrower interpretation of the prohibition of unfair acts or practices in all unfair competition actions and provides reason for caution in relying on the broad language in earlier decisions that the court found to be ‘too amorphous’” and requiring that UCL “unfair” claims based on public policy be
First District, held that in order to prove “unfairness,” the plaintiff must establish some causal link between the defendant’s business practice and the alleged harm to the public. Further, in Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern California, the Court of Appeal, Second District, articulated a very precise test. Relying again on the language of and policy considerations underlying section 5 of the FTCA, the court concluded that the elements of “unfair” conduct are: “(1) [t]he consumer injury must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.”

Given the various tests articulated by the Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court or the Legislature may ultimately determine what the test should be. At this point, it is an open issue for both courts and litigants as to which articulated test will govern an “unfairness” claim.
2. Defenses To Claims Of “Unfairness”

a. Conduct Is Not “Unfair”

The principal defense is straightforward: The conduct is not unfair pursuant to the test that the court chooses to apply. For example, in Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., plaintiffs challenged as unfair the defendant’s practice of passing on the actual cost of conducting property inspections to delinquent mortgage borrowers. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, which was affirmed. The Court of Appeal reasoned that defendant’s practice of passing on the actual cost of property inspection fees was not “unfair” as a matter of law because the small cost of the inspections (at most, $12) was insignificant when compared to their utility—protecting the real estate securing the loan. Similarly, in Bickoff, it was not unfair for a bank to foreclose on an overdue construction loan where it had never guaranteed permanent financing; and in Harris v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., it was not unfair for a bank to record a notice of default against secured real property at the same time as the borrower was preparing, but had not completed, a borrower’s loan modification application. In Abramson, the court recognized that while the definition of “unfair” conduct has been in flux in California courts, the test articulated in Camacho is a ‘better’ test to determine whether a plaintiff has met the heightened pleading standard.

b. Business Justification

A defendant may use the reasons, justifications and motives underlying the challenged business practice to show that it is not “unfair.” For example, a defendant may claim that the

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187 Id. at 1176 (“There is nothing ‘unethical’ about passing a reasonable cost of protecting the security to a defaulting borrower.”); see also Hutchinson, 2009 WL 1726344, at *8 (concluding that an early termination fee served legitimate interests and, thus, was not unfair); Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 12-04000 SC, 2013 WL 57861, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013) (finding that late fee provision in a contract was not unfair as plaintiff could not establish that injury was substantial or that plaintiff could not have avoided alleged injury); but see Bretches v. OneWest Bank, No. B238686, 2012 WL 6616478, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2012) (finding that a systematic breach of standard consumer contracts can constitute an unfair business practice under the UCL).
188 2016 WL 3280439, at *15-16.
190 155 F. Supp. 3d 1056 at 1066.
challenged conduct is an essential part of its business operations or that it is acting consistent with industry practice for an important reason.\textsuperscript{192}

c. Alternative Source Defense

A defendant may defeat a claim of unfairness by showing that the consumer had a “reasonably available alternative source[] of supply.”\textsuperscript{193} Derived from cases addressing the doctrine of unconscionability, this defense arises from the notion that a business practice is not “unfair” if the same service or product, without the allegedly offensive term, is available either from the defendant or from the defendant’s competitors.\textsuperscript{194} Similarly, where the plaintiff had a “choice” in performing some act, such as entering into an obligation, a defendant may argue that the challenged conduct is not “unfair.”\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{192} See Walker, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 1175; Kunert v. Mission Fin. Servs. Corp., 110 Cal. App. 4th 242, 265 (2003) (finding that the “unfair” prong of the UCL was not intended to eliminate retailers’ profits in action challenging payment of a dealer reserve); Byars v. SCME Mortg. Bankers, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 1134, 1149 (2003) (holding that a lender’s payment of a yield spread premium (“YSP”) to a broker did not violate the UCL on various grounds, including because YSPs are “widespread and commonly used as a method to compensate mortgage brokers for services provided to borrowers and the lender”). Nonetheless, compliance with industry practice in and of itself, without a link to a justifiable business concern, probably is not a defense; Chern v. Bank of Am., 15 Cal. 3d 866, 876 (1976) (stating that lender’s calculation of “per annum” interest rate based on 360-day year could violate the UCL, notwithstanding that such practice was “customary” in the banking community); but see S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 861 (1999) (finding a similar method to calculate interest in an ongoing business relationship between sophisticated businesses did not violate the UCL).


\textsuperscript{194} See, e.g., Shadoan v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 219 Cal. App. 3d 97, 103, 106 (1990) (holding prepayment penalty on a home loan to be invalid basis for UCL claim where defendant had simultaneously offered other similar products without the disputed term); Dean Witter, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 772 (holding that, because defendants’ competitors were not charging an IRA close-out fee, plaintiff had a meaningful choice and, therefore, such fees were not unconscionable); accord Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 209 (1994) (holding that a $3 NSF fee charged to retailers was not unconscionable because the fee was at the low end of the scale when compared to the fees charged by other institutions).

\textsuperscript{195} See, e.g., Olsen v. Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 608, 628-29 (1996) (affirming summary adjudication against plaintiff on UCL claim involving alleged “unfair” contractual releases relating to ski bindings since consumers had a choice in the matter—they did not have to ski).
d. “Safe Harbor” Defense – Conduct Explicitly Authorized By Law

A defense exists where the business practice at issue is expressly authorized by statute. However, the legislature’s mere “failure to prohibit” the challenged conduct is not sufficient to bar a UCL unfairness claim.

C. Claims For “Fraudulent” Conduct

1. The Liability Standard

As noted above, in Tobacco II, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the line of decisions stating that UCL claims premised on fraudulent conduct do not require proof of intent, reliance or damages (setting aside the issue of standing for named plaintiffs). Rather, under

196 See Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 183 (“Acts that the Legislature has determined to be lawful may not form the basis for an action under the unfair competition law.”); Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying California’s safe harbor doctrine, where “courts may not use the [UCL] to condemn actions the Legislature permits,” and affirming dismissal of UCL claim because gasoline dispensing design was certified by the California Department of Food and Agriculture’s Division of Measurement Standards, and therefore permitted by law); Lopez v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 201 Cal. App. 4th 572, 576-79 (2011) (plaintiffs contended that defendants violated the UCL by designing vehicle odometers that allegedly over-registered mileage by two percent; the court affirmed dismissal on grounds that Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12500 provides a tolerance of plus or minus four percent); Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, 552 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that safe harbor applied when credit card issuer complied with disclosure provisions of TILA); Suzuki v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., No. C 06-07289 MHP, 2007 WL 2070263, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2007) (same); Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 69 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1505 (1999) (“A business practice cannot be unfair if it is permitted by law.”) (citation omitted); Hobby Indus. Ass’n of Am., 101 Cal. App. 3d at 369-70 (dismissing UCL action against wholesalers and retailers for sale of certain prohibited packages because the statute prohibiting such packages explicitly exempted wholesalers and retailers); Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp., 93 Cal. App. 4th 363, 375 (2001) (holding that conduct permissible under doctrine enunciated in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), could not be deemed “unfair” as a matter of law).

197 See Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 184 (finding that “the Legislature’s mere failure to prohibit an activity does not prevent a court from finding it unfair”); Ebner, 838 F.3d 958 (safe harbor doctrine barred claim that an accurate net weight statement for lip balm was deceptive, but did not bar separate omission claim regarding product accessibility because omitting supplemental statements on cosmetic labels was not affirmatively permitted by statute); McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 972; Motors, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d at 741; see also Thompson v. Am. Tow Serv., No. A114373, 2007 WL 3045195, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2007) (holding that municipal ordinance cannot establish safe harbor under the UCL); Ramirez v. Balboa Thrift & Loan, 215 Cal. App. 4th 765, 774, 77-78, 780-81 (2013) (reversing denial of class certification because defendant was not entitled to assert the Rees-Levering Act’s safe harbor that it properly denied reinstatement of defaulted auto loans as a basis for opposing certification); Rojas v. Platinum Auto Grp., Inc., 212 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1005 (2013) (reversing demurrer because plaintiff “need not have suffered actual damage from Platinum’s violation of the [Rees-Levering Act’s] disclosure requirements” where alleged disclosure violations were “trivial”).

198 Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 320-21.
those decisions, a plaintiff must show only that members of the public were likely to be deceived.199

In Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co.,200 the Court of Appeal held that trial courts faced with fraudulent or false advertising claims must apply an “ordinary consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances” standard, rather than a “least sophisticated consumer” standard. In Lavie, a consumer who had an ulcer that started to bleed after ingestion of Aleve pain reliever sued defendant for stating in television commercials that Aleve was gentler to the stomach lining than aspirin. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant, holding that the statements were true and not likely to deceive reasonable consumers. The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that California and federal courts had never applied a “least sophisticated consumer” standard absent evidence that an advertisement targeted particularly vulnerable customers.201 “A representation does not become false and deceptive merely because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed.”202 The court warned, however, that, “[w]here the advertising or practice is targeted to a particular group or type of consumers, either more sophisticated or less sophisticated than the ordinary consumer, the question whether it is misleading to the public will be viewed from the vantage point of members of the targeted group, not others to whom it is not primarily directed.”203

199 See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1288; Chapman v. Skype Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 217, 227-30 (2013) (holding that “consumers are likely to believe that Skype’s ‘Unlimited US & Canada’ [] calling plan offers unlimited calling within the United States and Canada for a fixed monthly fee and that they will fail to notice the disclosure to the contrary in the fair usage policy” and reversing summary judgment because “whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived by the representation that the calling plan is ‘Unlimited’ is a question of fact”); West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 214 Cal. App. 4th 780, 806 (2013) (finding complaint stated claims for “unfair or fraudulent practices” where plaintiff alleged that bank’s temporary loan modification program did not comply with federal law, and that bank made misrepresentations regarding borrower’s right to challenge bank’s calculations and pending foreclosure sales, and wrongfully conducted a foreclosure sale when the borrower was in compliance with their temporary loan modification); Glaski v. Bank of Am., N.A., 218 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 1101 (2013) (allegations of wrongful foreclosure stated UCL claim); Rufini v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 4th 299, 311 (2014) (same).


201 Id. at 504.

202 Id. at 507 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

203 Id. at 512; see also Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1360 (2003) (confirming the reasonable consumer standard applied in Lavie); In re Onstar Contract Litig., 278 F.R.D. 352, 378 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (where putative class members received different disclosures from different sources and disclosures changed over time, court found it “impossible” to apply a reasonable consumer standard as to reliance class-wide), appeal filed, No. 12-101 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2012); but see People v. Cole, 113 Cal. App. 4th 955, 980 (2003) (reasoning that, even under a reasonable consumer standard, a reasonable consumer may be “unwary or trusting,” “need not be exceptionally acute and sophisticated” and that “courts simply recognize that the general public is more gullible than the sophisticated buyer”) (internal quotations and citations omitted), aff’d, 38 Cal. 4th 964 (2006).
In contrast, in *Hill v. Roll International Corp.*, plaintiffs alleged that they purchased Fiji bottled water based on an understanding that a green drop depicted on the bottles meant that Fiji bottled water was an environmentally conscious product and endorsed by an environmental organization. However, applying the reasonable consumer standard as outlined in *Lavie*, as well as analyzing examples contained in an FTC guide, the Court of Appeal held that “no reasonable consumer would be misled to think that [a] green drop on Fiji water represents a third party organization’s endorsement or that Fiji water is environmentally superior to that of the competition.” Further, the court noted that “in these days of inevitable and readily available Internet criticism and suspicion of virtually any corporate enterprise, . . . a reasonable consumer also does not include one who is overly suspicious.”

2. Defenses Specific To Fraudulent Claims

a. Conduct Not “Likely To Mislead”

The principal defense to a claim of fraudulent conduct is proof that the challenged business act or practice is not “likely to mislead” an ordinary consumer and thus, has not resulted in any actual injury. The analysis often is fact-specific. Proof might be offered in the form of testimony from experts or randomly selected members of the class represented in the action, and/or consumer surveys. Substantial disclosure of the central challenged practices often is central

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205 Id. at 1301.
206 Id. at 1304.
207 See, e.g., *Sugawara v. Pepsico, Inc.*, No. 2:08-cv-01335-MCE-JFM, 2009 WL 1439115, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2009) (dismissing UCL and CLRA claims where a “reasonable consumer” would not be deceived into believing that a cereal actually contained a fruit called a “crunchberry”); *Kunert*, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 264-65 (holding that payment of dealer reserve in automobile finance contracts was not fraudulent since it was not required to be disclosed and no “reasonable person” would believe that the financing rate in the contract with the dealer is the same rate at which a lender would make a direct loan); *Emery*, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 960 (holding that VISA could not be liable for fraudulent conduct under the UCL where merchants utilized VISA’s logos; use of the logos did not constitute representation by VISA that its merchants’ statements were true and/or not misleading); *Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt.*, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1557 (2007) (concluding that defendant had no duty to disclose financial status and “the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL”) (citing *Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co.*, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 838 (2006)); *Tietsworth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, No. 5:09-CV-00288 JFHRL, 2009 WL 3320486, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2009) (concluding that a mere failure to disclose a latent defect does not constitute a fraudulent business practice as, without a duty to disclose, it is not likely that such a failure would deceive anyone); *Simpson v. The Kroger Corp.*, 219 Cal. App. 4th 1352, 1371-72 (2013) (holding that “labels on the products here clearly informed any reasonable consumer that the products contain both butter and canola or olive oil” and “[n]o reasonable person could purchase these products believing that they had purchased a product containing only butter”); *Rojas v. Gen. Mills, Inc.*, No. 12-cv-055099-WHO, 2014 WL 1248017, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (“100% Natural” and “All Natural” representations on Nature Valley granola bars could mislead a reasonable consumer where the products contained GMOs); *Strumlauf*, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 1025 (denying Starbucks’ motion to dismiss because plaintiffs alleged plausible facts that a reasonable consumer would believe that Starbucks’ serving cup sizes referred to the amount of liquid only and did not include the volume of latte foam).
to defeating a UCL “fraudulent” claim. Where a disputed contractual term is at issue, courts have held that clear, unambiguous language will defeat a fraudulent claim as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{208}

b. “Puffing” Defense

If the claim involves an alleged false representation in connection with a sale of goods, the defendant may argue that the statement was mere “puffing”—sales talk that no reasonable person would rely upon or mistake as a factual claim. For example, in Consumer Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp.,\textsuperscript{209} the Court of Appeal applied a “puffing” defense in holding that certain statements were not actionable under the UCL. The statements at issue consisted of advertisements that defendant’s system provided “crystal clear digital” video or “CD quality” audio. The court reasoned that such statements were not “factual representations,” but rather, were “boasts, all-but-meaningless superlatives, . . . a claim which no reasonable consumer would take as anything more weighty than an advertising slogan.”\textsuperscript{210} It is worth noting that while courts permit sellers to “puff” their products, the question of whether a seller’s representation regarding a

\textsuperscript{208} See Bickoff, 2016 WL 3280439, at *15 (finding that the “public would not be likely to be deceived into thinking permanent financing was guaranteed” because Wells Fargo provided “many statements of limitation and condition” that referenced permanent financing and the absence of permanent financing in the Construction Loan Agreement); Van Ness v. Blue Cross of Cal., 87 Cal. App. 4th 364, 376 (2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant where the language in the health insurance policy and related materials clearly stated the terms of coverage, notwithstanding plaintiff’s assertion that he was misled); Shvarts, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 1160 (per-gallon price for fuel was not deceptive, given full disclosure of charge on rental car contract); but see Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 867, 891-92 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (rejecting argument that disclaimer on back of Joint Juice product would disabuse all reasonable customers of allegedly fraudulent advertising claims that the product relieved osteoarthritis).

\textsuperscript{209} 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1361-62.

\textsuperscript{210} Id. at 1361 n.3 (“The statements are akin to ‘mere puffing,’ which under long-standing law cannot support liability in tort.”) (quoting Hauer v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 111 (1975)); see also Stickrath v. Globalstar, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing UCL and CLRA claims because generalized statements were “mere puffery”); Long v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 06-02816 JW, 2007 WL 2994812, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2007) (same); Haskell v. Time, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1392, 1399-403 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (dismissing most statements in Publisher’s Clearinghouse Sweepstakes solicitations as “puffing” because no reasonable consumer could believe them to be true); Edmundson v. Procter & Gamble Co., 537 F. App’x 708 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissing UCL and CLRA claims because statements were “non-actionable puffery” that was “general, subjective, and cannot be tested”); Nilon v. Nat.-Immunogenics Corp., No. 3:12cv00930-LAB (BGS), 2013 WL 5462288, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) (denying motion for class certification without prejudice because UCL and CLRA claims cannot proceed based on lack of substantiation by scientific evidence of supplement’s efficacy); Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss allegations under UCL of mislabeled branding and unlawful branding regarding natural and health benefit claims on packages and denying preemption based on FDA regulations); Cheramie v. HBB, LLC, 545 F. App’x 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of CLRA claims based on alleged mislabeling of presence of melatonin in product because no reasonable consumer would be misled by package’s clear labeling); Rasmussen v. Apple Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (statements regarding high quality of product did not constitute actionable “misrepresentations about specific or absolute characteristics”).
product is factually specific and materially relied upon by a consumer in making a purchase is still one courts defer to the trier of fact.211

D. General Defenses To UCL Actions

1. Constitutional Challenges

The UCL has survived numerous constitutional challenges based on vagueness212 and due process.213 Although the defense bar has long hoped that the California Supreme Court would address due process considerations, as yet it has declined to do so. Proposition 64, in imposing a standing requirement and requiring compliance with class standards on aggregated claims, may further insulate the UCL from constitutional challenge.

2. First Amendment Defense

In Kasky v. Nike, Inc.,214 the California Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant’s statements made in the course of a public relations campaign were constitutionally protected from suit under the UCL. In response to adverse publicity regarding its overseas labor practices, Nike issued various statements, including in press releases and letters sent to newspaper editors, university presidents and athletic directors.215 Plaintiff alleged that Nike’s comments were false

211 See, e.g., Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 238 Cal. App. 4th 1164, 1176 (2015) (holding plaintiff’s allegations that she purchased her notebook based on an HP advertisement regarding its notebook screens created a triable issue of material fact as to the nature of defendant’s representation and whether the advertisement triggered a duty to disclose the product’s screen defect).

212 See, e.g., People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat’l Researc Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 772 (1962) (holding that former California Civil Code section 3369, the UCL’s predecessor, was not void due to uncertainty and/or vagueness since “[a] statute designed to protect the public good must be upheld unless its nullity clearly, positively and unmistakably appears”); cf. People v. Super. Ct. (Caswell), 46 Cal. 3d 381, 389 (1988) (stating that, to avoid a vagueness challenge, “a statute must be sufficiently definite to provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed. ‘[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’”) (citation omitted).

213 See, e.g., Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., 2 Cal. App. 4th at 343-44 (rejecting a due process challenge to the court’s power to order restitution and/or disgorgement of profits under the UCL where there was no cognizable victim); AT&T Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 707 F.3d 1106, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing district court’s holding that “Due Process Clause will permit the application of California law in a price-fixing case only when a plaintiff purchased the price-fixed goods in California” and holding that “anticompetitive conduct by a defendant within a state that is related to a plaintiff’s alleged injuries and is not ‘slight and casual’ [] establishes a ‘significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’”) (footnote and citation omitted).

214 27 Cal. 4th 939, 948 (2002). Previously, in Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1044-45 (1986), the California Supreme Court held that the failure of the New York Times to include a novel on its bestseller list fit within the free speech protections afforded by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, no matter “‘the label given the stated cause of action . . . .’” Id. at 1042 (citation omitted). Holding that the best seller list was not “commercial speech,” the Court determined that plaintiff’s UCL claim was defeated. Id. at 1048 n.3.

215 Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 948.
and misleading under the UCL. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, holding that Nike’s statements constituted non-commercial speech and were therefore absolutely immune from liability under the UCL. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The California Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Nike’s statements constituted commercial speech subject only to limited protections, which therefore could be the basis of a UCL claim. The Court found that the statements were not fully protected by the First Amendment because they did not deal with important issues of public concern. Also, applying a three-part analysis, the Court reasoned that commercial speech arises from: (a) a commercial speaker; (b) an intent to address a commercial audience; and (c) factual representations of a commercial nature.

Although the United States Supreme Court initially granted certiorari, it subsequently dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. Nike therefore remains good law.

3. Statute Of Limitations

The statute of limitations for UCL actions is “four years after the cause of action accrued.” The doctrine of equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment has been applied to UCL claims. California’s trial courts have been in conflict, however, as to whether the “discovery rule” applies to UCL claims, as have been the federal courts. In 2013, the

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216 Id.
217 Id. at 970.
218 Id. at 962, 964-65.
219 Id. at 963-64.
223 Compare Snapp, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 891 (“The ‘discovery rule,’ which delays accrual of certain causes of action until the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of facts giving rise to the claim, does not apply to unfair competition actions.” Thus, the statute begins to run “irrespective of whether plaintiff knew of its accrual, unless [the] plaintiff can successfully invoke the equitable tolling doctrine.”) (citation omitted), and Rambus Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. C-05-00334 RMW, 2007 WL 39374, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2007) (holding that discovery rule does not apply to UCL claims), with Broberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 171 Cal. App. 4th 912, 920-21 (2009) (noting that courts disagree as to whether the discovery rule applies); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1295 (noting that the statute of limitations for the UCL “will probably run from the time a reasonable person would have discovered the basis for a claim”); Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slutterback Corp., 82 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1030 (2000) (inferring that the discovery rule applies to UCL claims).
California Supreme Court held in *Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc.* that common law accrual doctrines are applicable to causes of action under the UCL.

There are two accrual doctrines: the *continuing violation* doctrine and the *continuous accrual* doctrine. The *continuing violation* doctrine extends the time to file a lawsuit when plaintiff's injury allegedly is caused by a series of small and related harms, making it difficult to determine when the actionable injury accrued. This doctrine may allow plaintiff to recover for earlier harm, even if the violations began years before the limitations period. By contrast, the *continuous accrual* doctrine extends the time to file a lawsuit when plaintiff allegedly is injured by a recurring or similar event and the injury caused by each event is sufficient to constitute the basis of its own independent lawsuit. This doctrine may save the claim from a time bar, but limits plaintiff's damages to those suffered during the limitations period. In *Aryeh*, the Court applied the continuous accrual doctrine to a UCL claim and suggested that this doctrine may apply to many types of UCL cases going forward. The courts are still evaluating the impact of *Aryeh* on claims that may previously have been found to be time-barred.

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225 55 Cal. 4th 1185 (2013).

226 See, e.g., *Hameed v. IHOP Franchising LLC*, 520 F. App’x 520, 522 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that continuous accrual theory did not permit time barred UCL claim to proceed because plaintiff did not allege a recurring wrongful act but that contract terms were unfair); *Plumlee v. Pfizer, Inc.*, No. 13-CV-00414-LHK, 2014 WL 695024, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (granting judgment on pleadings with leave to amend where plaintiff failed to meet “burden of pleading the time and manner of discovery, or of pleading facts that show her diligence” because plaintiff’s allegations provided “no basis for the Court to conclude she was unable to discover such facts earlier despite reasonable diligence”); *Allen v. Similasan Corp.*, No. 12CV0376-BTM-WMC, 2013 WL 5436648, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) (granting leave to amend as to tolling of UCL claim where court found “no reason this doctrine should not apply, as the Plaintiffs made discrete purchases of different products over many years”); *Crown Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors, LLC*, No. 13-CV-01362-TEH, 2014 WL 246500, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014) (“As the underlying cause of action is a RICO violation, the accrual rule of injury discovery that applies to the RICO claim also applies to the UCL claim” which was barred because “[i]f its injury is the alleged forced sale [] then its claim accrued in October 2008. If its injury is the breach of its side agreement . . . then its claim accrued at the time of the first breach in November 2008.”); *Ortega v. Nat. Balance Inc.*, No. CV 13-05942 ABC EX, 2013 WL 6596792, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) (finding that “[p]laintiffs sufficiently pled delayed discovery as to their own claims” and “pledged generalized allegations consistent with the elements of the delayed discovery rule” and rejecting assertion that allegations were too conclusory); *Irving v. Lennar Corp.*, No. 2:12-CV-0290 KJM EFB, 2013 WL 4900402, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2013) (applying *Aryeh* and granting leave to amend where “plaintiffs have not adequately alleged what caused them to suspect they were injured and the cause of the injury”); *Tarsha v. Bank of Am., N.A.*, No. 11-CV-928 W MDD, 2013 WL 1316682, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (finding allegations failed to invoke discovery rule even if *Aryeh* applied); *Wilson v. Household Fin. Corp.*, No. CIV S-12-1413 KJM AC, 2013 WL 1310589, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (applying *Aryeh* but holding certain UCL claims barred where “plaintiffs had copies of the documents relating to their loan but did not examine them until 2011 . . . That plaintiffs may not have been prudent in their business dealings does not show they may rely on the
A plaintiff also may use the UCL to obtain a longer statute of limitations than would apply
to a law giving rise to a claim for “unlawful” conduct. In *Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration
Products Co.*, the California Supreme Court held that the UCL’s four-year statute of
limitations applied, rather than the three-year statute of limitations under the provisions of the
Labor Code that formed the basis of the claim. The Court simply concluded that “any UCL
cause of action is subject to the four-year period of limitations created by that section.”


Businesses often include contractual choice-of-law or forum-selection provisions in their
consumer contracts. Courts sometimes enforce such provisions in consumer agreements, and
defense counsel should remain alert as to whether a matter involves a provision that may provide
the basis for a defense to a UCL claim.

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227 23 Cal. 4th at 179.
228 *Id.; see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels*, 816 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2016) (rejecting a preemption
argument and finding that plaintiff’s claims were not time barred because the UCL’s “more generous
four-year statute of limitations” governed rather than the underlying Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act (ILSA)); but see *Camillo v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A.*, No. 1:09-CV-1548 AWI SMS,
2009 WL 3614793, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009) (plaintiff cannot avoid an absolute bar to relief, i.e.,
the statute of limitations, by characterizing the claim as one for unfair competition); *Yeager v. Bowlin,*
No. CIV. 2:08-102 WBS JFM, 2010 WL 95242, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010) (the UCL is subject to
the single publication rule, which provides that no person shall have more than one claim for damages
for invasion of privacy, and the limitations period commences upon the first distribution of the
publication to the public); *Jordan v. Paul Fin., LLC*, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(explaining that, to the extent plaintiffs sought to plead around TILA’s one-year statute of limitations by
using the UCL, the claim was preempted by TILA); *Arias v. Capital One, N.A.*, No. C 10-1123 MHP,
2011 WL 835610, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011) (holding that plaintiffs’ UCL claim was not viable
because underlying TILA claims were time-barred); *Kohl v. Am. Home Shield Corp.*, No. 11CV0700
entirely on the application of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), the court concluded
that RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations applied to plaintiff’s UCL claim).

attorney general action); but see *Am. Online, Inc. v. Super. Ct.,* 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 15 (2001)
(refusing to enforce choice-of-forum provision in consumer agreement); *GMAC Com. Fin. LLC v. Super.
(striking forum-selection clause as unreasonable in putative class action to redress de
minimis claims).

230 The California tests for the enforceability and scope of choice-of-law provisions in consumer
agreements are discussed in *Wash. Mut. Bank, FA v. Super. Ct. (Brinson)*, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 916-17
(2001), and *Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Super. Ct.*, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 466 (1992); see also *MediMatch, Inc. v.
Lucent Techs. Inc.*, 120 F. Supp. 2d 842, 861-62 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that UCL action could not
5. Preventing the “End Run”

Defendants sometimes can argue that a UCL plaintiff may be attempting to “end run” a restriction associated with some other law. Such an “end run” may provide a defense to the UCL claim. Conversely, one court rejected an attempt to plead a breach of contract claim based on the theory that compliance with applicable statutes, including the UCL and CLRA, is an implied term of every contract.

6. Federal Preemption

Federally regulated businesses frequently invoke federal preemption in defending UCL actions, and the case law is extensive. For example, many courts have addressed the application of preemption with respect to banking laws. Courts have also addressed

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231 See Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 824 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that plaintiff was prohibited from “bootstrap[ping]” an unfair-competition claim using a failed breach-of-contract claim, because “[p]ermitting such recovery would completely destroy the principle that a third party cannot sue on a contract to which he or she is merely an incidental beneficiary”) (quoting Berryman, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1544); Blatty, 42 Cal. 3d at 1044-45 (UCL claim cannot be brought where plaintiff would be unable to sue for defamation because of First Amendment hurdles); Carr v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. CV F 11-0890 LJO GSA, 2011 WL 3568338, at * 9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (citing Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th 1187, 1204 (1993)) (litigation privilege bars claim under the UCL); see also Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 184 (confirming the rule set forth in previous decisions that no UCL action will lie where either: (a) the claim expressly is barred by some other law; or (b) the challenged conduct expressly is allowed by some other law, such as, for example, a “safe harbor” provision); Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 292, 313 (1988) (no private right of action exists under California Insurance Code section 790.03 and, therefore, third-party claimants cannot file UCL suit based on alleged violations of that statute); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing UCL claim where plaintiff stated no other claim and reasoning that “[t]he ‘breadth’ of [section] 17200, however, ‘does not give a plaintiff license to plead around the absolute bars to relief contained in other possible causes of action by recasting those causes of action as ones for unfair competition’”) (quoting Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001)); but see Wash. Mut. Bank, FA v. Super. Ct. (Brown), 75 Cal. App. 4th 606, 610 (2002) (holding that UCL claim based on savings and loan association’s practice of charging one day’s preclosing interest was barred by OTS preemption); Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that OTS preemption barred plaintiffs’ UCL and section 17500 claims challenging defendant’s interest rate lock-in fee and challenging defendant’s disclosure of consumers’ rescission rights under TILA); Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that National Bank Act (the “NBA”) preempted UCL as to disclosures associated with credit card account convenience checks).


233 Compare Lopez v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n. 105 Cal. App. 4th 729, 742 (2003) (holding that UCL claim based on federal savings association’s practice of assessing a $10 fax fee for payoff demand statements was preempted by federal law, specifically the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”) and 12 C.F.R. § 560.2, promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)); Wash. Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct. (Guilford), 95 Cal. App. 4th 606, 610 (2002) (holding that UCL claim based on savings and loan association’s practice of charging one day’s preclosing interest was barred by OTS preemption); Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that OTS preemption barred plaintiffs’ UCL and section 17500 claims challenging defendant’s interest rate lock-in fee and challenging defendant’s disclosure of consumers’ rescission rights under TILA); Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that National Bank Act (the “NBA”) preempted UCL as to disclosures associated with credit card account convenience checks); Kilgore v.
preemption with respect to environmental laws,\textsuperscript{234} bankruptcy laws,\textsuperscript{235} immigration laws,\textsuperscript{236} consumer protection laws,\textsuperscript{237} food safety laws and product labeling laws,\textsuperscript{238} transportation laws,\textsuperscript{239}

\textbf{KeyBank}, 712 F. Supp. 2d 939, 958 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that plaintiffs’ state law claims, including UCL claims, are preempted by the NBA because they would “significantly impair” defendant’s exercise of its “enumerated or incidental” powers under the NBA), \textit{appeal dismissed as moot}, 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012); Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, \textit{NA}, 704 F.3d 712, 723-25 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that NBA preempted UCL to the extent “unfair” prong prohibited defendant’s overdraft fee practice of posting checking transactions from “high-to-low”); Martinez v. Wells Fargo Bank, \textit{N.A.}, No. C-06-03327 RMW, 2007 WL 963965, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (NBA preempted UCL as to fees for mortgage loan settlement services); Newbeck v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. C 09-1599, 2010 WL 291821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010) (finding that HOLA preempts the UCL on claims alleging that defendants failed to disclose the nature of the interest rate on the loan and the potential for negative amortization); Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1275 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (plaintiff’s UCL claim relating to the “processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages” was preempted by HOLA and regulations promulgated thereunder by OTS); Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 938, 943 (2010) (UCL and CLRA claims alleging that student loan servicer improperly assessed interest charges were barred by preemption under the Higher Education Act); Robinson v. Bank of Am., \textit{NA}, 525 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2013) (National Bank Act preempted account holder’s claims under California law arising out of alleged nondisclosures relating to $1.50 account fee), with Reyes v. Premier Home Funding, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1155-56 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (UCL claims predicated on violations of the California Translation Act were not barred by HOLA); Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust, 143 Cal. App. 4th 526, 548 (2006) (on claims related to refund anticipation loans, the NBA did not preempt the UCL and the CLRA, among other state laws); Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, \textit{N.A.}, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1484 (2005) (UCL claim challenging notice of change in checking account overdraft fees was not barred by preemption under TISA and corresponding OCC regulations); Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1294 (2002) (UCL claim challenging federal savings association’s practice of passing through to its borrowers premiums for forced order insurance was not subject to OTS preemption); Black v. Fin. Freedom Senior Funding Corp., 92 Cal. App. 4th 917, 936-38 (2001) (UCL claim challenging marketing of reverse mortgage transactions was not barred by preemption under numerous federal banking laws); Wash. Mut. Bank (Brown), 75 Cal. App. 4th at 787 (UCL not preempted by RESPA); People ex rel. Sepulveda v. Highland Fed. Sav. & Loan, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1692, 1708 (1993) (12 C.F.R. § 545.2, promulgated under the HOLA, did not preempt the UCL); Gutierrez, 704 F.3d at 725-28 (claims for misleading misrepresentations under UCL fraudulent prong not preempted by NBA).

\textsuperscript{234} See, e.g., Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. DowElanco, 64 F. Supp. 2d 939, 944 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempted the UCL), \textit{aff’d}, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).

\textsuperscript{235} See, e.g., Rogers v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 233 B.R. 98, 109-10 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the UCL was preempted by bankruptcy statutes).

\textsuperscript{236} See, e.g., Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 599 (1970) (recognizing federal preemption in area of immigration and holding that California courts should abstain from intervening by way of a UCL claim).


\textsuperscript{238} See, e.g., Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. DowElanco, 64 F. Supp. 2d 939, 944 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempted the UCL), \textit{aff’d}, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).

\textsuperscript{239} See, e.g., Rogers v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 233 B.R. 98, 109-10 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the UCL was preempted by bankruptcy statutes).
labor laws, occupational safety laws, copyright laws, energy laws, postal laws, communications laws, drug labeling laws, cosmetics labelling laws, gasoline labeling laws, securities laws, credit reporting laws, and healthcare laws. See Reid, 780 F.3d at 965-68 (holding the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) regulations pertaining to nutrient content labeling did not preempt plaintiff’s UCL and CLRA claims for manufacturer’s “No Trans Fat” misrepresentation on the label of its vegetable oil spread); see also Backus v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (plaintiff’s claim which sought to prohibit use of PHOs in all food immediately was preempted because it would prevent the FDA from fulfilling its objectives and conflict with Congress’s decision not to deem PHOs unsafe pending a 2018 compliance date), appeal filed, No. 16-15389 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2016); Fisher, 656 F. App’x at 823 (plaintiff’s claims regarding the amount of caffeine in Monster Drinks were preempted because they would require ingredient labeling obligations beyond what federal law requires); In re Fontem US, Inc., 2016 WL 6520142, at *6 (UCL labeling claims expressly preempted by FDA rule defining e-cigarettes as “tobacco products,” which placed e-cigarettes within the scope of the labeling requirements of the Family Smoking and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), and its express preemption clause; however, UCL Proposition 65 warning claims are not preempted because compliance with Proposition 65 warning requirements can be accomplished via point-of-sale notices or advertising and therefore these claims are not captured by the scope of the TCA’s labeling requirements or express preemption clause); Hawkins, 2016 WL 7210381, at *6-7 (UCL claim for plaintiff’s alleged injury from repeatedly ingesting partially hydrogenated oil in defendant’s cookies preempted by conflict with FDA determination for industry phase out of partially hydrogenated oil at a future compliance date, and at odds with legislative purpose of the future compliance date to prevent economic disruption from lawsuits against food producers using partially hydrogenated oil in the meantime).

See, e.g., Dugan v. FedEx Corp., No. CV 02-1234-JFW (FMOX), 2002 WL 31305208, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2002) (the federal Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”) preempted the UCL and other state law as to air carrier’s policy regarding limitation on losses and damaged goods); Blackwell v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., No. 06CV0307 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5103195, at *15-18, 20 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008) (the ADA preempted the UCL and state wage and hour laws); People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 772, 783 (2014) (the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act did not preempt UCL claim that truck drivers were misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees because the act “does not preempt generally applicable employment laws that affect prices, routes, and services”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015); People ex rel. Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 247 Cal. App. 4th 884, 906 (2016) (the federal ADA preempted a UCL action for enforcement of California’s Online Privacy Protection Act’s privacy policy requirements for an airline’s consumer mobile application because the requirements “effectively interfere with the airline’s selection and design of its mobile application, a marketing mechanism appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation service, for which state enforcement has been held to be expressly preempted by the ADA.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

pleading raised these issues under the UCL, rather than directly under the provisions of the Labor Code alleged to have been violated”) (depublished by grant of review).


See, e.g., TPS Utilicom Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that UCL claim was preempted by Federal Communications Act).


See, e.g., El-Aheidab v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. C-11-5359 EMC, 2012 WL 506473, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (holding that a UCL claim is preempted when predicated on violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)); but see Alborzian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 235 Cal. App. 4th 29, 39 (2015) (holding plaintiffs’ claims regarding bank’s deceptive efforts to collect an unenforceable loan were not preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act because that act preempts only state laws that impose “a requirement or prohibition . . . relating to the responsibilities of persons
A preemption defense, however, always is subject to a court’s interpretation of congressional intent with respect to the federal law at issue, and often a state court is reluctant to find that state law will not apply to the claims of the state’s citizens. 253

In addition, some Courts of Appeal have held that UCL claims based on systematic contract breaches are not defeated by federal preemption. 254 In Gibson v. World Savings and Loan Ass’n, plaintiffs brought a UCL action challenging a federal savings association’s practice of assessing premiums for forced order insurance. Rejecting defendant’s preemption argument, which was based on federal banking law, the Court of Appeal reasoned that plaintiffs’ UCL claims were not aimed at regulating defendant’s lending practices, but rather, were predicated on “contractual duties” arising from borrowers’ deeds of trust. 256 The court’s reasoning in Gibson—that UCL unfairness claims can be predicated on “contractual obligations”—appears to conflict with other California authorities stating that the UCL “is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.” Nevertheless, in Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 258 the Court of Appeal

who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies” and were not implicated by the plaintiff’s claims).

251 See, e.g., Roberts, 2 Cal. App. 5th at 137. In Roberts, the California Court of Appeal held that UCL claims for misrepresentation in a medical insurer’s marketing materials were expressly and impliedly preempted by the Medicare Advantage preemption clause of the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3), following the Ninth Circuit in Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1148-1157 (9th Cir. 2010). Id. at 137-38. Notably, the Court split from two other California Court of Appeal rulings, both of which construed the Medicare Advantage preemption clause more narrowly. Roberts, 2 Cal. App. 5th at 144-47; cf. Cotton v. StarCare Med. Grp., Inc., 183 Cal. App. 4th 437, 447-54 (2010); Yarick v. PacifiCare of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1165-67 (2009). A split in the California Court of Appeal districts makes this issue ripe for review by the California Supreme Court.

252 For example, in Reid, the Ninth Circuit held a Food and Drug Administration letter discussing its intentions about enforcing requirements for health claims about plant stanol esters did not have a preemptive effect on plaintiff’s UCL and CLRA claims because the letter did not indicate it was made with lawmaking pretense in mind. See Reid, 780 F.3d at 965. Specifically, the letter was couched in “tentative and non-committal terms” and the letter did not authorize any health claims that conflicted with the FDA’s existing plant stanol esters rule. Finally, the letter did not include any notice or comment about any preemptive effect the letter carried. Id.


254 See Smith, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1483 (“it appears that a systematic breach of certain types of contracts (e.g., breaches of standard consumer or producer contracts involved in a class action) can constitute an unfair business practice under the UCL.”); Branick v. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 413 (2005), aff’d, 39 Cal. 4th 235 (2006).


256 Id. at 1301 (“Those [UCL] claims are predicated on the duties of a contracting party to comply with its contractual obligations.”). It should be noted that plaintiffs in Gibson had dismissed their claim for breach of contract, opting to proceed only under the UCL. Id. at 1294.
similarly concluded that the UCL was not preempted by TISA with respect to contractual notice requirements.259

7. Primary Jurisdiction

When a UCL action arises in a regulated area, such as insurance, a defendant might advance the defense of primary jurisdiction. In connection with that defense, it must be shown that an administrative procedure already is in place to address issues of widespread importance and/or consumer complaints. A successful defense based on primary jurisdiction suspends judicial proceedings until the appropriate administrative body can review the underlying claim.260 As explained in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court,261 “the primary jurisdiction doctrine advances two related policies: it enhances court decisionmaking and efficiency by allowing courts

257 Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 173; see also Altman v. PNC Mortg., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that the “unfairness” prong of the UCL “does not give the courts a general license to review the fairness of contracts”).
258 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1476–84.
260 See, e.g., Farmers Ins., 2 Cal. 4th at 394 (applying primary jurisdiction and staying a UCL government enforcement action pending review by the California Insurance Commissioner); Wise v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 Cal. App. 4th 287, 299-300 (1999) (applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine to stay a UCL action); accord Samura v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 1299 (1993) (holding that a UCL action was barred where the Legislature had expressly entrusted an administrative body with exclusive regulatory powers over the underlying statute); but see Cundiff v. GTE Cal. Inc., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1412 (2002) (rejecting primary jurisdiction defense in UCL action); AICCO, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 594-95 (rejecting defense to UCL claim based on doctrine of primary jurisdiction because there were no pending or proposed administrative proceedings focused on the corporate structure at issue in the action).

A doctrine similar to primary jurisdiction is exhaustion of administrative remedies. Differentiating between the two, the United States Supreme Court has explained:

‘Exhaustion’ applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. ‘Primary Jurisdiction,’ on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.

Farmers Ins., 2 Cal. 4th at 390 (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956)). Because a claim for violation of the UCL will be “originally cognizable in the courts,” only the primary jurisdiction doctrine appears applicable in most actions. See id. at 391. It should be noted that, regardless of whether primary jurisdiction might apply, administrative review may not be controlling. See People v. Damon, 51 Cal. App. 4th 958, 972 (1996) (holding that there was no res judicata effect of an administrative proceeding where a UCL remedy could not be sought through that proceeding).

261 2 Cal. 4th at 391.
to take advantage of administrative expertise, and it helps assure uniform application of regulatory laws.”


A number of courts have held that UCL actions should not proceed when they require trial courts to engage in “microeconomic management.” In applying this defense, courts have

262 Id.; see also Tryon v. DSB Enters., Inc., No. D045656, 2006 WL 234728, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2006) (concluding that individual citizens could not enforce the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act through private UCL actions because the state constitution and the Act itself granted exclusive enforcement power to the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control); Shamsian v. Dep’t of Conservation, 136 Cal. App. 4th 621, 642 (2006) (stating that “[f]or the court at this point to issue restitution and disgorgement orders against the corporate defendants would interfere with the department’s administration of the act and regulation of beverage container recycling and potentially risk throwing the entire complex economic arrangement out of balance”).

263 See, e.g., Desert Healthcare Dist. v. PacifiCare, FHP, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 781, 794-95 (2001) (dismissing UCL claim challenging defendant healthcare provider’s capitation agreement with an intermediary because assessing appropriate levels of capitation and industry oversight—i.e., determining economic policy—“is primarily a legislative and not a judicial function”); Crusader Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 4th 121, 138 (1997) (holding that plaintiff’s claim under the UCL, in essence, challenged whether the Department of Insurance properly regulated certain insurance providers; since “[i]nstitutional systems are . . . in place to deal with [plaintiff’s allegations,] . . . [t]here is no need or justification for the courts to interfere with the Legislature’s efforts to mold and implement public policy in this area”); Wolfe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 46 Cal. App. 4th 554, 562 (1996) (holding that the trial court properly sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on a UCL claim where plaintiffs brought suit against certain insurance companies based on their refusal to issue homeowners and earthquake insurance); Cal. Grocers Ass’n, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 218 (reversing trial court’s judgment under the UCL, which enjoined a bank from imposing certain service charges, because the “case implicates a question of economic policy: whether service fees charged by banks are too high and should be regulated”—and emphasizing that “[j]udicial review of one service fee charged by one bank is an entirely inappropriate method of overseeing bank service fees”); Samura, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1301-02 (reversing the trial court’s entry of an injunction under the UCL because “the courts cannot assume general regulatory powers over health maintenance organizations [relating to service agreement provisions] through the guise of enforcing” the UCL, and holding that such regulatory powers are entrusted by the Legislature to the Department of Corporations); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1383, 1391 (1991) (noting the trial court’s determination to rule in favor of a bank on a UCL claim involving the assessment of credit card late fees since, “as a matter of policy, [] this Court [is not] well suited to regulating retail bank pricing via injunction on an ongoing basis”); see also Lazar, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1509 (holding that a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Act could not be maintained where plaintiff challenged a car rental company’s surcharge because “this case concerns a question of economic policy—that is, whether the surcharge is too high and should be regulated. . . . It is the Legislature’s function, not ours, to determine the wisdom of economic policy.”); but see AICCO, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 593 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court properly abstained from deciding the action because, by doing so, it would “engage in ‘impermissible microeconomic regulation of the business of insurance’”); Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 471, 502 (2010) (where member brought putative class action for alleged denial of coverage for mental health care services, trial court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial abstention because the UCL claim did not require the court “to make individualized determinations of medical necessity, to evaluate complex issues of economic policy, or to decide matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [Department of Managed Health Care]”); Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 202 Cal.
emphasized that "[j]udicial intervention in complex areas of economic policy is inappropriate."\(^{264}\) Indeed, in the dissenting opinion in Stop Youth Addiction, Justice Brown noted:

Although California courts have not yet developed the doctrine fully, the fundamentals of an equitable jurisprudence of abstention in litigation brought under the UCL exists under both the California Constitution (art. III, § 3) and case law. As [numerous California decisions] show, the Courts of Appeal have done an admirable job of reining in the UCL’s potential for adverse regulatory effects by declining to grant relief in appropriate cases.\(^{265}\)

The judicial abstention defense is based on the notion that, where a challenged business practice arises in the context of a regulated industry and the practice has not been prohibited, the courts should not do what the Legislature or a responsible agency has left undone.

9. The “Safe Harbor” Defense

As noted above, in the context of an unfairness claim, the California Supreme Court confirmed in Cel-Tech that “[a]cts that the Legislature has determined to be lawful may not form the basis for an action under the [UCL] . . . .”\(^{266}\) Because “[c]ourts may not simply impose their own notions of the day as to what is fair or unfair” and “[s]pecific legislation may limit the judiciary’s power to declare conduct unfair,” the Court concluded that “courts may not use the [UCL] to condemn actions the Legislature permits.”\(^{267}\) Other California decisions have dismissed

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\(^{264}\) Wolfe, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 562; accord Loeffler v. Target Corp., 58 Cal. 4th 1081, 1129 (2014) (allowing plaintiffs’ claim that Target had collected excessive sales taxes to go forward would result in “a proceeding that would produce a binding interpretation of tax law, but in which a party considered by the Legislature to be necessary, . . . the [State Board of Equalization], would be absent,” and would also risk future “inconsistent determinations” of whether a particular transaction is subject to the sales tax); Alvarado v. Selma Convalescent Hosp., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1292, 1303-04 (2007) (“Adjudicating this class action controversy would require the trial court to assume general regulatory powers over the health care industry through the guise of enforcing the UCL, a task for which the courts are not well-equipped.”); Desert Healthcare Dist., 94 Cal. App. 4th at 795 (“Where a UCL action would drag a court of equity into an area of complex economic policy, equitable abstention is appropriate.”); De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that adjudicating UCL claim based on allegedly unconscionable interest rate would require the court to determine a fair rate and thus impermissibly intrude upon the province of the legislature in setting interest rates).

\(^{265}\) Stop Youth Addiction, 17 Cal. 4th at 596-97 (Brown, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also Quelimane, 19 Cal. 4th at 63 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“It is not simply that a single superior court judge hearing a single UCL case is a poor choice to resolve a myriad of complicated fact and policy issues tied to the economics, risks, cost and availability of [certain] insurance. It is that given the scope of its administrative authority and depth of regulatory experience, the Department of Insurance is likely to prove better at the job.”).

\(^{266}\) Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 183.

\(^{267}\) Id. at 182, 184. As discussed above, however, the decision in Cel-Tech was based on a dispute between two competitors and, therefore, may be distinguishable in the context of consumer transactions. Id.; but see Schnall, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 1166-67 (applying Cel-Tech standard in a consumer action).
UCL claims for unlawful and fraudulent conduct on these same “safe harbor” grounds—i.e., where the business practice forming the basis of the claim has been explicitly approved, or exempted from prosecution, by the Legislature. However, courts are cautioned against “creating safe harbors in the absence of ‘specific legislation.’” Defendants may raise a “safe harbor” defense based upon case law as well. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has held that the “safe harbor” defense applies retrospectively—i.e., following a change in the law authorizing the conduct at issue.

III. REMEDIES UNDER THE UCL

No damages of any kind are recoverable under the UCL. Instead, the UCL provides for injunctive relief, restitution and civil penalties. Injunctive relief and restitution are available in both private-party and government actions. Civil penalties are available only in government enforcement actions. As with the substantive provisions of the UCL, the remedial provisions

268 See, e.g., Ochs v. PacifiCare of Cal., 115 Cal. App. 4th 782, 793 (2004) (holding that “safe harbor” defense precluded UCL claim in action challenging health care service plan’s obligation to pay for emergency services); Byars, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 1148 (holding that a lender’s payment of a YSP to a broker did not violate the UCL because the payment of such a premium had been deemed lawful under federal law); Swanson v. St. John’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., 97 Cal. App. 4th 245, 248 (2002) (holding that defendant’s filing of liens pursuant to Hospital Lien Act precluded UCL action as a matter of law because “[i]f it is settled that a business practice does not violate the UCL if it is permitted by law”); Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 704 (2001) (holding that defendant insurers’ compliance with California Insurance Code section 11580.2 precluded UCL claim), overruled on other grounds by Parnell v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 109 P.3d 69, 73 (2005) (finding that a hospital may not assert a lien against a patient unless it proves the existence of an underlying debt owed by the patient); Hobby Indus. Ass’n of Am., 101 Cal. App. 3d at 370 (“Although the Supreme Court has construed the orbit of the unfair competition statutes expansively, it cannot be said that this embracing purview also encompasses business practices which the Legislature has expressly declared to be lawful in other legislation.”) (citations omitted); but see Aron v. U–Haul Co. of Cal., 143 Cal. App. 4th 796, 803–4 (2006) (on claims for failure to reimburse customer where vehicle is returned with more fuel than initially provided, refusing to find “implied safe harbor” insulating defendant from liability); Moran, 3 Cal. App. 5th at 1140 (safe harbor defense applies to patient plaintiff’s discriminatory pricing claim because Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16770 and 17042 allow hospitals to variably charge insured and non-insured patients, but the safe harbor defense does not apply to UCL claims for exorbitant pricing because the Hospital Fair Pricing Act, Health & Saf. Code § 127400 et seq., only requires a licensed hospital to establish and give notice of a schedule of fees, but does not permit charging excessive rates).

269 Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1029, quoting Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 163.

270 See, e.g., Chavez, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 375 (holding that defendant’s conduct was permissible under the Colgate doctrine and, therefore, “unlawful” or “unfair” under the UCL).

271 Olszewski v. Scripps Health, 30 Cal. 4th 798, 829 (2003) (“[R]etroactive application of a decision disapproving prior authority on which a person may reasonably rely in determining what conduct will subject the person to penalties, denies due process.”) (citation omitted).


have been liberally construed to give courts broad powers to fashion creative awards of injunctive or restitutionary relief. The remedies available under the UCL are cumulative to other remedies, regardless of whether those remedies arise under the UCL or other law.

A. Restitution Under The UCL

1. The Proper Scope Of Restitution Awards

The California Supreme Court has considered the proper scope of restitution awards in various contexts. The developments in this area probably can be best understood by starting with Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

As stated in Korea Supply, “[t]he object of restitution is to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.” A UCL order for restitution is one “compelling a UCL defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken, that is, to persons who had an ownership interest in the property or those claiming through that person.” Therefore, in order for an award of restitution to be appropriate against a defendant in any UCL action, that defendant must hold funds in which plaintiff has an ownership interest.

Post-Korea Supply cases expand on this conclusion. One illustrative case is Inline, Inc. v. Apace Moving Systems, Inc. There, plaintiff sued a storage company, Apace Moving Systems, alleging that when Apace auctioned the stored property of plaintiff’s predecessor, Production Resources, Inc. (“PRI”), to satisfy outstanding storage charges, Apace did so in a commercially unreasonable manner. At the auction, Apace obtained only $20 for the entire contents of PRI’s storage lot. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the auctioned lot from the buyer for $100,000. Plaintiff sued Apace, claiming, among other things, that Apace’s violation of the statutory commercial reasonableness standard in auctioning the property constituted a violation of the

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275 See Fletcher, 23 Cal. 3d at 449 (noting that principles of equity, combined with express statutory language, arms “the trial court with the cleansing power to order restitution to effect complete justice”); Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass’n. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 111 (1972) (explaining that the Legislature’s intent was “to permit tribunals to enjoin ongoing wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur”).

276 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17205 (“Unless otherwise expressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.”); but see Nelson v. Pearson Ford Co., 186 Cal. App. 4th 983, 1018 (2010) (rescission is not available under the UCL).

277 See Kraus, 23 Cal. 4th at 116; Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 177-78; Korea Supply, 29 Cal. 4th at 1142-43; Clark v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. 4th 605, 611, 614-15 (2010) (finding that claims under the UCL are not subject to the punitive device of trebling because restitution is not a punitive remedy). It should be noted that, in Kraus, the Court devoted substantial discussion to the availability of restitution in general public, private attorney general actions. Following Proposition 64’s prohibition on such actions, that discussion is moot.

278 23 Cal. 4th at 1149.

279 Id.

280 Id. at 1144-45 (quoting Kraus, 23 Cal. 4th at 126-27).

UCL. Plaintiff sought as “restitution” the $100,000 that it paid to the buyer of the PRI storage lot, who had paid only $20 for the lot. The trial court found that Apace’s auction was not held in a commercially reasonable manner and awarded Inline $20 as restitution under the UCL.

Plaintiff appealed the amount of the restitution award. The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the restitution remedy required Apace to reimburse plaintiff for the $100,000 paid to the third-party buyer to retrieve the property. The court reasoned that plaintiff sought more from Apace than the “return [of] something [it] wrongfully received”; it sought compensation “for injury suffered as a result of [defendant’s] conduct.” In other words, plaintiff sought damages, which are not available under section 17203. The court explained that “[t]he only nonpunitive monetary relief available under [the UCL] is the disgorgement of money that has been wrongfully obtained or, in the language of the statute, an order ‘restor[ing] . . . money . . . which may have been acquired by means of . . . unfair competition.’” The court emphasized that “section 17203 is not ‘an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.’” Rather, remedies under section 17203 are equitable and “designed to afford specific relief by requiring disgorgement of the particular property or money taken by an unfair business practice, rather than damages compensation.”

282 Id. at 903.
283 See id.
284 Id. (quoting Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1266 (1992)); see also Marsh v. Zaazoom Sols., LLC, No. C-11-05226-YGR, 2012 WL 952226, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss as to bank defendant where relationship arose out of general deposit because bank had no ownership interest in money and therefore could not be held liable for restitution of monies allegedly taken by other defendants).
285 Inline, 125 Cal. App. 4th at 904 (quoting Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 173).
286 Id. at 905 (emphasis added) (citing AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 3d 807, 835 (1990)) (recognizing that restitutionary remedies return to plaintiff “the very thing to which he was entitled,” while damages provide compensation for loss in the form of a money recovery) (emphasis added); see also Moss, 2016 WL 3753109, at *7 (dismissing plaintiff's UCL claim because the primary remedy sought, damages, in the form of payment of policy benefits, was “entirely inconsistent” with the permitted UCL remedy of restitution); Cox v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. C-08-03927 WHA, 2009 WL 3833899, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on UCL claim where plaintiff sought wages that were never earned and therefore could not be held liable for restitution of monies allegedly taken by other defendants); Pineda v. Bank of Am., N.A., 50 Cal. 4th 1389, 1401 (2010) (statutory penalties do not “restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest”; unlike unpaid wages, which are triggered by an employee’s actions, penalties are designed to encourage employers to pay on time); Reid v. Google, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744, 750-51 (2007) (affirming order striking prayer for restitution in UCL action based on allegedly discriminatory hiring practices where plaintiff sought return of unvested stock options held at time of termination), aff’d, 50 Cal. 4th 512 (2010); Pulido v. Coca-Cola Enters, Inc., No. EDCV06-406VAP(OPX), 2006 WL 1699328, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2006) (rejecting claims for restitution based on violations of California Labor Code section 226.7, which requires employers to pay employees for breaks that are not taken, and finding that the amounts were in the nature of a penalty, not restitution), overruled on other grounds by Cervantez v. Celestica Corp., 2007 WL 8076519, *6 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Wayne v. BP Oil Supply Co., No. B180025, 2006 WL 766712, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2006) (rejecting claims for restitution based on defendant’s alleged manipulation of crude oil prices so as to create higher prices for gasoline,
Two Court of Appeal decisions, Madrid v. Perot Systems Corp.\textsuperscript{287} and Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC.\textsuperscript{288} further address this issue, specifically considering whether nonrestitutionary disgorgement of profits is available in any UCL action, including a class action. In other words, can a UCL plaintiff alleging a class action seek disgorgement of monies in excess of or unrelated to what he or she paid or gave to the defendant, such as investment profits or costs savings made by the defendant? Both Madrid and Feitelberg answer “no.”\textsuperscript{289}

One case, however, arguably reached the opposite conclusion. In Juarez v. Arcadia Financial, Ltd.,\textsuperscript{290} plaintiffs brought a UCL class action based on alleged violations of the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales & Finance Act. After defendant refused to provide discovery regarding any profits defendant had earned on funds collected from class members, plaintiff moved to compel, claiming that the information was relevant to restitution.\textsuperscript{291} Reversing the trial court’s order denying the motion, the Court of Appeal maintained that Korea Supply “concluded that ‘restitutionary disgorgement’ is available under the UCL.”\textsuperscript{292} In support of this conclusion, the court quoted Korea Supply’s statements that restitution under the UCL “is not limited only to the return of money or property that was once in the possession of [the plaintiff],” and “is broad enough to allow a plaintiff to recover money or property in which he or she has a vested

\textsuperscript{287} 130 Cal. App. 4th 440 (2005).
\textsuperscript{290} 152 Cal. App. 4th 889, 894 (2007).
\textsuperscript{291} Id. at 912.
\textsuperscript{292} Id. at 914-15 (emphasis added).
interest.” It further reasoned that “the plaintiffs arguably have an ownership interest in any profits Arcadia may have gained through interest or earnings on the plaintiffs’ money that Arcadia wrongfully held.” Moreover, the court distinguished Feitelberg, Madrid and several other cases holding that there is no right to restitutionary disgorgement on the ground that plaintiffs in those cases “had not lost to the defendant any vested interest in money or property.” In essence, the court’s view was that, provided there is a reasonable nexus between profits and what was taken by the defendant, equity allows the plaintiff to recover not only what was taken, but also any profits generated from what was taken.

While restitution is limited to money or property in which the plaintiff had an ownership interest, the plaintiff need not have provided the money or property directly to the defendant. In Shersher v. Superior Court, plaintiff brought a UCL action against Microsoft, alleging that the packaging for certain Microsoft wireless routers, adapters and other products sold through retailers misrepresented the capabilities of the products. Microsoft successfully moved to strike plaintiff’s prayer for restitution, arguing that Korea Supply prevents plaintiffs from seeking to recover money or property they did not pay directly to the defendant. The Court of Appeal reversed, stating that Korea Supply was not “intended to preclude consumers from seeking the return of money they paid for a product that turned out to be not as represented. Rather, the holding of Korea Supply on the issue of restitution is that the remedy the plaintiff seeks must be truly ‘restitutio in natura’—that is, it must represent the return of money or property the defendant acquired through its unfair practices.”

2. “Fluid Recovery” In UCL Class Actions

Where a class-action judgment awards restitution and there are unidentifiable recipients, the doctrine of “fluid recovery” may be used to distribute any unpaid funds. Pursuant to this doctrine, a court might order a defendant to disgorge the amount that cannot be paid directly to class members for distribution through a claims process or to the “next best” use, meaning to

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293 Id. at 915 (quoting Korea Supply, 29 Cal. 4th at 1149 (citing Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 178)).
294 Id.
295 Id. at 917.
297 Id. at 1495.
298 Id. at 1498; accord Hartless, 2007 WL 3245260, at *7-8 (denying motion to dismiss UCL claim where challenged products were not purchased directly from defendant); see also People v. Sarpas, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 1562 (limiting restitution to sums paid directly to defendants “would allow UCL and [false advertising] violators to escape restitution by structuring their schemes to avoid receiving direct payment from their victims”).
produce benefits for as many class members as possible. The California Supreme Court has proposed several specific “fluid recovery” procedures, including: price rollback, general escheat, earmarked escheat, and the establishment of an equitable trust fund. In class action settlements where individual recoveries by class members in a settlement would be small and the cost of distributing settlement monies is high relative to the individual recoveries, payment of the settlement monies to charity is an appropriate cy pres remedy.

3. Defenses To Restitution Claims

a. The Filed Rate Doctrine

Under the “filed rate doctrine,” defendants that charge consumers certain rates for their products or services, which rates are required by law to be filed with and approved by a designated regulatory body, are insulated from lawsuits challenging those rates and from court orders having the effect of imposing rates other than the filed rates. Relying on this doctrine, the Court of Appeal in Day v. AT&T Corp. held that plaintiffs were precluded from seeking any monetary recovery under the UCL based on defendant’s rounding up of telephone charges on prepaid phone cards because the rates for such charges were disclosed and approved in publicly filed rates. Similarly, in Walker v. Allstate Indemnity Co., the Court of Appeal held that

300 “Fluid recovery” is borrowed from the doctrine of “cy pres”—a concept developed in the law of charitable trusts—which provides that, if a particular interest cannot go to an intended purpose, it will be put to its next best use.

301 Under the price rollback method, the defendant distributes the unclaimed funds throughout the market by lowering prices in the product or service area where the wrongful conduct occurred. See Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 473.

302 Under the general escheat approach, the unclaimed portion of the award is paid over to a general government fund. See id. at 475.

303 Under the earmarked escheat method, the uncollected funds are distributed to an appropriate government organization for use on projects that potentially could benefit non-collecting class members. See id. at 474.

304 Here, the court appoints a board of directors to administer recovery in the best interests of the represented parties. See id. at 476.

305 See, e.g., Slayton v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. A113891, 2007 WL 731432, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2007) (affirming approval of UCL class action settlement providing for payment of settlement monies to charity where each class member’s individual recovery would have been less than $1.50 before costs of mailing checks).

306 See Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Simply stated, the [filed rate] doctrine holds that any ‘filed rate’—that is, one approved by the governing regulatory agency—is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.”); Day v. AT&T Corp., 63 Cal. App. 4th 325, 335 (1998) (“It has been said that the doctrine furthers two legitimate goals: [1] nondiscriminatory rate setting and [2] agency autonomy in rate setting without court interference.”); AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel. Co., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998) (recognizing the filed rate doctrine’s purpose of preventing discriminatory pricing).

307 63 Cal. App. 4th at 335.

308 The court, however, did hold that plaintiffs still could seek injunctive relief under the UCL. See id. In Spielholz v. Super. Ct., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1366, 1369 (2001), the court rejected the filed rate doctrine
plaintiffs could not seek restitution under the UCL from certain insurance companies based on allegations that their rates were excessive. The court reasoned that no civil challenge could be brought to recoup insurance premiums charged pursuant to rates approved by the state’s insurance department. Courts around the country have applied the filed rate doctrine in various regulatory contexts, including telecommunications and utilities.

b. Ability To Pay

At least one California court has determined that the Equal Protection Clause “requires a court to grant a hearing on a defendant’s ability to pay restitution.” “[I]t does not require a trial judge [to] make a finding of ability to pay before ordering restitution,” however.

c. Restitution As A Disguised Damages Claim

A plaintiff should not be allowed to seek damages in the “disguise” of UCL restitution, but the distinction between damages and restitution sometimes is difficult to discern.

in a UCL action where plaintiff alleged that defendant’s advertising of a “seamless calling area” was misleading and deceptive.


Id. at 760; see id. at 756 (“[U]nder the statutory [insurance] scheme enacted by the voters, the charging of an approved rate cannot be deemed ‘illegal’ or ‘unfair’ for purposes of the [UCL] or, indeed, tortious.”); see also In re Wholesale Elec. Anti-Trust Cases I & II, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 1316 (holding that filed rate doctrine barred UCL claim challenging alleged anticompetitive activity in the wholesale electricity market); Gallivan v. AT&T Corp., 124 Cal. App. 4th 1377, 1385 (2004) (holding that filed rate doctrine barred plaintiff’s state law claims for monetary relief); Duggal v. G.E. Capital Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 81, 87 (2000) (holding that filed rate doctrine barred plaintiff’s state law claims).

See, e.g., Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying the doctrine to bar state law claims pursuant to an insurance regulatory scheme); Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 20 (stating that the “Supreme Court has ruled that the filed rate doctrine acts to bar state causes of action” and “that the rationales underlying the filed rate doctrine apply equally strongly to regulation by state agencies”); but see Spielholz, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 1377 (rejecting filed rate doctrine in a UCL action because allegations were directed at false advertising, not the defendant’s rates).


Id.

See Inline, 125 Cal. App. 4th at 898; Vikco Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Ohio Indem. Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 55, 68 (1999) (holding plaintiff could not maintain UCL claim because California Insurance Code section 769 does not create a private right to sue for damages, either directly or by indirect operation of the UCL); Seibels Bruce Grp., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. C-99-0593 MHP, 1999 WL 760527, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1999) (rejecting plaintiff’s UCL claim on the grounds that the remedy sought by plaintiff “is ‘none other than an alternative measure of legal damages’”) (citations omitted); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757-58 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing a UCL claim based on the rule that damages cannot be obtained under the UCL); but see Clark, 50 Cal. 4th at 611, 614-15 (finding that trebling of restitution award is not proper; California Civil Code section 3345 authorizes trebling of penalties, and restitution is not a penalty).
Cortez, for instance, the California Supreme Court awarded unpaid wages as restitution to a group of workers. The Court reasoned that, because the defendant improperly “acquired” its employees’ money, meaning that the workers had earned the money and the employer failed to pay it, the trial court could order the defendant to pay the wages as a form of restitution. In contrast, in a series of class actions brought by writers against the television industry, the Court of Appeal held in Alch v. Superior Court that restitutioary backpay was not available under the UCL. In Alch, plaintiffs sought an injunction under the UCL compelling defendants to pay restitution in the form of the wages they would have earned absent the alleged age discrimination and also in hopes that an injunction would deter future discrimination. Affirming denial of the restitution request, the court noted that restitution is available only if a defendant wrongfully acquires funds or property in which a plaintiff has an ownership or vested interest, and that the UCL does not provide courts with the equitable power to award any form of monetary relief that they believe might generally deter unfair competition.

d. Measure Of Restitution

In In re Tobacco Cases II, the California Court of Appeal specifically held that nonrestitutionary disgorgement (a full refund) is not an available remedy under the UCL where the plaintiff derives a benefit from the product received from the defendant. The class sought restitution for monies paid for “light” cigarettes they claimed the defendant misleadingly advertised as “less unhealthful” than full-flavored cigarettes. In denying the prayer for restitution, the court noted that restitutionary awards under the UCL must be supported by substantial evidence. There was no dispute that class members had derived a benefit from the “light” cigarettes they had received, but the class could not put forth credible evidence showing the amount of monetary value derived from the “light” cigarettes by class members, and thus, calculating the amount of restitution owed was not within the trial court’s discretion.

315 See Inline, 125 Cal. App. 4th at 903 (“The distinction between damages and restitution can seem elusive . . . , but our Supreme Court has drawn a clear line between the two concepts in the context of section 17203 and the UCL.”).
316 Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 177-78.
318 Id. at 800 (quoting Madrid, 130 Cal. App 4th at 440).
319 Id. at 403-08; see also Bradstreet v. Wong, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1440, 1460 (2008) (earned wages payable under the Labor Code can be awarded as restitution), abrogated in part by Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35 (2010), as modified (June 9, 2010); Dep’t of Fair Emp’t. & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. C 07-3747 PJH, 2008 WL 5157710, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2008) (plaintiff could not obtain restitution of wages that he would have earned if he had remained employed).
320 Id. at 800 (quoting Madrid, 130 Cal. App 4th at 440).
321 Id. at 784.
322 Id. at 792.
323 Id. at 802; see also In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (holding that plaintiff class could not adequately demonstrate measure of restitution because the plaintiff class’ expert’s methodology for calculating restitution, which was based off of asking consumers what amount

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Moreover, the court specifically noted that restitution is not an available remedy in the UCL context “for the exclusive purpose of deterrence.”

B. Civil Penalties In Government Enforcement Actions

As noted above, civil penalties are available under the UCL only in government enforcement actions. Government agencies, including the California Attorney General, city attorneys and district attorneys, increasingly are using the UCL’s civil penalty provision in such actions.

Penalty liability can be substantial. The UCL provides that civil penalties shall be assessed in an amount not to exceed $2,500 for each violation. If a government agency proves a violation of the UCL in an enforcement action, it is error for the court not to impose penalties in some amount. In construing the phrase “for each violation,” courts may apply a per-victim calculation or a per-act calculation.

they would have paid for a safer product and finding an average, was “entirely subjective and lack[ed] any market-based component.”); Jones, 2014 WL 2702726, at *20 (denying class certification because expert witness’s methodology of comparing defendant’s product to a comparator product and calculating restitution based on the price difference was “deeply flawed” because it could not be “assume[d] that the entire price difference between the [products] [wa]s attributable to the alleged misstatements”).

Id. at 801.


See, e.g., People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 4th 508, 513 (2002) (imposing over $2.5 million in civil penalties under sections 17200 and 17500); People v. First Fed. Credit Corp., 104 Cal. App. 4th 721, 728 (2002) (imposing $200,000 in civil penalties); see also City & Cty. of S.F. v. PG&E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that attorney general action seeking injunctive relief, $500 million in civil penalties and restitution was an exercise of the state’s police or regulatory power, which cannot be removed to the bankruptcy court).


See People v. Orange Cty. Charitable Servs., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1054, 1071 (1999); First Fed. Credit Corp., 104 Cal. App. 4th at 728 (“The duty to impose a penalty for each violation is mandatory.”).


People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Inv., Ltd., 111 Cal. App. 4th 102, 119 (2003) (finding that long-term leases obtained by mobile home park owners were unlawful and calculating the number of UCL violations based on the number of times each defendant forced a tenant to accept a long-term lease, as well as every time each defendant collected monthly rent in violation of the underlying city ordinance, for a total of more than 14,000 UCL violations). The Court of Appeal noted that Jayhill Corp. did not establish a rule for determining the number of violations on a “per victim” basis in all situations, but rather, determination of the number of violations should be made on a case-by-case basis.
A court has broad discretion in setting a penalty amount in a given case; it is not automatically set at $2,500 per victim or per act.\textsuperscript{332} In determining the amount of the penalty, a court must consider “any one or more of the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not limited to, the following: [1] the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, [2] the number of violations, [3] the persistence of the misconduct, [4] the length of time over which the misconduct occurred, [5] the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and [6] the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.”\textsuperscript{333} Given these broad, discretionary factors, it is difficult to predict the amount of civil penalties that a court might assess in a particular case.\textsuperscript{334}

In People v. JTH Tax, Inc.,\textsuperscript{335} the Court of Appeal affirmed the imposition of “$774,399 in civil penalties pursuant to the UCL and [False Advertising Law] against [the defendant] for illegal advertising in six categories of ads.” The court found reasonable the trial court’s: (1) determinations that “the ads at issue were likely to deceive or confuse” because the “mandatory disclaimers” were “in a very small font, appear within a mass of other text, and are on screen for just a second,” and thus were “plainly designed to be overlooked by consumers” and “patently and deliberately illegible”; (2) imposition of “a significantly lower penalty than would have resulted if it applied the viewership estimates provided by the People” because the television ads at issue “aired a total of 1,829 times” and thus the court could have “imposed penalties of over $9 million, but only imposed penalties of $715,344”; (3) imposition of penalties for “certain illegal, [defendant]-approved Pennysaver advertisements that were mailed to homes” where the penalty was based on “calculation that less than one percent of the publications circulated were viewed”; and (4) injunction requiring the defendant to educate its personnel and control its franchisees.\textsuperscript{336}

\textsuperscript{332} See People v. Custom Craft Carpets, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 676, 686 (1984) (“The amount of each penalty . . . lies within the court’s discretion.”); City of Santa Rosa v. Patel, No. A122151, 2010 WL 2060097, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2010) (trial court properly awarded statutory penalties at a daily rate of $1,500 per violation for nine months and totaling $409,500; the amount was “conservatively” calculated and could have been $2,500 per violation).

\textsuperscript{333} Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17206(b); see First Fed. Credit Corp., 104 Cal. App. 4th at 728.

\textsuperscript{334} See, e.g., First Fed. Credit Corp., 104 Cal. App. 4th at 728 (assessing $500 UCL penalty per violation); Fremont Life Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 4th at 513 (imposing $210 UCL penalty per violation, plus a $210 per violation enhancement as to victims who were senior citizens, based on what the trial court found to be “serious” and “harmful” misconduct); City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sainez, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1302, 1306-08 (2000) (assessing $100 penalty on each of 53 violations of the housing code); Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 534-35 ($167,500 penalty affirmed based on 67 violations ($2,500 per violation)); People v. Dollar Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 Cal. App. 3d 119, 132 (1989) ($100,000 penalty affirmed where company used over 500,000 misleading contracts and submitted 1,500 false repair invoices (no “per violation” penalty determined)); Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., 2 Cal. App. 4th at 339-44 (imposing maximum $17,500 penalty for 7 violations ($2,500 per violation)); People v. Morse, 21 Cal. App. 4th 259, 272 (1993) (affirming $400,000 in civil penalties for 4 million violations of false advertising statute (10 cents per violation)).

\textsuperscript{335} 212 Cal. App. 4th at 1249.

\textsuperscript{336} Id. at 1253-59.
C. Injunctions Under The UCL

Little guidance exists as to the proper scope of injunctive relief under the UCL. For example, on the one hand, a court exercised its injunctive power to require a ten-year mandatory disclosure in the form of a warning on the defendant’s future products.\textsuperscript{337} On the other, an injunction requiring defendant to have appropriate policies and procedures to ensure that defendant and its dealers “promptly” complied with the “replacement or restitution” remedy contained in the Song-Beverly Warranty Act was improper because: (1) injunctive relief under the UCL should be withheld where there is an adequate remedy at law; and (2) a court of equity “should not intervene under the guise of the UCL when injunctive relief implicates matters of complex economic policy, where the injunction would lead to a multiplicity of enforcement actions, and/or result in ongoing judicial supervision of an industry.”\textsuperscript{338} Therefore, overall, it is fair to say that the issuance of a UCL injunction is highly case-specific.

D. Equitable Defenses To UCL Remedies

In Cortez, the California Supreme Court held that because UCL claims are claims in equity, trial courts may take into account equitable defenses and “considerations,” including laches, good faith, waiver and estoppel, in fashioning UCL remedies.\textsuperscript{339} The Court observed that reduction of a restitution award probably would be unusual, particularly where unlawful conduct was proven.\textsuperscript{340} Nonetheless, a defendant might decrease its exposure for restitution, or limit the scope of an injunction, based on equitable considerations.

\textsuperscript{337} See Consumers Union, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 972-74 (requiring a warning to be placed on all of dairy company’s advertisements and products for the next ten years because the dairy was found liable for false advertising); see also Robinson v. U–Haul Co. of California, 4 Cal. App. 5th 304 (2016) (granting injunction of “broad public interest” against defendant franchisor); but see Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (granting motion to dismiss a UCL claim on the grounds that the injunction sought constituted a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment); Nelson, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 1018 (explaining that rescission and restitution are distinct remedies and rescission is an equitable remedy intended to restore both parties to their former positions; finding no authority allowing rescission in a UCL action); In re Fluidmaster, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 958-59 (dismissing UCL claim seeking prospective injunctive relief for lack of standing because the relief sought—prohibiting defendant from marketing and selling its allegedly defective product and requiring defendant to notify consumers of the alleged product defects—was disconnected from and would not remedy injury of the named plaintiff, who had already purchased and installed the allegedly defective product); Strumlauf, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (dismissing claim for injunctive relief because plaintiffs could not allege a threat of repeated injury now that they were aware of Starbucks’ alleged misrepresentation of under filling its lattes).


\textsuperscript{340} Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 182.
E. Res Judicata Under The UCL

In Fireside Bank Cases, the Court of Appeal found that the UCL does not preclude application of res judicata or collateral estoppel as a defense. In Fireside, the creditor sued the debtor to collect on a deficiency balance following the sale of repossessed property. The debtor filed a cross-complaint alleging that the creditor served a defective redemption notice that overstated the amount due, in violation of the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act, and that, by proceeding to collect on the balance, the creditor committed an unlawful business practice in violation of the UCL. The debtor’s cross-complaint was certified as a class action. The class claims suggested that the creditor had already obtained judgments against some of the class members and sought relief that included “restitution and damages paid to class members based on all money they paid on invalid deficiency judgments obtained,” as well as injunctive relief vacating the judgments. The creditor filed motions to strike the allegations seeking to unwind its previously obtained judgments on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The debtors argued that the UCL does not expressly declare res judicata or collateral estoppel as a limitation on a court’s remedial power under the UCL.

The Court of Appeal rejected the debtors’ argument, holding that “[g]iving a prior judgment its normal effect in a UCL action does not ‘imply’ an ‘exception’ to the act or fashion a ‘safe harbor’ from it. It simply recognizes a defense that is available to every civil defendant when the facts support it.” Thus, since the creditor obtained judgments against the affected class members, the judgments may provide a defense to any claims those members might bring against it.

Principles of res judicata also limit the scope of relief available to public agencies that may bring enforcement actions following a class-action settlement. In California v. IntelliGender, LLC, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that public officials cannot obtain a duplicate recovery in the form of restitution under the UCL to individuals who previously participated in a class action settlement, even if the officials contended that monetary relief provided to class members was not sufficient. The court emphasized that “[a]llowing the State’s claims for restitution to go forward in state court would undermine this central guarantee of our legal system and undercut [the Class Action Fairness Act’s] purpose of increasing the fairness and consistency of class action settlements.” The court did note, however, that the private settlement did not preclude the state from acting in its “sovereign capacity” to seek injunctive relief.

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342 Id. at 1123.
343 Id. at 1124.
344 Id. at 1128.
345 Id. at 1130.
346 Id. at 1131.
347 771 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014).
348 Id. at 1181.
349 Id. at 1177.
F. Attorneys’ Fees Under The UCL

Attorneys’ fees are not recoverable under the UCL. This is true even when a plaintiff prevails on an “unlawful” UCL claim and the underlying law allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees. A successful UCL plaintiff may, however, seek attorneys’ fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, but there is no corresponding right for a successful defendant to do so.

Under section 1021.5, a plaintiff may recover attorneys’ fees if: (1) the lawsuit “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest”; (2) “a significant benefit” is “conferred on the general public or a large class of persons”; (3) “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate”; and (4) the fees “should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” Courts uniformly have recognized that an attorneys’ fees award is inappropriate when the applicant has a large economic stake in the outcome of a case. Also, the decisions construing section 1021.5 demonstrate that awards of attorneys’ fees turn upon the unique facts presented.

For example, in Baxter v. Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc., the Court of Appeal affirmed denial of an award of attorneys’ fees to a successful UCL plaintiff. Plaintiff, purportedly acting as a private attorney general (prior to Proposition 64’s enactment), sued the owner of several health

350 See Shadoan, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 108 n.7 (“The Business and Professions Code does not provide for an award of attorney fees for an action brought pursuant to section 17203, and there is nothing in the statutory scheme from which such a right could be implied.”).


352 See Walker, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 1179-81 (holding that prevailing defendant did not have the right to seek attorneys’ fees in UCL action). In addition, although a prevailing defendant may have the right to seek attorneys’ fees on other grounds, such as a contract at issue in the action, trial courts have the discretion to apportion or deny such fees where the action principally was to enjoin an unfair business practice. See id.; see also Kirby v. Immoos Fire Prot., Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1361 (2010) (holding that the defendant had no right to attorneys’ fees; it is settled law that the UCL does not provide for an award of attorney’s fees), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 53 Cal. 4th 1244, 1249 (2012).

353 See In re Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal. 4th 1206, 1211 (2010) (“[T]he purpose of section 1021.5 is not to compensate with attorney fees only those litigants who have altruistic or lofty motives, but rather all litigants and attorneys who step forward to engage in public interest litigation when there are insufficient financial incentives to justify the litigation in economic terms.”); Save Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Super. Ct., 84 Cal. App. 4th 235, 253-54 (2000) (UCL defendant is entitled to limited discovery on subject of whether public interest organization litigated private attorney general action primarily for the benefit of non-litigants).

354 Compare Cal. Licensed Foresters Ass’n v. State Bd. of Forestry, 30 Cal. App. 4th 562, 570 (1994) (narrowly construing the third prong of section 1021.5 and stating that attorneys’ fees are awarded only if a significant public benefit is made “through litigation pursued by one whose personal stake is insufficient to otherwise encourage the action”), and Olsen, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 628-29 (refusing to award attorneys’ fees even though defendants had changed their business practices), with Hewlett, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 543-46 (granting an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1021.5).

clubs, alleging, among other things, that defendant’s health club contracts did not comply with certain California statutory requirements. Although defendant maintained that the contracts were compliant, it modified them after suit was filed to conform precisely with the statutory requirements. Following a bench trial, the court ruled that defendant’s contracts had not been compliant prior to the modifications. The court ordered defendant to provide notice to its customers with non-conforming contracts, among other things, but found no evidence that any person actually had been harmed. As a result, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5, reasoning that “[t]he relief granted plaintiff was a de minimus change in the defendant’s contracts that did not result in a significant benefit to the public.” The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Plaintiffs’ counsel regularly seek fees when a defendant has changed its practices, arguing that their lawsuit precipitated the change. In Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the California Supreme Court held that attorneys’ fees could be awarded where a lawsuit serves as a “catalyst” to the defendant’s changed behavior. The Court concluded that such awards are proper where: (1) the plaintiff’s lawsuit serves as a catalyst to the changed behavior; (2) the lawsuit has merit; and (3) the plaintiff engaged in a reasonable attempt to settle the dispute prior to litigation. In Graham, plaintiffs filed a breach-of-warranty claim against DaimlerChrysler, challenging its admitted mismarketing of the towing capacity of its 1998 and 1999 Dakota R/T trucks. Although DaimlerChrysler established a response team to address the problem and to take corrective steps, plaintiffs filed suit. After the trial court dismissed the action, the parties spent more than a year litigating plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorneys’ fees. The trial court ultimately determined that the lawsuit had been a “catalyst” in causing DaimlerChrysler’s corrective conduct and awarded attorneys’ fees.

In a 4-to-3 decision, the California Supreme Court upheld application of the catalyst theory, finding it to be consistent with the purposes of section 1021.5. Notably, the Court declined to follow Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, in which the United States Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory under federal law. The Court also was not persuaded by DaimlerChrysler’s policy argument that awards under the catalyst theory would require complex causal determinations and encourage nuisance suits.

356 Id. at 944.
357 Id. at 946.
359 Id. at 560-61.
360 Id. at 566.
362 Graham, 34 Cal. 4th at 573.
In a UCL class action, attorneys’ fees may be calculated pursuant to traditional principles governing fees for class counsel, including the lodestar and multiplier or “common fund” approaches, as applicable.363

1. The Lodestar Approach

California courts adopt the lodestar approach as “the primary method” for establishing a “reasonable” amount of attorneys’ fees.364 Under the lodestar approach, the court calculates attorneys’ fees based upon reasonable time spent and hourly compensation for each attorney.365

The primacy of the lodestar method in California was established in Serrano v. Priest.366 The California Supreme Court explained:

The starting point of every fee award, once it is recognized that the court’s role in equity is to provide just compensation for the attorney, must be a calculation of the attorney’s services in terms of the time he has expended on the case. Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.367

Affirming application of the lodestar method pursuant to its holding in Serrano, the California Supreme Court in Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc.368 rejected attorneys’ fees awarded by a trial court pursuant to section 1021.5, concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in not applying the lodestar method. The Court indicated that, “[w]hen a party is entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5, the amount of the award is determined according to the guidelines set forth by this court in [Serrano]” and, “since determination of the lodestar figures is

363 Wershba v. Apple Comput., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254 (2001); Nat. Gas Anti-Trust Cases I, II, III & IV, Nos. 4221, 4224, 4226, 4228, 2006 WL 5377849, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2006) (“Both California state and federal courts recognize two methods for evaluating the fairness and reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in class action settlements resulting in the creation of a common fund for the distribution to class members: (1) the percentage-of-the-benefit method; or (2) the lodestar method plus multiplier method.”); Lamb v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Nos. A108354, A108355, 2006 WL 925490, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2006) (finding that trial court’s conclusion based on “independent review of the court file, his first-hand knowledge of the case, his personal experience, and the supplemental information provided by counsel, that class counsel had appropriately demonstrated the lodestar amount . . . was entirely appropriate”); see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch’s Nat. Food Mkts., Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th 387, 397 (2005) (“The substantial benefit doctrine is an extension of the common fund doctrine. It applies when no common fund has been created, but a concrete and significant benefit, although nonmonetary in nature, has nonetheless been conferred on an ascertainable class.”).
367 Id. at 49 n.23.
368 34 Cal. 3d 311 (1983).
so ‘[f]undamental’ to calculating the amount of the award, the exercise of that discretion must be based on the lodestar adjustment method.” 369 The Court continued:

[W]hile a trial court has discretion to determine the proper amount of an award, the resulting fee must still bear some reasonable relationship to the lodestar figure and to the purpose of the private attorney general doctrine. If there is no reasonable connection between the lodestar figure and the fee ultimately awarded, the fee does not conform to the objectives established in [Serrano], and may not be upheld.

... The lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees set forth in [Serrano] is designed expressly for the purposes of maintaining objectivity. In failing to apply these guidelines, the trial court awarded an amount which had no rational relationship to the skill, time and effort expended by plaintiffs’ attorneys on this litigation.370

At a minimum, the lodestar method must be applied in cases where there is no ascertainable common fund from which a percentage can be drawn. Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. 371 is illustrative. In Dunk, the settlement provided that coupons worth $400 each for purchases of Ford vehicles would be available to a class of over 65,000, for a total potential value of over $26 million.372 The trial court awarded attorneys’ fees of $985,000 and costs of $10,691 based upon the common fund method.373 The Court of Appeal remanded the issue of attorneys’ fees finding that the “award of attorney fees based on a percentage of a ‘common fund’ recovery is of questionable validity in California” and “even if it is valid, the true value of the fund must be easily calculated.”374 The court explained:

Later cases have cast doubt on the use of the percentage method to determine attorney fees in California class actions. Even if the method is permissible, it

369 Id. at 321-22.
370 Id. at 324. In Press, plaintiffs sought to circulate petitions regarding an oil profits initiative on the premises of several privately owned shopping centers; among the locations was an area in Santa Monica in front of defendant’s store. Id. at 316. Plaintiffs successfully challenged defendant’s refusal to allow the circulation of petitions. Id. Plaintiffs submitted a lodestar figure of $13,960 with a request to apply a multiplier of 1.5 for a total of $20,940 in attorneys’ fees. Id. at 322-23. The trial court awarded $112.98 in attorneys’ fees after multiplying the requested amount by a ratio of 3,000/556,000, the ratio of petition signatures obtained at the Santa Monica store to the number obtained statewide. Id. at 323; see also Perez v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., No. C 05-5338 PJH, 2010 WL 934100, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010) (stating that the degree of plaintiffs’ success in relation to the goals of the lawsuit as a whole indicated that plaintiffs’ suggested lodestar amount stretched the parameters of what should be considered “reasonable”).
372 Id. at 1804.
373 Id. at 1800.
374 Id. at 1809.
should only be used where the amount was a “certain or easily calculable sum of money.” Although the ultimate settlement value to the plaintiffs could be as high as $26 million, the true value cannot be ascertained until the one-year coupon redemption period expires. This is not the type of settlement that lends itself to the common fund approach.\(^{375}\)

Under the lodestar approach, the “base amount produced by multiplying hours spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate ‘may then be increased or reduced by application of a “multiplier” after the trial court has considered other factors concerning the lawsuit.’”\(^{376}\) Relevant factors in calculating the multiplier may include: (a) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (b) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (c) the contingent nature of the fee award.\(^{377}\) The factors taken into account must not be duplicative. For example, if a court takes into account the skill and experience of the attorneys and the nature of the work involved in calculating the reasonable hourly rate, it cannot also use those factors to enhance or apply a multiplier to the award.\(^{378}\) Moreover, the “factors which a trial court may consider are not fixed” and “our state has a relatively ‘permissive attitude’ as to the elements that go into what will ultimately make up the multiplier.”\(^{379}\)

In \textit{Lealao},\(^{380}\) the Court of Appeal recognized “results obtained” as an additional factor in determining a multiplier, thereby allowing the attorneys’ fees award to be cross-checked against the class recovery. The court stated:

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\text{[I]n cases in which the value of the class recovery can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty and it is not otherwise inappropriate, a trial court has discretion to adjust the basic lodestar through the application of a positive or negative multiplier where necessary to ensure that the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.}\(^{381}\)
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Where a court in determining a multiplier considers the “results obtained,” less weight should be given to the size of recovery where the recovery is large due primarily to the size of the

\(^{375}\) \textit{Id.} (citations omitted); see also \textit{Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.}, 82 Cal. App. 4th 615, 628 (2000) (finding the common fund exception inapplicable where “plaintiffs’ efforts have not created an identifiable fund of money out of which attorney fees are sought”).


\(^{378}\) \textit{Robbins v. Alibrandi}, 127 Cal. App. 4th 438, 456 (2005) (finding “record so devoid of evidence supporting a substantial multiplier that the trial court’s use of multipliers from 2.5 to 3.0 to enhance the lodestar was an abuse of discretion” and finding skill, expertise and contingent nature and risk of litigation did not justify multiplier); see also \textit{Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol}, 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 647 (1998).


\(^{380}\) 82 Cal. App. 4th at 26.

\(^{381}\) \textit{Id.} at 49-50.
While the court may “cross-check” the lodestar against the value of the class recovery, the award must still be “anchored” in the time spent by the attorneys.\footnote{383} For instance, in \textit{Lealao}, class counsel sought approximately $1.76 million in attorneys’ fees based upon the amount of $7.35 million in claims that had been submitted under the claims-made settlement. Defendants were potentially exposed for $14.8 million—i.e., if every member of the class filed a valid claim.\footnote{384} The Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $425,000, which was based solely on the hours expended by counsel, could be enhanced based on the percentage-of-the-benefit method, even though there was no conventional common fund,\footnote{385} and remanded the matter to trial court for reconsideration of a reasonable fee.\footnote{386} The Court of Appeal justified its conclusion in several ways. \textbf{First}, the total initial exposure of $14.8 million, and the actual value of the valid claims of $7.35 million, were both undisputed.\footnote{387} Second, because the average recovery of class members was over $2,000, the total settlement value was due in significant measure to the individual recoveries, and not just the size of the class.\footnote{388} Third, the court found that \textit{Dunk} did not limit utilization of class recovery to cross-check a lodestar because \textit{Dunk} did not “address the question whether an award anchored in a lodestar calculation could be adjusted to reflect the amount of a monetizable recovery.”\footnote{389} 

\section{The Common Fund Doctrine}

The common fund doctrine is “grounded in ‘the historic power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to recover his costs, including his attorneys’ fees, from the fund of property itself or directly from the other parties enjoying the benefit.’”\footnote{390} Under the common fund method, “the activities of the party awarded fees have resulted in the preservation or recovery of a certain or easily calculable sum of money-out of which sum or ‘fund’ the fees are to be paid.”\footnote{391} Once the fund is established, attorneys’ fees are calculated as a reasonable percentage of the common fund.

\footnotetext[382]{\textit{Id.} at 49; see also \textit{In re Vitamin Cases}, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1060 (2003).} \footnotetext[383]{\textit{Lealao}, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 45–46; see also \textit{Ramos}, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 628.} \footnotetext[384]{\textit{Lealao}, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 23.} \footnotetext[385]{Despite the fact that the court recognized there was no traditional common fund, the court stated that, in this particular case, the “monetary value of the benefit to the class is much less speculative than that of some traditional common funds.” \textit{Id.} at 50.} \footnotetext[386]{See \textit{id.} at 49–53.} \footnotetext[387]{\textit{Id.} at 50.} \footnotetext[388]{\textit{Id.} at 53.} \footnotetext[389]{\textit{Id.} at 45 (emphasis in original).} \footnotetext[390]{\textit{Serrano}, 20 Cal. 3d at 35.} \footnotetext[391]{\textit{Id.}; see, e.g., \textit{Schiller v. David’s Bridal, Inc.}, No. 10-CV-00616-AWI, 2012 WL 2117001, at *15 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) (“[T]he structure of the parties’ Settlement Agreement creates a Maximum Settlement Amount that constitutes a common fund out of which reasonable attorneys’ fees will be paid.”).}
“Because the common fund doctrine ‘rest[s] squarely on the principle of avoiding unjust enrichment,’ attorney fees awarded under this doctrine are not assessed directly against the losing party (fee shifting), but come out of the fund established by the litigation, so that the beneficiaries of the litigation, not the defendant, bear this cost (fee spreading).” Nevertheless, it has been held that “direct payment of attorney fees by defendants should not be a barrier to the use of the percentage of the benefit analysis.” This is based upon the view that an “award to the class and the agreement on attorney fees represent a package deal. Even if the fees are paid directly to the attorneys, those fees are still best viewed as an aspect of the class’ recovery.”

The California Supreme Court explained that attorneys are only entitled to a fee award based on a common fund theory where an identifiable fund is established out of which the attorneys seek to recover their fees. In cases where courts have adopted the percentage or common fund method, the “benchmark” for fees is twenty-five per cent, “which may be raised or lowered under appropriate circumstances.” Moreover, it has been recognized that “when the fund is extraordinarily large, the application of a normal range of fee awards may result in a fee that is unreasonably large for the benefits conferred.” In cases filed in or removed to federal court, use of the common fund theory may be limited by the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in *Perdue v. Kenny A.*, which calls for application of the lodestar method, without any multiplier, in many circumstances.

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392 Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 27 (citations omitted).
393 Johnston v. Comerica Mortg. Corp., 83 F.3d 241, 246 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 39.
394 Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 33.
395 Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 37-38 (“We hold that here, where plaintiffs’ efforts have not effected the creation or preservation of an identifiable ‘fund’ of money out of which they seek to recover their attorneys’ fees, the ‘common fund’ exception is inapplicable.”); Cundiff, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 724-25.
396 Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 968 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); see also In re Cal. Indirect Purchases, No. 960886, 1998 WL 1031494, at *9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1998) (awarding 30% of the settlement fund); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (“[I]n class action common fund cases the better practice is to set a percentage fee and that, absent extraordinary circumstances that suggest reasons to lower or increase the percentage, the rate should be set at 30%.”); Camden I Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The majority of common fund fee awards fall between 20% to 30% of the fund,” with an upper limit of 50%); but see In re Infospace, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1206, 1210 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (recognizing that the “Ninth Circuit has established 25 percent of a settlement fund as a ‘benchmark’ award for attorneys’ fees in common fund cases” but reasoning “[t]here is nothing inherently reasonable about a 25 percent recovery, and the courts applying this method have failed to explain the basis for the idea that a benchmark fee of 25 percent is logical or reasonable”).
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE UCL

A. Arbitration Of UCL Claims

Because many businesses include arbitration provisions in their customer agreements, the enforceability of such provisions has always been an important subject in UCL jurisprudence. Following AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, however, the issue has become critical.

1. The Decision In Concepcion

Plaintiffs in Concepcion asserted UCL, CLRA and False Advertising Law claims, alleging that AT&T engaged in false advertising and fraud by advertising “free” phones but charging for sales tax. The district court held, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that the class-action waiver in the arbitration agreement between plaintiffs and AT&T rendered the agreement unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable under the rule established by the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.

In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court held that class-action waivers may be unconscionable under California law “in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money . . . .” In denying AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration, the district court noted that the Discover Bank rule provides “redress to individuals whose recovery ‘would be insufficient to justify bringing a separate action.’” Thus, according to the district court, the “net effect” of the class-action waiver and the presence of “small amounts of damages” was that “customers would not bother to pursue individual litigation or arbitration, and if precluded from participation in classwide litigation or arbitration, would effectively have no redress.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed, specifically endorsing the district court’s analysis of Discover Bank.

The United States Supreme Court reversed and abrogated Discover Bank and its progeny. The United States Supreme Court held that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration

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399 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (reversing a California Supreme Court case that held that arbitration agreements that contain class action waivers are unconscionable under California law, finding the rule preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act) (hereinafter referred to as “Concepcion”).

400 See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *1-5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; see also Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336.

401 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336–38.


403 Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *10 (citing Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 156); id. (noting that the “presence of predictably small amounts of damages (or individual gain) invokes the concern of Discover Bank that without class litigation or arbitration, individuals have no ‘method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation’”) (internal citations omitted).

404 Id.

405 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338.
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with” the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). The United States Supreme Court noted that the FAA was enacted in response to “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements” and requires arbitration agreements to be enforced unless grounds exist for “the revocation of any contract”—such as fraud, duress or unconscionability—under Section 2 of the FAA (the “savings clause”). However, in articulating a doctrine of “purposes and objectives” preemption, the United States Supreme Court held that “when a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration,” a court must determine whether the state law rule “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives,” which are principally to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.”

According to the United States Supreme Court, because the Discover Bank rule “allows any party to a consumer contract to demand [classwide arbitration] ex post . . . it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, [and therefore it] is preempted by the FAA.”

2. Arbitrability Of UCL Claims Pre-Concepcion

In two pre-Concepcion decisions, the California Supreme Court had held that while claims for monetary relief under the UCL and CLRA are arbitrable, claims for public injunctive relief are not. In Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, the California Supreme Court held that public injunctive relief claims under the CLRA are inarbitrable because certain limitations on an arbitrator’s ability to oversee enforcement of a public injunction create an inherent conflict between arbitration and the underlying purpose of public injunctive relief. Then, in Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., the California Supreme Court confirmed that UCL claims for injunctive relief are not arbitrable, but that UCL claims for restitution are. Although the California Supreme Court limited its holding in Cruz on the injunctive relief claim to “the circumstances of the . . . case,” it did not specify the “circumstances” critical to its decision. With respect to UCL monetary claims for restitution, the Court reasoned that such claims are similar to damages claims under the CLRA, which it held in Broughton to be arbitrable and to not require substantial judicial supervision.

406 Id. at 344.
407 Id. at 339, 341.
408 Id. at 341.
409 Id. at 343-44.
410 21 Cal. 4th 1066, 1079-84 (1999).
412 Id. at 307; but see Smith v. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 09cv1076 DMS (BLM), 2009 WL 4895280, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009), remanded and decided on other grounds, No. 09CV1076 DMS BLM, 2012 WL 834784 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012) (interpreting Cruz to hold that claims for injunctive relief are not arbitrable if “designed to prevent further harm to the public at large”; court found plaintiff’s class claims were not exempt from arbitration because they were not intended to benefit a particularly large group).
413 30 Cal. 4th at 317.
3. Arbitrability Of Claims Post-Concepcion

The majority of district courts to consider whether injunctive relief claims are arbitrable after Concepcion agree that the rule in Broughton/Cruz no longer applies. For example, in Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the Northern District of California reasoned that “Discover Bank itself was based upon public policy rationales intertwined with the generally applicable doctrine of unconscionability.” Discover Bank invoked Cal. Civ. Code § 1668, which provides that ‘All contracts which have for their object . . . to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own . . . violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.’ Discover Bank thus was abrogated because it “applied the unconscionability doctrine ‘in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.’” Accordingly, with respect to injunctive relief, the court concluded that “Cruz and Broughton, even more patently than Discover Bank, apply public policy contract principles to disfavor and indeed prohibit arbitration of entire categories of claims.”

In 2013, the Ninth Circuit confirmed the reasoning of these district court opinions, concluding that Concepcion forecloses application of the Broughton/Cruz rule. In Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling by the district court that the “California Legislature’s decision to allow citizens to bring injunctive relief claims . . . on behalf of the public” was not preempted by the FAA. In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit

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812 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.

Id. at 1051 (citation omitted).

Id. (citation omitted).

Id.; see also Nelson, 2011 WL 3651153, at *2 (describing Broughton/Cruz rule as a “blanket ban[]” on arbitration of injunctive relief claims and holding that Concepcion compels preemption of such a rule, notwithstanding “public policy arguments thought to be persuasive in California”).

733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013).

The now overturned district court opinion is at Ferguson, v. Corinthian Colls., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Lombardi v. DIRECTV, Inc., 546 F. App’x 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2013).
expressly held that “the Broughton-Cruz rule is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.”

Interestingly, the opinion in Ferguson came after the Ninth Circuit vacated its prior opinion in Kilgore v. Keybank, N.A. that had roundly criticized Broughton/Cruz and, instead, issued a substantially narrower en banc opinion not taking a position on the viability of that rule, but compelling arbitration on the grounds that Broughton did not apply to the facts of Kilgore. The Ninth Circuit stated: “Defendants’ alleged statutory violations have, by Plaintiffs’ own admission, already ceased, where the class affected by the alleged practices is small, and . . . there is no real prospective benefit to the public at large from the relief sought.”

California courts have also changed course, with numerous opinions now holding that the Broughton/Cruz rule is preempted by the FAA. For example, in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, the California Supreme Court held that a challenge to a class-action waiver contained in an employment arbitration agreement was preempted by the FAA, consistent with the reasoning in Concepcion. In so holding, the California Supreme Court abrogated its prior contrary opinion in Gentry v. Superior Court. Affirming a Court of Appeal decision compelling arbitration, the California Supreme Court emphasized that “Concepcion holds that even if a class waiver is exculpatory in a particular case, it is nonetheless preempted by the FAA.”

Additionally, the California Court of Appeal held in McGill v. Citibank, N.A. that California’s state-law rule against arbitrating claims for public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA and the False Advertising Law was preempted by the FAA and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion. In McGill, the Court of Appeal specifically rejected the pre-Concepcion Broughton/Cruz rule. In so holding, the Court of Appeal held that Concepcion “unmistakably declared the FAA preempts all state-law rules that prohibit arbitration of a particular type of claim because an outright ban, no matter how laudable the purpose, interferes with the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms.” The Broughton/Cruz rule, the court reasoned, fell prey to Concepcion’s “sweeping directive because

(reversing denial of arbitration following Ferguson and reasoning that “‘effective vindication’ exception to the FAA does not extend to state statutes, including the UCL and the CLRA. [ ] That customers have to arbitrate their claims for injunctive relief against DirecTV whereas DirecTV is unlikely to seek injunctive relief from its customers does not make the arbitration agreement unconscionable.”).

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421 Ferguson, 733 F.3d at 930.
422 673 F. 3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2012).
423 Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 718 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013).
425 563 U.S. 333. As discussed in more detail below, the Court in Iskanian nevertheless refused to compel arbitration of a claim brought under California’s Private Attorney General Act, a statute limited to employment claims.
426 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007), abrogated in part by Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 366.
427 Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 364.
429 Id. at 497.
it is a state-law rule that prohibits arbitration of UCL, [False Advertising Law] and CLRA injunctive relief claims brought for the public’s benefit. Finally, the Court of Appeal recognized that Concepcion “dramatically broadened the FAA’s preemptive scope” and “in turn requires a reevaluation of all state statutes and rules that allowed courts to deny enforcement of arbitration agreements.” On April 1, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s petition for review in McGill, and as of this writing the case has been argued and submitted for decision.

In Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, the plaintiff asserted class claims against a car dealer, alleging violations of the UCL, CLRA and other California statutes arising from plaintiff’s purchase of a vehicle. The dealer moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement contained in its form retail installment sales contract. The dealer raised the argument that Broughton and Cruz were “implicitly overruled” by Concepcion. The Court of Appeal did not address that argument, however, finding that Concepcion “is inapplicable where, as here, we are not addressing the enforceability of a class action waiver or a judicially imposed procedure that is inconsistent with the arbitration provision and the purposes” of the FAA. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration after concluding that the provision itself was unconscionable because, among other things, the requirement that the buyer seek injunctive relief from the arbitrator, while exempting from arbitration repossession claims by the car dealer, “is inconsistent with the CLRA.” Relying heavily on the reasoning in Broughton, the court also found an “inherent conflict” between arbitration and the purpose of injunctive relief under the CLRA— “to remedy a public wrong.” Ultimately, even if the FAA did preempt Broughton’s holding, “the court’s observations about arbitral injunctions under the CLRA remain accurate.”

The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Like the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court declined to address the continued viability of Broughton and Cruz. Unlike the Court of Appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration provision was not unconscionable. The court noted that the “potentially far-reaching nature of an injunctive relief remedy… is sufficiently apparent here to justify the extra protection” of arbitral review of injunctive relief. Further, the court noted that because arbitration is intended as an alternative to litigation, and the validity of an arbitration provision could only be viewed in the context of

430 Id. 431 Id. at 504. 432 McGill, 345 P.3d at 61. 433 61 Cal. 4th 899 (2015). 434 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 201 Cal. App. 4th 74, 89 (2011). 435 Id. at 101. 436 Id. at 101-2. 437 Id. at 102 n.6. 438 Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 924. 439 Id. at 917. 440 Id. at 913-22. 441 Id. at 917.
rights and remedies otherwise available to the parties, the fact that a self-help remedy, such as repossession, fell outside of the arbitration provision did not render the provision unconscionable. 442 Thus, the arbitration provision was not unconscionable. 443

Perhaps most importantly, the California Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of the class action waiver contained in the parties’ arbitration provision. 444 The court held that in light of Concepcion, the FAA preempts the trial court’s invalidation of the class waiver on unconscionability grounds. 445 Specifically, the court held that “imposition of class action arbitration… interferes ‘with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.’” 446

The United States Supreme Court has also enforced arbitration agreements in the UCL and CLRA contexts with its recent decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. 447 In Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 448 the California Court of Appeal held that a class-action waiver included as part of an arbitration agreement in a consumer contract remained unenforceable under California law despite the holding in Concepcion. The Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that the FAA preempts the portions of California law the Court of Appeal relied on in deciding the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. 449 Specifically, the Court found that the Court of Appeal erroneously concluded that the parties were free to refer to California law absent federal-preemption because the contract was entered into prior to the decision in Concepcion. 450 Thus, the Court found that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of California law was also preempted, and therefore remanded the case with an order to enforce the arbitration provision. 451

It should be noted that some California cases have carved out certain exceptions to enforceability of arbitration provisions despite the aforementioned opinions holding that the FAA preempts Broughton/Cruz. In Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 452 the Court of Appeal addressed the arbitrability of a claim under California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), the purpose of which “is not to recover damages or restitution, but to create a means of ‘deputizing’ citizens as private attorneys general to enforce the Labor Code.” Citing Broughton and Cruz, the court found that the “relief [under PAGA] is in large part ‘for the benefit of the general public rather than the party bringing the action,’ just as the claims for public injunctive relief in Broughton and Cruz.” 453 The court held that PAGA (which is specific to employment claims)

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442 Id. at 922.
443 Id. at 913-22.
444 Id. at 923.
445 Id. at 923-24.
446 Id. at 923 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344).
450 Id.
451 Id.
453 Id. (citation omitted).
did not conflict with the FAA because, if it did, PAGA’s primary benefit of “enforc[ing] state labor laws would, in large part, be nullified.”

The plaintiff in Iskanian, discussed above, also brought his claims in a representative capacity under PAGA. The California Supreme Court did not compel arbitration of his PAGA claims, holding that the rule that the right to bring a representative action under PAGA cannot be waived remains valid even after Concepcion and does not frustrate the FAA’s objectives. Rather, “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and the [California] Labor and Workforce Development Agency.”

Additionally, in Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, the California Supreme Court’s first major opinion on arbitration following Concepcion and American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court restated its view that the FAA, as construed in Concepcion, does not preempt generally applicable state-law rules regarding whether a contract is unconscionable. Notwithstanding its opinion in Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, the Ninth Circuit appeared to agree, based on its rulings in a matter involving the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an employment agreement. Now that Imburgia has been decided, however, it is doubtful whether future rulings from these courts will not find that the FAA preempts.

In response to the courts’ expansive application of the FAA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) proposed rules in 2016 that would prohibit entities under its jurisdiction (such as those offering credit cards, checking and deposit accounts, and all types of credit) from including class-action waivers in arbitration agreements. The CFPB received a massive volume of public comments on the proposed rules in October 2016, which precluded its quick adoption of the rules. The industry also made clear its intent to bring challenge in court if the CFPB adopted the rules as proposed. Most importantly, the election of Donald Trump and a Republican-dominated Congress, potentially willing to block the proposed rules through

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454 Id. at 502.
455 Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 384.
457 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (holding that the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery).
458 See Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. Cal. 2013) (“Federal law favoring arbitration is not a license to tilt the arbitration process in favor of the party with more bargaining power. California law regarding unconscionable contracts, as applied in this case, is not unfavorable towards arbitration, but instead reflects a generally applicable policy against abuses of bargaining power. The FAA does not preempt its invalidation of Ralphs’ arbitration policy.”).
legislation, makes the CFPB's successful blanket prohibition of class action waivers unlikely in the near term.

Looking ahead, Imburgia and Sanchez provide a strong mandate to California courts to enforce arbitration provisions in consumer contracts going forward. The California Supreme Court’s ruling in McGill v. Citibank will also help frame the next chapter in the ongoing battle on the enforceability of arbitration agreements, particularly those that include class-action waivers, as will the anticipated rulemaking by the CFPB.

B. No Right To Jury Trial

There is no right to a jury trial under the UCL.460

C. Filing A Pleading Challenge To A UCL Claim

Although demurrers and motions to dismiss rarely dispose of UCL claims,461 they sometimes are sustained based on legal defenses or obvious defects in the pleading.462 With respect to specificity of pleading, no special standard applies in state court under the UCL. For


461 See, e.g., Motors, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d at 741-42 (stating that a UCL complaint usually should be construed to withstand demurrer); Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (“California courts, however, have recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on demurrer.”); Mullins, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 891-92 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because the issue of whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived is best reserved for the jury); but see Berryman, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1556 (“We do not take the statement in Motors, Inc. to mean that a special rule applies to demurrers in cases under the UCL. It simply reflects the general rule that questions of fact—such as whether the utility of the defendant’s conduct outweighed the gravity of the harm—cannot be decided on demurrer. If, however, as here, the facts as pled would not state a claim even if they were true, the demurrer may be sustained.’”).

462 See, e.g., Cryoport Sys. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 149 Cal. App. 4th 627, 632-34 (2007) (affirming order sustaining demurrer based on lack of standing under Proposition 64); Young Am. Corp. v. Super. Ct., No. C049337, 2007 WL 2687587, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2007) (reversing denial of motion for judgment on the pleadings where plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing standing); McCann, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 1398 (demurrer upheld on appeal in action where plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged that money transmitter had duty to disclose wholesale exchange rate in addition to retail exchange rate); Gregory, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 857 (affirming trial court’s sustaining of demurrer where plaintiff’s underlying theory of “unfairness” was not sufficient as a matter of law); Searle v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1327, 1330 (2002) (affirming trial court’s sustaining of demurrer where hotel’s practice of paying “service charge” to its employees was neither “unfair” nor “fraudulent”); Shvarts, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 1158-60 (sustaining demurrer to UCL complaint without leave to amend on grounds that per-gallon fuel price could not be “unfair,” given Civil Code section allowing for charge, and could not have been likely to deceive, given full disclosure of charge on rental car contract); Lazar, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1505-06 (sustaining defendant’s demurrer to UCL claim because the challenged business practice was approved and authorized by the Legislature); Wolfe, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 568 (sustaining demurrer to a UCL claim challenging insurance companies’ alleged “unfair” practice of failing to offer earthquake insurance because the issue was a matter within the legislative domain).
example, in *Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.*, the California Supreme Court refused to hold UCL plaintiffs to the pleading standard for fraud. The Court noted that fraud is the only exception to the well-settled rule that pleading specific facts is not required to state a cause of action and, therefore, a plaintiff pleading a UCL cause of action should not be held to a higher standard. In federal court, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires UCL claims “grounded in fraud” to be pleaded with particularity.

D. Special “Anti-SLAPP” Motions

California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute authorizes the filing of a special motion to strike against causes of action arising out of conduct “in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution.” In the consumer protection context, however, California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 places critical restrictions on the use of the “anti-SLAPP” statute. Section 425.17 prohibits anti-SLAPP motions in actions: (1) brought “solely” in the public interest (subject to certain conditions); or (2) brought against a defendant engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods and services (subject to certain conditions).

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463 19 Cal. 4th at 46–47 (holding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action for an “unlawful” business practice under the UCL by pleading facts establishing a violation of the Cartwright Act).

464 See *Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA*, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102–05 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rule 9(b) applies to state claims “grounded in fraud” even if elements of fraud need not be established to state a claim; allegations of fraudulent conduct need be pleaded with particularity).


466 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). To succeed on such a motion, a defendant must first establish that the action “alleges acts in furtherance of defendant’s right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.” *DuPont Merck Pharm. Co.*, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 565; see also *Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1395–1400 (2002) (holding that anti-SLAPP statute did not apply in UCL action challenging insurer’s claims handling practices because action was not premised entirely on insurer’s reports to the California Department of Insurance). Once this first test is satisfied, the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that there is “a probability” of prevailing on the claim. See *Wilcox*, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 823; *Yu v. Signet Bank/Va.*, 103 Cal. App. 4th 298, 317 (2002) (affirming trial court’s denial of anti-SLAPP motion to strike and stating that “a plaintiff’s burden as to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment”).


E. Class Certification Of UCL Claims

A major battleground in UCL litigation is class certification. For example, in Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that “damage calculations alone [with respect to restitution] cannot defeat certification” of a UCL class claim. This case concerned a class of advertisers who claimed that Google’s pricing scheme for advertisements was deceptive because it charged them premium prices for their ads to appear on certain websites, when in reality they did not. The trial court denied certification on grounds that individual issues would predominate in calculating the amount of restitution owed to each class member based on their particular ad and expected target site. In reversing the trial court’s decision, the court held that a reasonable consumer standard could be used in calculating the damages amount, and Google’s own pricing scheme supplied a reliable method for calculating the amount received over the benefit derived; thus, individual issues did not predominate.

Likewise, in Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the court held that damage calculations would not defeat class certification. There, employees asserted a putative class action against its employer alleging violation of the UCL in failure to pay premium wages for missed meal breaks. The court found restitution was capable of being determined classwide, based on the parties’ proposed “market value approach,” whereby the court could examine time punch cards for violations of the meal break requirement and pay accordingly.

Courts have similarly rejected challenges to class certification based on arguments that individualized issues exist whether or not the putative class members each have suffered injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. As discussed above, the California Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Tobacco II concluded that only the named plaintiff must have Article III standing to bring a UCL claim on behalf of a class. Following that decision, other courts have refused to deny certification on the sole basis that a putative class may contain members that have failed to suffer an “injury-in-fact.”

On the other hand, California courts have recognized that “Tobacco II does not allow a consumer who was never exposed to an alleged false or misleading advertising . . . campaign to

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469 802 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015).
470 Id. at 986 (quoting Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th. Cir. 2010)).
471 Id. at 982.
472 Moreover, the court identified a temporal element for the restitution calculation to be applied on remand, noting that the correct measure is “the difference between what was paid and what a reasonable consumer would have paid at the time of purchase without the fraudulent or omitted information. Id. at 989 (emphasis added).
474 Id. at 1144.
475 Id. at 1163.
476 Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 314-16.
477 See, e.g., Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020-21 (reversing district court’s denial of certification on the basis that class certification under Rule 23 does not require proof that all unnamed class members have standing under Article III).
recover damages under California’s UCL.\footnote{Mazza, 666 F.3d at 595 (internal quotations omitted) citing Pfizer Inc. v. Super. Ct., 182 Cal. App. 4th 622, 632 (2010); Davis-Miller v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 201 Cal. App. 4th 106, 124-50 (2011).} Specifically, courts have vacated class certification orders where a showing of reliance cannot be inferred by a defendant’s advertising scheme.\footnote{Mazza, 666 F.3d at 594-95 (vacating certification order because each class member could not be presumed to have relied on the alleged misleading advertising given the limited scale of the defendant’s advertising campaign, thus individual issue predominated); see also In re NJOY Consumer Class Action Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d at 1109 (denying class certification on the basis of misrepresentations in advertising because the defendant’s electronic cigarette advertising campaign was not “sufficiently substantial or pervasive to give rise to a presumption that all class members were exposed to the advertisements”); Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, 660 F. App’x 531 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming trial court’s decertification of class because plaintiff failed to provide proof that damages were common to the class).} In this regard, the attack on class certification is related less to Article III standing, than it is to standing necessary to assert a claim under the UCL. In \textit{Mazza}, for instance, the court reasoned that plaintiffs sufficiently established “injury in fact” to confer Article III standing by alleging they paid more for a product because of defendant’s deceptive conduct.\footnote{Mazza, 666 F.3d at 595.} Nevertheless, the court vacated the class certification order, holding a presumption of reliance under the UCL could not be maintained because Honda’s advertising campaign was “very limited.”\footnote{Id. at 596 (“Honda’s product brochures and TV commercials fall short of the ‘extensive and long-term [fraudulent] advertising campaign’ at issue in Tobacco II . . . A presumption of reliance does not arise when class members ‘were exposed to quite disparate information from various representatives of the defendant.’”).}

Similarly, in \textit{Cohen}, the district court affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification based on its finding that individual issues predominated for purposes of the UCL because the class would include subscribers who never saw the misleading advertisements or representations before deciding to make a purchase.\footnote{Cohen, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 980 (“[W]e do not understand the UCL to authorize an award for injunctive relief and/or restitution on behalf of a consumer who was never exposed in any way to an allegedly wrongful business practice.”).} Even in \textit{Stearns}, the court referenced in dicta that its holding was not indicative of finding “predominance . . . in every California UCL case . . . [Rather,] it might well be that there [is] no cohesion among the members because they were exposed to quite disparate information from various representatives of the defendant.”\footnote{Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020.}

\section*{F. Summary Judgment Under The UCL}

“Although the issue of whether a practice is deceptive or unfair is generally a question for the trier of fact,” UCL claims can be disposed of by summary judgment when the facts are undisputed.\footnote{Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 160 Cal. App. 4th 638, 645 n.5 (2008) (citing Linear Tech. Corp., 152 Cal. App. 4th at 134-35 & n.9 (2007)) (lender’s practice of calculating interest on a monthly rather than daily basis was not “unfair” as a matter of law); see also Motors, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d at 740 (stating that, if “the utility of the conduct clearly justifies the practice, no more than a simple motion for summary judgment would be called for”).} As one California court reasoned, the issue of “whether a practice is unfair under...
the [UCL]” is a question of law because “[i]nterpretation and application of statutes is a question of law, subject to [the courts’] independent review.” Nonetheless, because UCL legal issues can be fact-intensive, motions for summary judgment succeed most often when focused on legal defenses or the absence of any factual support for a claim.

G. Removal Of UCL Actions

Federal court is an attractive forum for many UCL defendants, especially in class actions. Federal courts generally are more willing to dispose of frivolous UCL claims at the pleading or pre-trial stages, and often are more receptive to preemption arguments. As discussed below, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) allows many UCL class actions to be removed to federal court. In non-class cases, traditional removal analysis based on diversity will apply because UCL plaintiffs now must possess standing. Removal on federal question grounds in a non-class case remains difficult, however, even where federal law forms the basis of an unlawful claim.

1. Removal Based On CAFA

CAFA applies to many multi-state class actions filed on or after the date of enactment, February 18, 2005. Previously, a federal court would have diversity jurisdiction over a class action only if there was: (a) “complete diversity” of citizenship between named plaintiffs and defendants; and (b) satisfaction of the amount-in-controversy requirement by all named plaintiffs, i.e., claims for each in excess of $75,000. Thus, by naming one plaintiff from the same state as

485 People v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 68 Cal. App. 4th 654, 660 (1998) (affirming the trial court’s judgment that a laboratory did not violate the UCL by offering discounts to physicians’ private-pay patients or utilizing an “unbundled” billing system, but finding that commissions paid for marketing services were unlawful and, thus, in violation of the UCL).

486 See, e.g., Paduano v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1453, 1470-74 (2009) (finding that plaintiff had no UCL claim based on miles-per-gallon claims made consistent with preemptive federal law, but denying summary judgment on that claim because plaintiff also challenged other advertising statements outside the scope of federal preemption).


489 See, e.g., Perez v. Nidek Co., Ltd., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (“[F]ederal question jurisdiction is not created by the fact that Plaintiff’s state law claims under the CLRA and UCL hinge upon alleged violations of the FDCA and its regulations.”); Klussman v. Cross-Country Bank, No. C-01-4228-SC, 2002 WL 1000184, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2002) (removal held improper where plaintiff’s UCL claim was based on violation of FCRA because the alleged FCRA violation was not a necessary element of UCL claim—plaintiff could assert a UCL claim without the FCRA violation).

490 See, e.g., Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 938 (9th Cir. 2001). The rule regarding individual amounts in controversy was also altered, without regard to the passage of CAFA, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (holding that supplemental jurisdiction can be asserted over claims that do not exceed $75,000 so long as one plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy requirement).
the defendant or one defendant from the forum state, the alleged class could avoid removal. The
supposed class also could avoid removal by alleging that each plaintiff’s claims did not exceed
$75,000 in total, even if the aggregated amount in controversy of all plaintiffs’ claims totaled in
the millions of dollars. CAFA has greatly expanded the ability to remove cases to Federal court.

Under CAFA, individual class plaintiffs’ claims must, in the aggregate, exceed $5
million.\textsuperscript{491} Moreover, only minimal diversity between plaintiffs and defendants need be
established.\textsuperscript{492} Depending on the circumstances, CAFA may confer jurisdiction on a federal court
where “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate different from any defendant.”\textsuperscript{493} Whether a federal court ultimately exercises jurisdiction, however, is determined according to a
further set of rules. Essentially, jurisdiction is either mandatory, discretionary or precluded.

Jurisdiction is mandatory if there are 100 or more members in the class, one-third or fewer
of those class members are citizens of the forum and none of the exceptions in CAFA apply (for
example, securities fraud and derivative lawsuits are not governed by CAFA).\textsuperscript{494} Given this, most
nationwide, non-securities fraud, non-derivative class actions will proceed in federal court.

Jurisdiction is discretionary if more than one-third but fewer than two-thirds of the class
members are citizens of the forum state and the “primary” defendants also are citizens of the
forum state.\textsuperscript{495} In that event, the court must consider: (a) whether the claims asserted involve
matters of national or interstate interest; (b) whether the claims asserted will be governed by the
laws of the state where the action originally was filed or the laws of other states; (c) whether the
class action has been pled to avoid federal jurisdiction; (d) whether the state forum has a distinct
nexus with the class, the defendants or the alleged harm; (e) whether the number of class
members who are citizens of the forum state is substantially larger than the number from any
other state; and (f) whether any class action asserting similar claims has been filed in the prior three
years.\textsuperscript{496}

A federal court must decline jurisdiction if: (a) more than two-thirds of the class members
are citizens of the forum state; and (b) either (i) all of the primary defendants are citizens of the

\textsuperscript{491} 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6).

\textsuperscript{492} Moreover, whereas previously unincorporated associations were considered citizens of every state in
which their constituents were citizens, under CAFA unincorporated associations are considered citizens
only of (1) the state where they have their principal place of business and (2) the state in which they are

\textsuperscript{493} 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). In a similar manner, CAFA applies where minimal diversity of citizenship
exists because a plaintiff or defendant is a foreign state or a citizen of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(2)(B), (C).

\textsuperscript{494} 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (3), (4), (5), (9). Section 1332, subsection (d)(9), excludes class actions that
“solely” involve claims under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
claims involving corporate governance under state laws. Thus, to the extent that federal and related
state securities claims may already be heard by federal courts, while derivative actions must be heard by
state courts, CAFA effects no changes. Actions involving states and government officials also are

\textsuperscript{495} 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).

In conjunction with the changes in the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, the procedures for removal also were relaxed. For instance, in an ordinary diversity action, a defendant seeking to remove an action to federal court cannot do so unless all defendants consent. CAFA eliminated this requirement, expressly providing that class actions may be “removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants.”

This Overview touches upon only the highlights of CAFA. CAFA is a complex statute that presents many open issues.

2. Removal Based On Federal Question

Notwithstanding that a plaintiff asserts a UCL claim based entirely on a question of federal law, a federal court probably will not allow removal because the federal law is merely an “element” of plaintiff’s state law claim. Although one district court allowed removal where a UCL claim was predicated on questions of federal antitrust law, the decision seemingly is

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497 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). This sometimes is referred to as the “home state controversy” exception to CAFA jurisdiction.

498 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B). This sometimes is referred to as the “local controversy” exception to CAFA jurisdiction.

499 See, e.g., United Comput. Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2002).


501 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (holding that, because federal question jurisdiction only lies when a plaintiff’s claim “arises under” federal law, defendant could not remove case to federal court where plaintiff merely alleged violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action and federal statute itself provided no private right of action); Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2003); Klussman, 2002 WL 1000184, at *2-6 (holding that FCRA violation was not a necessary element of plaintiff’s UCL claim and that defense based on federal preemption was not sufficient to warrant removal); Pickern v. Stanton’s Rest. & Woodsman Room, No. C 01-2112 SI, 2002 WL 143817 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2002) (finding no federal court jurisdiction where violation of federal Americans with Disabilities Act was alleged as predicate law for violation of the UCL); Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 793 F. Supp. 925, 929 (1992) (relying on Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, in holding that UCL action allegedly preempted by federal law did not “arise under” federal law so as to create an appropriate “federal question” for removal purposes); Jimenez v. Bank of Am. Home Loans Servicing LP, No. CV 11-09464 MMM (Jrx), 2012 WL 353777, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb 2, 2012) (stating that a claim will not present a substantial question of federal law merely because a federal question is an “ingredient” of the claim); but see Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., No. C-02-1787-VRW, 2002 WL 1897669 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2002) (denying motions to remand in numerous cases challenging power companies’ post de-regulation conduct where plaintiff’s UCL claim primarily was based on questions of federal law).

anomalous. In addition, where the action involves securities claims, removal may be appropriate. Generally, however, removal based on federal question jurisdiction is unsuccessful.

H. Extraterritorial Application Of The UCL

Section 17203 currently states that anyone “who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Although the section formerly was limited to unfair competition “within this state,” the Legislature deleted these words in 1992. This amendment could be construed as clarifying the Legislature’s intent that the power of the California courts to remedy business practices under the UCL is coextensive with the reach of due process. In other words, as long as the “minimum contacts” test of personal jurisdiction is met, a California court may enjoin a defendant’s business practice. In fact, the Courts of Appeal have held that an out-of-state defendant may be held liable under the UCL where the conduct at issue adversely affected California residents.

Similarly, a plaintiff’s non-residency in California is not enough to preclude application of California consumer protection laws. In California, there is a two-step process to determine whether the CLRA, the UCL (and the FAL) can apply to interstate plaintiffs. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the application of California law comports with due process. Second, the onus then shifts to the defendant to show that foreign law, rather than California law, should apply to these claims. As to the first prong, the court in Arroyo explained that courts “must consider (1) where the defendant does business, (2) whether the defendant’s principal offices are

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504 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49, 1053 (holding that UCL action based on securities transactions was removable under Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p & 78bb(f) (“SLUSA”), which bars filing certain kinds of securities class actions in state court; court held that, while SLUSA only applies to actions seeking “damages,” which are not available under the UCL, that term should be interpreted broadly to encompass claims for restitution and disgorgement under the UCL).

505 By contrast, section 17500 contains language that could be interpreted to limit the statute’s extraterritorial application. Section 17500 prohibits false or misleading statements made “before the public in this state” and “from this state before the public in any state.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500.

506 See Yu v. Signet Bank/Va., 69 Cal. App. 4th 1377, 1391 (1999) (holding that plaintiffs could sue Virginia bank under the UCL for acts that allegedly occurred in Virginia since, “[i]n the absence of any federal preemption, a defendant who is subject to jurisdiction in California and who engages in out-of-state conduct that injures a California resident may be held liable for such conduct in a California court”); Application Grp., Inc. v. Hunter Grp., Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 908 (1998) (affirming trial court’s decision that out-of-state employer’s use of unlawful non-compete clause violated the UCL).

507 Arroyo, 666 F.3d at 589-95.

508 Arroyo, 2015 WL 5698752, at *3 (explaining that this inquiry involves establishing “sufficient contacts between alleged misconduct and the state”) (internal quotations omitted).

509 Arroyo, 666 F.3d at 590
located in California, (3) where the potential class members are located, and (4) the location from which the advertising and promotional literature decisions were made.510

The decision in Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Court,511 however, limits the extraterritorial application of the UCL.512 Addressing the issue in the context of nationwide class certification, the Court of Appeal held that the UCL could not be used to regulate conduct unconnected to California.513 Specifically, the court held that the UCL would not apply to claims of class members residing outside of California for conduct occurring outside of California by a company headquartered outside of California.514 Norwest was extended in Aghaji v. Bank of America, N.A., where the Court of Appeal determined that the non-California plaintiffs could not assert UCL claims without alleging that the harm they suffered emanated from California.515

Courts also have considered the effect of choice-of-law provisions under the above Norwest rule. In Ice Cream Distributors of Evansville, LLC v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc.516 plaintiff alleged that defendant violated the UCL when employees outside of California made fraudulent statements at the direction of employees in California, which resulted in termination of plaintiff's business relationships with several regional ice cream distributors and convenience stores. Plaintiff argued that it was permitted to bring a UCL claim for out-of-state conduct pursuant to the choice-of-law provision in the underlying distribution agreement with

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512 See Tidenberg v. Bidz.com, Inc., No. CV 08-5553 PSG (FMOx), 2009 WL 605249, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009) (following Norwest and noting that, while defendant's principal place of business is in California, that fact alone does not permit application of the UCL to the claims of nonresident plaintiffs; plaintiff did not allege that defendant, operator of a web business, actually engaged in misleading conduct in California); see also Standfacts Credit Servs. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1147-48 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd, 294 F. App'x 271 (9th Cir. 2008) (following Norwest and dismissing UCL claim brought by non-resident plaintiffs); Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1206-09 (2011) (citing Norwest and holding that the UCL did not apply to claims of nonresident plaintiffs of failure to pay overtime where work was performed outside of California but employer was a California company); but see Ehret, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding sufficient nexus with California where alleged misrepresentations were developed in California and contained on websites and an application that were maintained in California and billing and payment of services went through servers located in California).


defendant. Under that provision, the agreement would be “governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California without regard to any contrary conflicts of law principles.” The district court rejected plaintiff’s argument, finding that the provision did not provide for extra-territorial application of the UCL, but instead addressed under what law the agreement would be construed. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff’s UCL claim because the alleged fraudulent statements still were made outside of California and plaintiff was a limited liability corporation based in Kentucky. As stated by the court, the UCL does not extend to “actions occurring outside of California that injure non-residents.” The court additionally noted that plaintiff’s allegation that defendant’s employees outside of California made false statements at the direction of two California-based employees was bare and insufficient to suggest that the falsehoods were “prepared in and emanated from” California, which would have been sufficient to allege liability under the UCL.

In contrast, the Court of Appeal in Schlesinger v. Superior Court found that contractual choice-of-law and forum-selection provisions are relevant to the Norwest analysis. Plaintiffs in Schlesinger alleged that Ticketmaster violated the UCL by: (1) deceiving customers into believing that fees charged on its website were pass-through costs, instead of sources of profit for Ticketmaster; and (2) making a processing charge mandatory and not allowing its customers to use an alternative delivery system. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the False Advertising Law and CLRA. Under the choice-of-law provision in Ticketmaster’s online purchase agreement, a customer agreed that disputes under the purchase agreement would “be governed by the laws of the State of California without regard to its conflict of law provisions and you consent to personal jurisdiction, and agree to bring all actions, exclusively in state and federal courts located in Los Angeles County, California.” Ticketmaster argued that the UCL does not apply to out-of-state residents, but the court found no express geographic restriction in the UCL. Also, unlike the defendant in Norwest, Ticketmaster’s headquarters and principal place of business is in California and, more importantly, Ticketmaster required its customers to agree to the application of California law. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal issued an order directing the Superior Court to vacate its order denying certification of a nationwide class and instead enter a new order granting plaintiffs’ motion to certify a nationwide class as to the first UCL claim and the False Advertising Law claim.

The lack of geographical restrictions under the UCL also implicate considerations when determining whether to certify a nationwide class under California’s consumer protection laws. Generally, a court will consider whether California has “significant contact or significant

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517 Id. at *8.
518 Id.
519 Id. (quoting Standfacts Credit Servs., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1148).
520 Id. (citing Wershba, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 241-44 (2001)).
522 Id. at *2.
523 Id.
524 Id. at *7.
525 Id. at *6.
aggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts creating state interests, in order to ensure that the choice of [forum] is not arbitrary or unfair.”

In this regard, courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether California has sufficient contact to the asserted claims. Upon a determination that California has sufficient contacts to the claims of the nationwide class, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the interests of the other state’s laws is greater than California’s.

Another issue courts face with respect to the extraterritorial application of the UCL is whether district attorneys may bring public prosecutor actions seeking to obtain relief outside of the counties in which they have jurisdiction. In The People of the State of California v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the district attorneys for the counties of San Francisco and Los Angeles sought to obtain civil penalties and restitution on behalf of citizens throughout California, but the court granted a motion to strike their claims to the extent they related to operations outside of those two counties. The court reasoned that “[w]hile it is undisputed that [district attorneys] may act on the People’s behalf, they do not have the power to restrain the right of other district attorneys to seek restitution and civil penalties for violations that occurred within their respective territories.” Resolution of this issue is important as it may have implications for state-wide injunctive relief claims, as well as settlement agreements in cases where plaintiffs purport to sue on behalf of all California residents.

I. Notice To The Attorney General’s Office Of Appellate Matters

California Business & Professions Code section 17209 requires that, where a proceeding involving the UCL is commenced in California’s appellate courts, the party commencing the proceeding shall provide notice to the California Attorney General and to the district attorney of the county in which the action originally was filed.

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526 See Rutledge, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 1186 (internal quotations omitted).
527 See id. (holding California contacts were sufficiently linked to nationwide class claims where defendant created a national advertising campaign by a California agency; defendant’s contracts with manufacture of computers were governed under California law; defendant designated California service provider for computer repairs; and defendant’s witnesses were located in California); Wershba, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 242 (holding application of California law for settlement purposes appropriate when defendant is a California corporation; has its principle place of business in California; has brochures promising free technical support for products that were made and distributed from California; and the policy to terminate the technical support at issue in the case was made at defendant’s headquarters in California).
528 Rutledge, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 1188 (explaining the trial court improperly placed the burden on appellant class members “to persuasively articulate why California has a special obligation that would fairly call for it to assume the burden of adjudicating a nationwide class action”).
530 Id. at 2-3.
531 Id. at 3. This limitation contrasts sharply with the private UCL litigant’s relatively expansive power to seek state-wide injunctive relief on behalf of the public. See, e.g., Robinson v. U–Haul Company, 4 Cal. App. 5th 304, 320 (2016) (affirming state-wide injunction of “broad public interest” against defendant franchisor).
532 Section 17209 provides:
J. Insurance Coverage For UCL Actions

Although the availability of coverage depends upon the terms and conditions of the relevant policy and the circumstances of each case, a UCL claim generally falls outside the scope of coverage or, in some cases, may be expressly excluded. In Bank of the West v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that there was no coverage under a standard comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policy for a settling UCL defendant. Since Bank of the West, other courts likewise have determined that UCL claims are not covered under most standard CGL policies.

If a violation of [the UCL] is alleged or the application or construction of [the UCL] is in issue in any proceeding in the Supreme Court of California, a state court of appeal, or the appellate division of a superior court, each person filing any brief or petition with the court in that proceeding shall serve, within three days of filing with the court, a copy of that brief or petition on the Attorney General, directed to the attention of the Consumer Law Section at a service address designated on the Attorney General’s official Web site for service of papers under this section or, if no service address is designated, at the Attorney General’s office in San Francisco, California, and on the district attorney of the county in which the lower court action or proceeding was originally filed. Upon the Attorney General’s or district attorney’s request, each person who has filed any other document, including all or a portion of the appellate record, with the court in addition to a brief or petition shall provide a copy of that document without charge to the Attorney General or the district attorney within five days of the request. The time for service may be extended by the Chief Justice or presiding justice or judge for good cause shown. No judgment or relief, temporary or permanent, shall be granted or opinion issued until proof of service of the brief or petition on the Attorney General and district attorney is filed with the court.


Many policies include express exclusions for willful or fraudulent acts. Because intent is not an element of a UCL claim, even if based on an alleged “fraudulent” business practice, such an exclusion would not appear to be applicable.

Specifically, the Court held that there was no coverage for the UCL action as a claim for damages because of “Advertising Injury.” Id. The Court reasoned, among other things, that: (1) “damages” were not available under the UCL—only restitution and injunctive relief were available; and (2) “unfair competition,” as used in the insurance policy, referred only to the common law tort of unfair competition and did not include a statutory violation of the UCL. Id. at 1261-73, 1277.

THE CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT

I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CLRA

A. Purpose Of The CLRA

“The CLRA was enacted in an attempt to alleviate social and economic problems stemming from deceptive business practices . . . ” 536 As stated by the Court of Appeal, “the [CLRA] is a legislative embodiment of a desire to protect California consumers and furthers a strong public policy of this state.” 537 To achieve that end, the CLRA proscribes 24 specified business acts or practices. The Legislature intended that courts construe the CLRA liberally to “protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” 538

B. Coverage Of The CLRA

The CLRA provides “consumers” with a private right of action for “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in connection with “a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services.” 539 The CLRA applies to both actions and material omissions by a defendant. 540 Although not expressly limited to California residents and transactions, California courts have indicated that the CLRA does not apply to conduct that affects non-California residents and occurs entirely outside California. 541

536 Broughton, 21 Cal. 4th at 1077.
538 Cal. Civ. Code § 1760. However, CLRA claims filed in federal courts are subject to more stringent federal procedural standards. See Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that, where conduct complained of is grounded in fraud, CLRA claims must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard) (citing Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103-06 (state law claims are subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards when grounded in fraud)).
540 See, e.g., Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F. 3d 1136, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2012) (CLRA claims may be based on fraudulent omissions if the omissions are contrary to representations made by the defendant, or are omissions of fact that the defendant was obliged to disclose) (citing Daugherty, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 835); Rutledge, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 1173 (“In order to be deceived, members of the public must have had an expectation or an assumption about the materials used in the product.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); but see Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 (“In light of Wilson and overwhelming authority, manufacturers are duty-bound to disclose only information about a product’s safety risks and product defects. The duty to disclose does not extend to situations . . . where information may persuade a consumer to make different purchasing decisions.”).
541 See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 917-18 (dismissing CLRA claims and holding that CLRA “cannot provide relief for non-California residents who cannot allege a sufficient connection to California”).
1. Who Is A “Consumer”?

The CLRA defines a “consumer” as “an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.” Courts strictly enforce this provision and do not allow individuals who lease or purchase goods or services for business purposes to proceed under the CLRA. Moreover, a “consumer” must have purchased the good or service, or have been assigned the purchaser’s rights. One who obtains mere possession of a good is insufficient. Even plaintiffs pursuing CLRA claims solely for injunctive relief must satisfy traditional standing requirements to be considered a “consumer.” Thus, a plaintiff’s failure to establish that he falls within the CLRA’s definition of “consumer” generally defeats his ability to represent a class.

2. Damages And Causation Are Required Elements.

To state a cause of action for an alleged violation of the CLRA, section 1780(a) requires allegations of actual damages caused by the conduct at issue:

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543 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (CLRA inapplicable to commercial or government contracts, or to contracts formed by nonprofit organizations and other non-commercial groups) (citing Cal. Grocers Ass’n, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 217); Frezza v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-00237-RMW, 2012 WL 5877587 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (dismissing CLRA claim where plaintiff had enrolled in service for business purpose); Zepeda v. PayPal, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding individuals who primarily used website to sell goods or services did not constitute “consumers” under the CLRA).

544 See Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc., 125 Cal. App. 4th 949, 960 (2005) (plaintiff lacked standing to assert CLRA claim because she did not acquire the good as a result of her own purchase—it was a gift—she was not a “consumer” under section 1761(d)); Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. B188081, 2006 WL 3823522, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006) (plaintiff lacked standing to assert CLRA claim because he could not allege the existence of a “transaction” between him and defendant under section 1761(e)); Bristow v. Lycoming Engines, No. CIV S-06-1947 LKK/GGH, 2007 WL 1752602, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2007) (denying certification of CLRA subclass where title to plane with defective crankshaft was held by plaintiff’s corporation); but see Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1302, 1303 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (where plaintiff alleged purchase through retail channels and communications with company’s customer service representatives, he possessed standing to sue as a “consumer” under the CLRA but not as a competitor of defendant under the Lanham Act).

545 See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 966 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing CLRA claim seeking injunctive relief for failure to properly allege standing); see also In re Fluidmaster, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 958-59 (dismissing CLRA claim seeking prospective injunctive relief for lack of standing because the relief sought would not remedy the named plaintiff’s injury).

546 See Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 143 Cal. App. 3d 128, 142 (1983) (because plaintiff was not a “member of the consumer class,” he could not maintain a CLRA class action); but see Schneider v. Vennard, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1340, 1347 (1986) (“[W]hile class actions brought under section 382 are not governed exclusively by the procedures outlined in section 1781, these procedures may provide guidance in such actions.”).
Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by section 1770 may bring an action against that person to recover.\textsuperscript{547}

“Relief under the CLRA is specifically limited to those who suffer damage, making causation a necessary element of proof.”\textsuperscript{548} Moreover, the alleged violation of the CLRA must take place prior to the sale at issue in order to be the basis for a claim.\textsuperscript{549}

In Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P.,\textsuperscript{550} the California Supreme Court confirmed this rule and elaborated on what constitutes “damage” sufficient to state a claim under the CLRA. The Court of Appeal in Meyer affirmed a trial court ruling sustaining a demurrer to a complaint challenging arbitration and other provisions in a contract as illegal and/or unconscionable. The trial court had reasoned that none of these provisions actually had been invoked against plaintiffs, so plaintiffs could not establish causation or damages under the CLRA, thus defeating the claim. On appeal to the California Supreme Court, plaintiffs principally argued that “the very presence of unconscionable terms within a consumer contract, in violation of section 1770, subdivision

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[547] Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a) (emphasis added).
\item[548] Wilens v. TD Waterhouse Grp., Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 746, 754 (2003); accord True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“With respect to Plaintiff’s CLRA claim for false advertising, California law clearly holds that causation, in the form of reliance, likewise is an essential element of such claims.”) (citing numerous cases); Buckland, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 811 (“Actual reliance is an element of a CLRA claim sounding in fraud.”); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1292 (“[T]his limitation on relief requires that plaintiffs in a CLRA action show not only that a defendant’s conduct was deceptive but that the deception caused them harm.”); Cholakyan, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (standing for plaintiff asserting misrepresentation claim under the CLRA requires, in addition to establishing actual injury as a result of defendant’s alleged conduct, that plaintiff relied on a material misrepresentation); Perez v. Nidek Co., Ltd., 711 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding plaintiff did not state CLRA claim for injunctive relief because there was no ongoing conduct to enjoin and declining to reach preemption ground on which district court dismissed); Janney v. Gen. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 2d 806, 817-18 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss CLRA (and UCL/FAL) claims on ground that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged misrepresentations regarding whether granola bars were “natural”); Epstein v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 13 Civ. 4744(KPF), 2014 WL 1133567 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2014) (plaintiff who received refund of allegedly improperly charged interest prior to filing suit had not suffered actual injury and lacked standing to sue individually or on behalf of a putative class under the CLRA); Brooks v. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC, 246 Cal. App. 4th 973 (2016), ordered not to be officially published (Aug. 10, 2016) (plaintiff lacked standing to sue absent actual injury; mere violation of Cal. Veh. Code Section 11713.18 did not satisfy or dispense with the “actual injury” requirement under the CLRA and UCL); Rojas-Lozano, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1114-15 (Plaintiff failed to allege she suffered any damages because “Google’s profit is not Plaintiff’s damage.”).
\item[550] 45 Cal. 4th 634 (2009).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
(a)(14) and (19), constitutes a form of damage within the meaning of section 1780(a),” and thus, confers standing under the CLRA. The Court rejected this argument, affirming the trial court’s reasoning that plaintiffs could not establish damages without defendant actually enforcing the allegedly unconscionable provisions. The Court concluded that, “in order to bring a CLRA action, not only must a consumer be exposed to an unlawful practice, but some kind of damage must result.” Notably, the Court additionally held that the requirement that the consumers have suffered damage extends as well to actions under the CLRA for injunctive relief.

The Court, however, broadly interpreted the phrase “any damages,” concluding that it is not limited to pecuniary damages, but also can include transaction and opportunity costs, such as attorneys’ fees in connection with the challenged practice or loss of an opportunity to do business elsewhere. Accordingly, the Court found that California’s Legislature had “set a low but nonetheless palpable threshold of damage.” Thus, California courts have recognized that “damage” under the CLRA is not synonymous with “actual damages,” and may encompass “harm other than pecuniary damages.”

3. What Constitutes The “Sale Or Lease Of Goods Or Services”?

Until recently, there were few published cases addressing this issue. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Legislature arguably intended to limit the CLRA to traditional sales transactions. 551 Id. at 641.

552 Id.

553 Id. at 646.

554 Id. at 642-44.

555 Id. at 646; see also Boone v. S & F Mgmt. Co., Inc., No. G040426, 2009 WL 3049309, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2009) (explaining that, in order to bring a CLRA action, a consumer must be exposed to an improper practice, and some form of harm must result); see also Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (district court must remand to state court instead of dismissing the case because a California court could have found standing under CLRA for allegations that plaintiff would not have purchased defendant’s product that was marketed as diabetes treatment on the same terms had she known the true facts, despite the district court’s undisputed factual findings that plaintiff did not have diabetes and that plaintiff discontinued taking diabetes medication at least five months before purchasing defendant’s product).

556 Lengen, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1221-22 (rejecting defendant’s claim that it had already provided for the damages sought by plaintiffs, even though it had provided for a full refund for all those persons affected by the contaminated Cheerios products, because plaintiffs sought more than a “mere refund”; they also sought “compensatory, exemplary, punitive and statutory penalties and damages”); Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1111 (2010) (quoting In re Steroid Hormone Prod. Cases, 181 Cal. App. 4th 145, 156 (2010)).

557 A “transaction” under the CLRA is defined as “an agreement between a consumer and another person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(e); see also Nordberg v. Trilegiant Corp., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1095-97 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s contention that, because defendant automatically enrolled plaintiffs in discount programs, plaintiffs did not “seek” the services of defendant and, therefore, were not “consumers” under the CLRA, but accepting argument that there was no “transaction”).
purchases of consumer goods and related services,\textsuperscript{558} and legislative history supports this conclusion.\textsuperscript{559} Nonetheless, given that the CLRA is to be construed “liberally,”\textsuperscript{560} plaintiffs argue that it applies in nearly every type of consumer transaction, except where expressly exempted from coverage. For example, in \textit{Ladore v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, LLC},\textsuperscript{561} the Northern District of California found that videogame software is a good as that term as defined in the CLRA. In so holding, the court emphasized that the plaintiff “did not simply buy or download (arguably) ‘intangible’ software, or otherwise play an online game” but instead “went to a brick-and-mortar store . . . where he paid for and received a tangible product,” specifically the “game disc.”\textsuperscript{562}

Nevertheless, a growing body of case law now holds that certain consumer transactions, not expressly exempted from the CLRA, do not fall within the purview of the CLRA — i.e., are not “goods” or “services” as defined by the CLRA.\textsuperscript{563} Most notably, the California Supreme Court found in \textit{Fairbanks v. Superior Court} that insurance is not a “good” or a “service” as defined by the CLRA.\textsuperscript{564} In \textit{Fairbanks}, plaintiffs alleged that Farmers Group, Inc. and Farmers New World Life Insurance Company deceptively marketed and administered their life insurance policies in violation of the CLRA.\textsuperscript{565} The Court found that life insurance is not a “tangible chattel,” and therefore, not a “good.”\textsuperscript{566}

\textsuperscript{558} \textit{See}, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a) (“transaction[s] intended to result or that result[] in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(a) (“tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(b) (“including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods”).
\textsuperscript{559} \textit{See} Assemb. J., Sept. 23, 1970, p. 8465–66 (in a Report Relative to Assemb. Bill No. 292, the Assembly Judiciary Committee Members detailed a non-exhaustive list of unfair business practices, which focused on purchases of goods and services, such as the sale of tires, perfume and automobiles).
\textsuperscript{560} \textit{See} Cal. Civ. Code § 1760; \textit{Shin v. BMW of N. Am.}, No. CV 09-00398 AHM (AJW), 2009 WL 2163509, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2009) (on claim of omission of material fact under the CLRA, finding that “transaction” is broadly defined as an agreement between a consumer and any other person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement).
\textsuperscript{561} 75 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
\textsuperscript{562} \textit{Id.}; \textit{see also} \textit{Haskins v. Symantec Corp.}, No. 13-cv-1834-JST, 2013 WL 6234610, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (software disc is a tangible good because “[a] consumer can purchase [it] in a store, pick it up in her hands, and carry it home.”), \textit{aff’d}, 654 F. App’x. 338 (9th Cir. 2016).
\textsuperscript{563} \textit{See} \textit{Cornu v. Norton Cmty. Apartments, L.P.}, No. B207802, 2009 WL 1961013, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 9, 2009) (concluding that apartment leases are not “goods” as defined by the CLRA because an apartment is real property, not a tangible chattel); \textit{Maraziti v. Fid. Nat’l Title Co.}, No. E045812, 2009 WL 3067074, at *6–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2009) (defendant, a trustee in foreclosure, did not perform “services” apart from those necessary to accomplish the foreclosure; further, foreclosure proceedings are not “transactions” within the purview of the CLRA); \textit{I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc.}, 905 F. Supp. 2d 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing because “Facebook Credits, ‘separate and apart from a specific purchase or lease of a good or service,’ are not covered by the CLRA”).
\textsuperscript{564} 46 Cal. 4th 56, 61 (2009).
\textsuperscript{565} \textit{Id.} at 59.
\textsuperscript{566} \textit{Id.} at 61.
the CLRA, the Court reasoned that a “contractual obligation to pay money under a life insurance policy is not work or labor, nor is it related to the sale or repair of any tangible chattel.”

The Court also concluded that the ancillary services that insurers provide, such as “services related to the maintenance, value, use, redemption, resale, or repayment of the intangible item,” do not bring the intangible chattel within the coverage of the CLRA. The Court reasoned that doing so “would defeat the apparent legislative intent in limiting the definition of ‘goods’ to include only ‘tangible chattels’.” Since *Fairbanks*, trial courts have applied its reasoning to other areas, such as apartment leases and mortgage loans.

The Court of Appeal in *Berry v. American Express Publishing, Inc.* similarly relied on the CLRA’s legislative history in holding that the CLRA does not apply to the issuance of a credit card. When it enacted the CLRA, the Legislature deleted users of “money” and “credit” from a definition of the term “consumer” in an early draft of the bill. Based in part on this

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567 *Id.; see also Consumer Sols. REO, LLC v. Hillery*, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1016-17 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing *Fairbanks* and emphasizing that loans are intangible goods and that ancillary services provided in the sale of intangible goods do not bring these goods within the coverage of the CLRA).

568 *Fairbanks*, 46 Cal. 4th at 65; see also *McKell*, 142 Cal. App. 4th at 1465, 1488 (affirming order sustaining demurrer to CLRA claim challenging mortgage lender’s alleged practice of charging borrowers fees for underwriting, tax services and wire transfers in excess of the lender’s actual costs on grounds that the CLRA did not apply because the transactions involved sales of real property, not goods or services); *Berryman*, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1558 (affirming order sustaining demurrer to CLRA claim challenging fees charged for document and transfer fees on the ground that the “transaction does not involve the ‘sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer’ as contemplated by the CLRA”).

569 *Fairbanks*, 46 Cal. 4th at 65.

570 *Cornu*, 2009 WL 1961013, at *6 (citing *Fairbanks* and concluding that apartment leases are not “goods,” as defined by the CLRA; an apartment is real property, not a tangible chattel); *Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Inc.*, No. 2:10-cv-02799 LKK, 2011 WL 1103439, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (holding that the CLRA did not encompass plaintiff’s claims arising from his attempted loan modification, on the grounds that “loans are intangible goods” and “ancillary services provided in the sale of intangible goods do not bring these goods within the coverage of the CLRA”); *Sanders v. Choice Mfg. Co., Inc.*, No. 11-3725 SC, 2011 WL 6002639, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) (“[A]n insurer’s contractual obligation to pay money under a life insurance policy is not work or labor, nor is it related to the sale or repair of any tangible chattel” and therefore does not qualify as a good or a service under the CLRA).

571 *Alborzian*, 235 Cal. App. 4th at 40 (citing *Fairbanks* and concluding a mortgage loan is not a “good” or “service” as defined by the CLRA; a loan is not a “good” because it is not “tangible chattel,” nor is it a “service” because it is not “work, labor, or services . . . furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods”).

572 147 Cal. App. 4th 224, 233 (2007) (affirming order sustaining demurrer to CLRA claim seeking to enjoin enforcement of credit card arbitration provision).

573 *Id.* at 230 (“‘Early drafts of section 1761, subdivision (d), defined ‘Consumer’ as ‘an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods, services, money, or credit for personal, family or household purposes.’ (Assemb. Bill No. 292 (1970 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 21, 1970, italics added.) But the Legislature removed the references to ‘money’ and ‘credit,’ before CLRA’s enactment, and they do not appear in the current version.”).
deletion, the Berry court concluded that “neither the express text of [the] CLRA nor its legislative history supports the notion that credit transactions separate and apart from any sale or lease of goods or services are covered under the act.” 574 The California Supreme Court denied review in Berry, and several courts have followed it. 575 Prior to Fairbanks, some courts criticized Berry or otherwise read the term “consumer transactions” broadly. 576 Whether these cases retain viability in the post-Fairbanks world remains to be seen.

Some courts also have drawn a distinction between tangible goods and incorporeal rights in determining what is a “good” or “service.” 577

574 Berry, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 233.

575 See, e.g., O’Donovan v. CashCall, Inc., No. C 08-03174 MEJ, 2009 WL 1833990, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2009) (following Berry and dismissing CLRA claim challenging practice allowing defendant to make preauthorized electronic debits for loan payments from debtor’s bank account); Ball v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 164 Cal. App. 4th 794, 798-99 (2008) (following Berry and affirming denial of leave to amend complaint to add CLRA claim alleging that class-action waiver in credit card agreement was unconscionable); In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 953, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (following Berry and dismissing CLRA claim challenging allegedly excessive late fees and overlimit fees); Van Slyke v. Capital One Bank, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358-59 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (following Berry and dismissing CLRA claim challenging credit card arbitration provision and disclosures regarding various fees and “penalties”); Augustine v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (following Berry and dismissing CLRA claim challenging practice of retroactively increasing credit card interest rates).


577 See, e.g., Wofford, 2011 WL 5445054, at *2 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim that defendants violated the CLRA by fraudulently inducing them to download harmful software, on the grounds, among others, that software is not a tangible good or service under the CLRA; it is not goods because it is not “tangible chattels” and it is not a service because it does “not fit into the narrow definition of ‘service’ provided in Civil Code § 1761(b)”; In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (“[A]ll of Plaintiffs’ allegations against [Defendant] appear to be about software . . . Software is neither a ‘good’ nor a ‘service’ within the meaning of the CLRA.”); Sproul v. Oakland Raiders, Nos. A104542, A106658, 2005 WL 1941388, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005) (holding that “personal seat licenses,” which entitled plaintiffs to purchase season tickets to home and post-season games, were not tangible chattels and, therefore, were not covered by the CLRA); Boling v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. G034203, 2005 WL 1186519, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 19, 2005) (holding that vacation property timeshares, which were intangible “incorporeal
4. Exemptions

The CLRA does not apply to the sale of real property, including the sale or construction of residential housing, and commercial or industrial buildings. Those in the business of advertising also are outside the reach of the CLRA, provided that such persons do not have knowledge of any deceptive methods, acts or practices. In addition, the CLRA is probably unavailable in actions against a governmental entity.

II. LIABILITY UNDER THE CLRA – SECTION 1770(a)

A. Prohibited Acts

Section 1770 states the CLRA’s prohibitions. They are as follows:

1. Passing off goods or services as those of another.
2. Misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services.
3. Misrepresenting the affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another.
4. Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services.
5. Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or qualities that they do not have or that a person has a

rights in real property,” were not “goods” under the CLRA) (citing Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 8 Cal. 4th 868, 875 (1994) (intangible property “is generally defined as property that is a ‘right’ rather than a physical object” but “[t]angible property is that which is visible and corporeal, having substance”), and Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 232 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96 (1965) (the “portion of the gross receipts representing the transfer of the leases (a chattel real) was not taxable because, although personal property, it was not tangible property”); Rojas-Lozano, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1116 (holding that Google’s reCAPTCHA software—“a one-time use software program used as a gate-keeper to Internet sites”—was neither a good nor a service).

See Cal. Civ. Code § 1754; McKell, 142 Cal. App. 4th at 1488 (confirming that the CLRA does not apply to “the sale of real property”).

See Cal. Civ. Code § 1755 (“Nothing in this title shall apply to the owners or employees of any advertising medium, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines, broadcast stations, billboards and transit ads, by whom any advertisement in violation of this title is published or disseminated.”).


Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(1)–(23) and (b)(1).

In Colgan, a product advertised as “[M]ade in the USA,” which was primarily assembled in the United States, but consisted of parts made in other countries, violated the CLRA. 135 Cal. App. 4th at 677. The Court of Appeal confirmed that “[t]he standards for determining whether a representation is misleading under the False Advertising Law apply equally to claims under the CLRA. Conduct that is ‘likely to mislead a reasonable consumer’ thus violates the CLRA.” Id. at 680 (quoting Nagel, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 54) (citation omitted).

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sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection that he or she does not have.\footnote{Courts typically interpret subsections (a)(5), (7) and (9) as proscribing “both fraudulent omissions and fraudulent affirmative misrepresentations.” See, e.g., Herron v. Best Buy Co., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2013); see also Gray v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 22 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D.N.J. 2014) (plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant failed to disclose defect in convertible top stated a claim under the CLRA); but see Kowalsky v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same as the standard for deceptive practices under the fraudulent prong of the UCL, “a representation will not violate the CLRA if the defendant did not know, or have reason to know, of the facts that rendered the representation misleading at the time it was made”).}

6. Representing that goods are original or new if they have deteriorated unreasonably or are altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used or secondhand.

7. Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality or grade or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are not.\footnote{See Simpson, 219 Cal. App. 4th 1352 (finding no reasonable consumer would be misled by package labeling to believe product was pure butter rather than butter and oil).}

8. Disparaging the goods, services or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact.

9. Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.\footnote{Again, the test that courts apply to this provision is similar to that for the UCL—whether the advertisement is likely to deceive or mislead a reasonable consumer. See Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1360 (finding that the reasonable consumer standard applies to the CLRA as it does to the UCL); see also Verdiner v. Pep Boys, No. B165747, 2004 WL 1146705, at *6, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2004) (reversing dismissal of CLRA claim without leave to amend where plaintiff alleged that defendant misled consumers by advertising labor charges as “hourly” when labor was charged using estimated repair times regardless of actual time spent); Chapman, 220 Cal. App. 4th at 230 (reversing order granting demurrer because “whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived by the representation that the calling plan is ‘Unlimited’ is a question of fact”); Yordy v. Plimus, Inc., No. C12-0229 TEH, 2013 WL 5832225 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2013) (denying class certification where plaintiff failed to show common questions existed regarding defendant’s involvement in allegedly misleading marketing scheme); see also Perez, 711 F.3d at 1114 (holding that plaintiff did not state CLRA claim for injunctive relief based on alleged unapproved use of surgical laser because there was no ongoing conduct to enjoin); Rasmussen, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 1039-43 (“puffery” defense applies to claims brought under CLRA).}

10. Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity.

11. Advertising furniture without clearly indicating that it is unassembled if that is the case.

12. Advertising the price of unassembled furniture without clearly indicating the assembled price of that furniture if the same furniture is available assembled from the seller.

13. Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reduction.

14. Representing that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies or obligations which it does not have or involve, or that are prohibited by law.
15. Representing that a part, replacement, or repair service is needed when it is not.
16. Representing that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not.
17. Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other economic benefit, if earning the benefit is contingent on an event to occur after the transaction.
18. Misrepresenting the authority of a salesperson, representative, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a transaction.
19. Inserting an unconscionable provision in a contract.
20. Advertising that a product is being offered at a specific price plus a percentage of that price unless: (A) the total price is set forth in the advertisement; and (B) the specific price plus a specific percentage of that price represents a markup from the seller’s costs or from the wholesale price of the product.\footnote{See Peralta v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. D039510, 2003 WL 996217, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2003) (where room service included prices for individual menu items in addition to disclosed service charges and taxes, it did not offend section 1770(a)(20), which plainly indicates that it was intended to apply to situations where consumers may be “unduly confused about the price of a certain product by misleading shelf tags, displays, and media advertising”).}
21. Selling or leasing goods in violation of Chapter 4 . . . of Title 1.7 (concerning “Grey Market Goods”).
23. The home solicitation, as defined in subdivision (h) of section 1761, of a consumer who is a senior citizen where a loan is made encumbering the primary residence of that consumer for the purposes of paying for home improvements and where the transaction is part of a pattern or practice in violation of either subsection (h) or (i) of Section 1639 of Title 15 of the United States Code or subsection (e) of section 226.32 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations.\footnote{See Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 et seq.}
24. Prohibiting mortgage brokers and lenders, “directly or indirectly, to use a home improvement contractor to negotiate the terms of any loan that is secured, whether in whole or in part, by the residence of the borrower and that is used to finance a home improvement contract or any portion” thereof.

B. Frequently Litigated Prohibitions

1. \textbf{Section 1770(a)(14) – Representing That A Transaction Confers Or Involves Rights, Remedies Or Obligations That It Does Not Have Or Involve, Or That Are Prohibited By Law}

Section 1770(a)(14) provides consumers with a basis to invalidate contracts. Courts have construed section 1770(a)(14) to include “oral misrepresentations or promises concerning the...
rights, remedies or obligations under a written contract.” Thus, the Legislature “intended to repudiate any purported bar or defense based on the parol evidence doctrine.”

2. **Section 1770(a)(17) – Representing That The Consumer Will Receive A Rebate, Discount Or Other Economic Benefit That Is Actually Contingent On Another Event**

Section 1770(a)(17) “prohibits bait-and-switch rebate offers that cannot be performed before or at the time of purchase . . . .” In enacting section 1770(a)(17), “the Legislature intended to prohibit merchants from advertising a rebate or discount when they conceal from consumers the conditions to be satisfied to receive the rebate or discount.” For example, the Legislature intended to prevent making an advertised discount contingent upon purchasing an additional, more expensive or higher quality product than the product advertised at the discounted price. The Court of Appeal has emphasized that the Legislature intended to prevent concealment and deception, and not to prohibit rebates altogether, reasoning that the Legislature regulated rebates in another, specific statute, and had not done so under the CLRA. Thus, according to the court, by addressing and expressly authorizing the conduct in a separate statute,

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589 “By its very language, [section 1770(a)(14)] contemplates the existence of collateral oral promises, representations or agreements which may be inconsistent with the rights, remedies, or obligations set out in a written contract . . . .” Wang v. Massey Chevrolet, 97 Cal. App. 4th 856, 870 (2002) (holding that parol evidence rule cannot bar a CLRA claim based on section 1770(a)(14) because to do so would make a practice unlawful and simultaneously prevent a plaintiff from proving such; moreover, to allow defendant to assert a parol evidence or ratification defense to a section 1770(a)(14) claim would violate the CLRA’s anti-waiver provision).

590 Id.


592 Kramer v. Intuit Inc., 121 Cal. App. 4th 574, 580 (2004) (citing Assemb. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assemb. Bill No. 292 (Sept. 30, 1970) 4 Assemb. J. (1970 Reg. Sess.) p. 8466). In Kramer, the Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff did not allege that the rebate offer was misleading or deceptive. Hence, an offer that advertised a $30 discount when two types of software were purchased did not contravene the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 1770(a)(17). The court reasoned that the rebate program at issue did not necessarily require a subsequent purchase because the consumer could either purchase both products simultaneously or purchase one before the other in addition to purchasing the secondary product within 30 days of the product on which the discount was offered. Id. at 581.

Because these two other options existed, the rebate offer’s language did not require a “subsequent” purchase and thus did not violate section 1770(a)(17). Id. Given the legislative intent to avoid concealment cited by the court, it is interesting that the court focused on whether the rebate program violated the express language of section 1770(a)(17)—whether the earning of the rebate was contingent on an event to occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction—rather than the fact that the rebate requirement was conspicuously disclosed on the product packaging.

593 Id.
the Legislature demonstrated that it only intended to require accurate advertising of rebates through the CLRA.\(^{594}\)

3. **Section 1770(a)(19) – Inserting An Unconscionable Provision In The Contract**

   Section 1770(a)(19) is a widely used provision of the CLRA. Significantly, this subdivision does not merely codify the defense of unconscionability, but supplies an affirmative right to relief for consumers who allegedly are injured by an unconscionable contract provision.\(^{595}\) Section 1770(a)(19) requires courts to draw upon the doctrine of unconscionability, as stated in California Civil Code section 1670.5\(^{596}\) and general principles of California law.\(^{597}\)

   These claims are fact-specific. For example, in *Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*\(^{598}\), the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of a CLRA claim in which plaintiff alleged that a non-usage fee on a gift card—which defendant renamed a “shopping card” with the ability to add value—was unconscionable in violation of section 1770(a)(19). The court held that plaintiff could have avoided the fee, which was disclosed on the back of the card and in an accompanying disclosure, by using the card. Moreover, the contract was not one of adhesion because defendant did not

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\(^{594}\) Id. at 580 (“The legislative intent of preventing concealment or deception by nondisclosure is further bolstered by the subsequent enactment of another statute addressing rebates.”).


\(^{596}\) The test under section 1670.5 is “whether, in the light of the general background and the needs of the particular case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract . . . . The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.” *Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 111 Cal. App. 4th 660, 669-70 (2003) (quoting Legislative Comm. Comment, Assemb., 1979 Addition).

\(^{597}\) In California, the unconscionability doctrine “has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” *A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.*, 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (1982) (citation omitted); accord *Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.*, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113-14 (2000). “Put another way, . . . unconscionability presents a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ aspect.” *Dean Witter*, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 767; accord *Woodside Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct.*, 107 Cal. App. 4th 723, 727 (2003). The procedural element includes (a) “oppression,” referring to an “inequality of bargaining power resulting in no real negotiation and the absence of meaningful choice,” and (b) “surprise,” where the purportedly offensive “terms of the bargain are hidden in a proxix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” *Dean Witter*, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 767; see also *Woodside Homes*, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 727 (“The former takes into consideration the parties’ relative bargaining strength and the extent to which a provision is ‘hidden’ or unexpected . . . .”).

\(^{598}\) 111 Cal. App. 4th at 668.
present plaintiff with a take it or leave it proposition. Plaintiff could have simply declined to purchase a shopping card and paid for purchases through other means.599

Also, relying primarily on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank,600 some plaintiffs have filed claims under section 1770(a)(19) based on the inclusion of class-action waivers in arbitration agreements. As discussed above, the California Supreme Court held in Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., that a party to a contract containing allegedly unconscionable provisions may not challenge them under the CLRA unless the defendant has at least threatened to enforce those provisions, since the plaintiff cannot establish causation or damages absent attempts at enforcement.601 Challenges to arbitration provisions under the CLRA also might be unsuccessful on other grounds, such as based on choice-of-law or preemption under the FAA,602 but no published authority has directly addressed these issues.

C. The Anti-Waiver Provision – Section 1751

Section 1751 provides that “[a]ny waiver by a consumer of the provisions of [the CLRA] is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.” Courts have interpreted this provision to prohibit, for example, forum-selection clauses contained in consumer contracts.603 The section also has been utilized by plaintiffs in arguing against the enforcement of class-action

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599 Id. at 669-70; see also Olsen, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 621-22; Lynch v. Com. Union Ins. Co., No. A094846, 2001 WL 1660035, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (trip cancellation insurance excluding third parties’ pre-existing medical conditions as reason for cancellation did not violate section 1770(a)(19) because the policy’s exclusion was conspicuous and unambiguous and policy permitted plaintiff to cancel and obtain a refund if policy terms did not satisfy him).

600 36 Cal. 4th at 161 (noting that, under California law, class-action waivers in arbitration agreements may be unconscionable in certain circumstances).

601 45 Cal. 4th at 643.

602 See, e.g., Vannier v. Gateway Cos., Inc., No. B179663, 2006 WL 121962, at *2-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2006) (rejecting claim that computer company’s service contract included unconscionable arbitration provision in violation of section 1770(a)(19) because the FAA preempted an affirmative cause of action for violation of the CLRA and because South Dakota law applied) (relying on Ting, 319 F.3d 1126 (holding that section 1751’s anti-waiver provision was preempted and did not void arbitration agreement’s class-action ban and two-year limitations period because CLRA is a statute of limited applicability)). In Ting, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that while the defense of unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense that is not preempted by the FAA, 319 F.3d at 1150 n.15, “the CLRA applies only to noncommercial contracts and only to consumer contracts . . . . Because the CLRA applies to such a limited set of transactions, we conclude that it is not a law of ‘general applicability.’” Id. at 1148 (citations omitted); accord Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 134 Cal. App. 4th 886, 893, 898 (2005) (holding that, pursuant to choice-of-law provision, class-action waiver was enforceable under Delaware law); Lux v. Good Guys, No. SACV 05-300 CJC ANX, 2005 WL 1713421, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005) (form credit card agreement that required consumer to arbitrate claims pursuant to Nevada law was not procedurally unconscionable); Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1203, 1205-06 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (class-action waiver upheld under Texas law pursuant to form agreement’s choice-of-law provision).

603 Am. Online, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 15 (Virginia forum selection clause, accompanied by Virginia choice-of-law provision, “would necessitate a waiver of the statutory remedies of the CLRA, in violation of that law’s antiwaiver provision (Civ. Code, § 1751) and California public policy.”).
waivers in arbitration agreements,\textsuperscript{604} as well as the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions.\textsuperscript{605} Indeed, California courts have refused to enforce contract provisions that require consumers to litigate in a “far location” because California has a “materially greater interest” than the proposed forum state in ensuring that “its citizens have a viable forum in which to recover minor amounts of money.”\textsuperscript{606} The CLRA anti-waiver provision does not, however, prohibit waiver of non-CLRA claims.\textsuperscript{607} Even with this limitation, the anti-waiver provision may have a broad reach, and factors into plaintiffs’ counsel’s increased reliance on the CLRA.

In Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC,\textsuperscript{608} the California Supreme Court resolved a split in authority among Courts of Appeal regarding preemption of the CLRA’s anti-waiver provision by the Federal Arbitration Act. As discussed above, the court held that in light of Concepcion, “the CLRA’s anti-waiver provision is preempted insofar as it bars class waivers in arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.”\textsuperscript{609}

D. Defenses To CLRA Claims

1. Statute Of Limitations

CLRA claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.\textsuperscript{610} Courts have held that the statute runs from the time that a reasonable person would have discovered the basis for a claim.\textsuperscript{611}

\textsuperscript{604} The Ninth Circuit has concluded, however, that the CLRA, including the anti-waiver provision, is preempted by the FAA in the context of arbitration agreements. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152; see also Flores v. W. Covina Auto Grp., 212 Cal. App. 4th 895, 910, 912 (2013) (“[F]or our purposes, no meaningful distinction exists between the CLRA’s prohibition against class action waivers and the Discover Bank rule. Both are state law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of the FAA by effectively requiring the availability of classwide arbitration.” “[T]he CLRA’s prohibition against class waivers is preempted by the FAA. The waiver of class arbitration rights in appellants’ sales contract is not unenforceable under the CLRA’’’); Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218, 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (affirming order compelling arbitration as to party to arbitration agreement based on Concepcion but reversing as to non-signatory to agreement).

\textsuperscript{605} See, e.g., Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2009); Am. Online, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 15.

\textsuperscript{606} Aral, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 564; but see Net2Phone, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 590 (enforcing New Jersey forum selection clause where it was not shown that requiring non-injured consumers to litigate in New Jersey would deprive them of adequate protection).


\textsuperscript{608} 61 Cal. 4th 899 (2015).

\textsuperscript{609} Id. at 924.

\textsuperscript{610} Cal. Civ. Code § 1783.

2. Notice And Cure Process

At least 30 days before a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for damages under the CLRA, the plaintiff must notify the prospective defendant(s) of the alleged violations and demand that they be corrected. The notice must be in writing, delivered by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and it must provide sufficient detail to allow the violations to be addressed by the defendant. Courts will often dismiss a CLRA damages claim for failure to comply strictly with these requirements. As one court explained:

612 Cal. Civ. Code § 1782(a) (“Thirty days or more prior to the commencement of an action for damages pursuant to this title, the consumer shall do the following: (1) Notify the person alleged to have employed or committed methods, acts, or practices declared unlawful by Section 1770 of the particular alleged violations of Section 1770; (2) Demand that the person correct, repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the goods or services alleged to be in violation of Section 1770.”); see also Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1195 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (invalidating plaintiff’s CLRA claims because he failed to comply with the 30-day notice requirement under the statute), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.


614 See, e.g., Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that “a plaintiff must provide notice regarding each particular product on which his CLRA damages claims are based, even where the products qualify as substantially similar”); Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 939, 950 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (denying leave to amend to comply with notice requirements after plaintiff claimed damages without giving required notice, reasoning that statutory purpose of facilitating settlement would be undermined if amendment were permitted); Galindo v. Financo Fin., Inc., No. C 07-03991 WHA, 2008 WL 4452344, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2008) (dismissing plaintiffs’ CLRA claim for failing to give notice but without prejudice, calling dismissal of CLRA claim with prejudice for failing to satisfy pre-litigation requirements “draconian”); Keihloltz v. Super. Fireplace Co., No. C 08-00836 CW, 2009 WL 839076, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (concluding that compliance with notice requirement in prior state-wide class action, including same alleged CLRA violations, was not sufficient notice); Keihloltz v. Lennox Hearth Prods., Inc., No. C 08-00836 CW, 2009 WL 2905960, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009) (noting that pre-litigation notice requirement must be literally applied and strictly construed); Laster, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that inadvertent disregard of the notice requirement should be excused); Von Grabe, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 (dismissing CLRA claim with prejudice because notice letter was not sent timely or using required mail service); Doe 1, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (declining to dismiss plaintiff’s claim with prejudice because doing so would not meet purpose of notice requirement; stating that claim should be dismissed until plaintiff complies with notice requirements); Waller v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 11cv0454-LAB (RBB), 2011 WL 6325972, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2011) (plaintiff failed to comply with CLRA notice requirements where plaintiff filed original complaint seeking damages, then gave statutory notice and filed first amended complaint seeking only injunctive relief, and subsequently filed second amended
The purpose of the notice requirement of section 1782 is to give the manufacturer or vendor sufficient notice of alleged defects to permit appropriate corrections or replacements. The notice requirement commences the running of certain time constraints upon the manufacturer or vendor within which to comply with the corrective provisions. The clear intent of the [CLRA] is to provide and facilitate precomplaint settlements of consumer actions wherever possible and to establish a limited period during which such settlement may be accomplished. This clear purpose may only be accomplished by a literal application of the notice provisions.

If proper notice is provided, the defendant then has 30 days in which to correct the alleged violations. If the defendant undertakes appropriate corrective action, or agrees to do so, no action for damages will lie under the CLRA. A defendant may avoid maintenance of a class action for damages based on the notice and cure process if: (a) all consumers similarly situated have been identified; (b) all consumers so identified have been notified that upon their request the defendant shall take the appropriate corrective action; (c) the corrective action has been, or in a reasonable time shall be, taken; and (d) the defendant has ceased from engaging in, or within a reasonable time will cease to engage in, the challenged conduct. By its terms, the CLRA does not permit a defendant to contest notice of alleged violations. It must either cure or the action for damages may proceed.

complaint (operative complaint) seeking damages; plaintiff had statutory obligation to provide notice before filing original complaint); contra Morgan, 177 Cal. App. 4th at 1259 (finding requirement satisfied by filing of earlier complaints); Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CIVS-06-cv-2573 DFL KJM, 2007 WL 1345706, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2007) (finding notice given by a different member of putative class nearly a year before case was filed satisfied notice requirement); Shein v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 08-07323 CAS (Ex), 2009 WL 3109721, at *4-7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009) (concluding that plaintiffs complied with notice requirement by sending demand letter to defendant's headquarters); see also Janda v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 378 F. App'x 705, 708-09 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that "there is a split in authority on whether the CLRA requires strict compliance with its notice provision"); Whelan v. BDR Thermea, No. C-11-02146 EDL, 2011 WL 6182329, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for failure to comply with CLRA notice requirements, where, although plaintiff filed original complaint seeking damages without giving notice, plaintiff subsequently gave notice and, after defendants responded, filed an amended complaint; the issue of notice was moot because the “proper remedy” for plaintiff’s filing a complaint for damages before sending notice would have been leave to amend).


Cal. Civ. Code § 1782(b) (“[N]o action for damages may be maintained under Section 1780 if an appropriate correction, repair, replacement, or other remedy is given, or agreed to be given within a reasonable time, to the consumer within 30 days after receipt of the notice.”); see also Kagan, 35 Cal. 3d at 590 (“If, within this 30-day period, the prospective defendant corrects the alleged wrongs, or indicates that it will make such corrections within a reasonable time, no cause of action for damages will lie.”).


There is a split of authority on the issue of whether a claim for restitution under the CLRA is a claim for “damages” for these purposes. Compare Kennedy v. Nat. Balance Pet Foods, Inc., No. 07-CV-1082-H-RBB, 2007 WL 2300746, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (holding notice not required to seek
In most instances, a plaintiff will file a complaint for injunctive relief, and then provide notice that he intends to amend to include damages claims. If the defendant does not cure within the 30-day time period, plaintiff may so amend.619

A defendant’s efforts to take corrective action pursuant to section 1782 are deemed an offer to compromise and, thus, are inadmissible pursuant to California Evidence Code section 1152.620 Furthermore, attempts to comply with a demand for corrective action are not to be construed as admissions of engaging in an act or practice declared unlawful by section 1770.621 However, evidence of compliance or attempts to comply with a demand for corrective action may be introduced by a defendant for the purpose of establishing good faith or compliance with the CLRA.622

Upon receiving notice under the CLRA, a defendant may not avoid a potential CLRA class action by “picking off” the named plaintiff by resolving only his or her own claim. The California Supreme Court resolved this issue in Kagan v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Association.623 Specifically, the Court evaluated whether a consumer who provides a prospective defendant with notice of a class grievance under the CLRA, and informally obtains individual relief, subsequently may commence a class action for damages.624 The Court held that, under these circumstances, the defendant has not destroyed the named plaintiff’s adequacy as a class representative.625 The Court emphasized that one goal of the CLRA is to enable plaintiffs to prosecute class actions. In fact, the Legislature’s explicit intent was “to make certain that a person can commence a class action 30 days after he has made a demand on behalf of the class even if the merchant has offered to settle his particular claim in accordance with section 1782(b).”626

3. **Bona Fide Error**

Section 1784 provides that “[n]o award of damages may be given in any action . . . if the person alleged to have employed or committed such method, act or practice (a) proves that such violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures adopted to avoid any such error and (b) makes an appropriate correction,”627

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621 Id.
622 Id.
623 35 Cal. 3d at 587.
624 Id.
625 See id. at 595 (“We now hold only that [defendant’s] exemption of plaintiff from [the alleged CLRA violation] does not render her unfit per se to represent the class.”).
626 See id. at 593 (“Settlement with the named plaintiffs will not preclude them from further prosecuting the action on behalf of the remaining members of the class.”).
627 Id. (citing James S. Reed, Legislating For The Consumer: An Insider’s Analysis Of The Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1, 19 (1971)).
repair or replacement or other remedy of the goods and services . . . ”. This corrective action must occur within 30 days following notice to the defendant of the alleged violation.

4. Safe Harbor

Courts have also applied the safe harbor for UCL claims similar to that outlined in Cel-Tech to CLRA claims.629

5. Alternative Choice Of Goods And Services

The doctrine of unconscionability generally has been recognized to involve an absence of a meaningful choice on the part of the “weaker” party to a contract. Thus, although the decisions are split, the availability of alternative goods or services in the market may provide a defense to an “unconscionable contract provision” claim pursuant to section 1770(a)(19). For example, in Dean Witter,630 the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court should have denied class certification because plaintiff, who asserted unconscionability claims, “could have gone to a competing financial service and opened an IRA free of the offending provisions.” The court reasoned that the “existence of a ‘meaningful choice’ to do business elsewhere” defeated a claim that a contract provision was “oppressive” and therefore procedurally unconscionable.631 The court further held that the “oppression” factor is possibly defeated if the complaining party has a meaningful choice of reasonably available alternative sources for the desired goods or services that do not include the allegedly unconscionable terms.632 However, case law in California state courts is mixed, and the Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected the “market alternative” defense.633


629 See Alvarez, 656 F.3d at 934 (finding that “[t]he California regulatory framework creates specific requirements [for retail gasoline dispensing] that may not be trumped by the general prohibitions of the CLRA” and that, as a result, defendants were entitled to safe harbor from plaintiffs’ CLRA claims) (alterations omitted); Lopez, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 576-79 (plaintiffs contended that defendants violated the CLRA by designing vehicle odometers that allegedly over-registered mileage; court dismissed claims on grounds that a separate statute provides a “safe harbor” for use of odometers that register actual mileage within a certain percentage range); Loeffler, 58 Cal. 4th at 1127 (finding claim barred “[w]hether alleged under the UCL or the CLRA”).

630 211 Cal. App. 3d at 766.

631 Id. at 768.

632 See id.

633 Compare Wayne v. Staples, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 466, 482 (2006) (defendant’s charge to customers of 100% markup on excess value insurance for shipped merchandise was not unconscionable and hence not unlawful under the CLRA because customers had meaningful choices and could ship packages without purchasing insurance coverage, obtain excess coverage from other carriers, or ship packages from other retail shipping outlets); In re iPhone Application Litig., 2011 WL 4403963, at *8 (“[T]he availability of alternative sources from which to obtain the desired service defeats any claim of oppression, because the consumer has a meaningful choice.”) (quoting Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1245 (2007)); Schnall, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 1161 n.9 (discussed above); and Shvarts, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 1160 (same), with Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 498 F.3d 976, 985-86 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing split of authority and holding that meaningful choice as to service providers does not defeat procedural unconscionability).
6. Federal Preemption

As with the UCL, the defense of federal preemption may defeat a CLRA claim depending upon the federal statute at issue and the circumstances of the transaction.\(^ {634} \)

7. Disclosure

In misrepresentation cases under the CLRA, express disclosure of the allegedly misrepresented or nondisclosed practice provides a defense.\(^ {635} \)

8. Arbitration

The issues presented by arbitration are addressed in Section IV.A. of the UCL discussion above.

III. REMEDIES UNDER THE CLRA

A. Legal And Equitable Relief

The CLRA provides for actual damages (with a $1,000 minimum in class actions), injunctive relief, restitution and punitive damages.\(^ {636} \) The CLRA allows for an additional statutory award of up to $5,000 to senior citizens or disabled persons (as defined in section 1761) where the trier of fact finds that: (1) “the consumer has suffered substantial physical, emotional, or economic damage resulting from the defendant’s conduct”; (2) one or more of the factors set forth in California Civil Code section 3345(b) is present; and (3) “an additional award is appropriate.”\(^ {637} \) This additional remedy also is available in class actions.\(^ {638} \) Where damages are

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\(^ {634} \) See, e.g., Roberts v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the federal Carmack Act, which regulates interstate shipment of goods and motor carrier liability, preempted CLRA claims regarding interstate moving company’s “bait and switch” scheme because extensive federal regulations demonstrated Congress’s intent to occupy the field); see also In re Fontem US, Inc., 2016 WL 6520142, at *6 (CLRA labeling claims expressly preempted by FDA rule defining e-cigarettes as “tobacco products,” which placed e-cigarettes within the scope of the labeling requirements of the Family Smoking and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), and its express preemption clause); but see Smith, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1482, 1484 (holding that NBA did not preempt CLRA claim against national bank); Hood, 143 Cal. App. 4th 526 (same).

\(^ {635} \) See, e.g., Augustine, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75 (affirming dismissal of CLRA claim challenging retroactive increase in interest rates upon default where credit card agreement expressly disclosed the consequences of default).

\(^ {636} \) Cal. Civ. Code § 1780 (“Any consumer who suffers any damage . . . may bring an action . . . to recover or obtain any of the following: (1) Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of damages in a class action be less than one thousand dollars ($1,000). (2) An order enjoining the methods, acts, or practices. (3) Restitution of property. (4) Punitive damages. (5) Any other relief that the court deems proper.”).

\(^ {637} \) Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(b)(1). The factors in Civil Code section 3345(b) include: (1) “[w]hether the defendant knew or should have known that his or her conduct was directed to one or more senior citizens or disabled persons”; (2) whether the defendant’s conduct caused the “loss or encumbrance of a primary residence, principal employment, or source of income; substantial loss of property set aside for retirement, or for personal or family care and maintenance; or substantial loss of payments received under a pension or retirement plan or a government benefits program, or assets essential to the health or welfare of the senior citizen or disabled person”; or (3) whether the plaintiffs “are substantially more
proven, the court may order a fluid recovery procedure to distribute the proceeds. Section 1752 provides that the remedies available under the CLRA are not exclusive and are available in addition to “other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct provided for in any other law.”

B. Attorneys’ Fees

The CLRA allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover court costs and attorneys’ fees as a matter of right. Because the CLRA itself does not define “prevailing plaintiff,” courts draw upon the general definition of “prevailing party” with respect to plaintiffs in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. Courts have held that, where a plaintiff obtains a “net monetary recovery” on a CLRA claim, he is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees. The CLRA’s language is mandatory, and a court must award costs and fees to a prevailing plaintiff. At least one California court has clarified, however, that attorney’s fees are not available where a suit for damages cannot be maintained under the CLRA because a merchant offered an appropriate cure in response to plaintiff’s notice. A prevailing defendant, in contrast, is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees only if it can establish that the plaintiff’s CLRA claim was not made in good faith. Where a

vulnerable than other members of the public to the defendant’s conduct because of age, poor health or infirmity, impaired understanding, restricted mobility, or disability, and actually suffered substantial physical, emotional, or economic damage resulting from the defendant’s conduct.”


Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(e) (“The court shall award court costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to [the CLRA].”).

“Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery . . . .” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1032(a)(4). Moreover, to obtain an attorneys’ fees award as a “prevailing party,” a plaintiff must prevail on a CLRA cause of action, and not a different cause of action alleged in the same lawsuit. Bennett v. Cal. Custom Coach, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 333, 339 (1991) (where plaintiff prevailed only on claim for money had and received, award of costs did not include attorneys’ fees “since recovery of attorney’s fees was contingent on plaintiff prevailing on a different cause of action, i.e., his claim under the [CLRA]”).

See Reveles, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 1154; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 149-54 (2006) (plaintiff was “prevailing party” entitled to attorneys’ fees under the CLRA where she succeeded on CLRA claims; remaining non-CLRA claims were relevant only to the amount of fees and whether court could apportion fees); see also Kim v. Euromotors W./The Auto Gallery, 149 Cal. App. 4th 170, 178-79, 181 (2007) (pre-trial settlement does not prevent plaintiff from seeking attorneys’ fees under the CLRA absent enforceable agreement to the contrary).

Benson, 239 Cal. App. 4th at 1212 (“Attorney fees are not recoverable in actions for damages under the CLRA unless the response to the notice letter is not an appropriate one or no response is forthcoming within the statutory time period.”).

“A court . . . may award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing defendant if the court finds the plaintiff’s prosecution of that action was not made in good faith.” Matson Constr., Inc. v. Miller, No. A102564, 2005 WL 1663521, at *26 (Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 2005) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(d))
CLRA claim for injunctive relief for a group of persons is successfully brought, a plaintiff might also seek attorneys’ fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CLRA

A. Venue

The CLRA provides that “[a]n action . . . may be commenced in the county in which the person against whom it is brought resides, has his or her principal place of business, or is doing business, or in the county where the transaction or any substantial portion thereof occurred.”

The CLRA's venue provisions, however, do “not override the general rule [that] a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence.” Section 1780(c) requires that the plaintiff file an affidavit with his or her complaint stating facts that establish venue where the action is filed. Upon motion by the court or a party, a court must dismiss an action where the plaintiff fails to file the required affidavit.

B. Motions For “No Merit” Or “No Defense” Determination

In class actions under the CLRA, motions for summary judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 437c are not allowed. Rather, the CLRA allows a party, upon ten days' notice, to make a motion to determine whether “[t]he action is without merit or there is no defense to the action.” Courts nonetheless have concluded that the procedural

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647 Gallin v. Super. Ct., 230 Cal. App. 3d 541, 543, 545 (1991) (venue was improper where no corporate defendant maintained its principal place of business, single consumer transaction occurred, and at least some of the individual defendants did not reside because, in part, “rights protected by the [CLRA] do not rise to the level of a civil right” that warranted venue where the transaction had occurred).


649 Id.; Allen v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., No. A105864, 2005 WL 318753, at *3-4 & n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2005) (although a plaintiff alleges multiple causes of action besides the CLRA, the general venue statute does not excuse section 1780(c)'s requirement that the plaintiff file an affidavit that venue is proper; it is likely that the Legislature intended that neither a court nor a party may waive this provision, and the plaintiff’s failure to file an affidavit of venue mandates dismissal).

650 Cal. Civ. Code § 1781(c) (“A motion based upon [Code of Civil Procedure section 437(c), for summary judgment] shall not be granted in any action commenced as a class action pursuant to [1781(a)].”).

651 Cal. Civ. Code § 1781(c)(3) (“If notice of the time and place of the hearing is served upon the other parties at least 10 days prior thereto, the court shall hold a hearing . . . to determine if any of the
requirements for a “no merit” or “no defense” determination, except for the timing requirements, mirror those for a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. 652

Moreover, most courts have held that a plaintiff is not required to controvert a no-merit motion in order to certify a class. Stated differently, a defendant may not take the position that plaintiff is required to show, at the class certification stage, that his or her CLRA claim has merit in order to obtain class certification. 653 This is not to say, however, that a defendant is prohibited from filing a no-merit motion to be heard prior to, or concurrently with, the plaintiff’s motion to certify a class. 654

following apply to the action: . . . (3) The action is without merit or there is no defense to the action.”).

652 See, e.g., Olsen, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 624; Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1359 (affirming trial court’s no-merits determination even though “the trial court chose to deem the dismissal as one after summary judgment rather than one after a no-merit determination,” but that there is “no meaningful distinction in the choice”); see also Leonhardt v. AT&T Co., No. A103610, 2005 WL 240428, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2005) (“If the motion is originally denominated as one for summary judgment . . ., it can be treated as a motion to determine that the action is without merit.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Smith, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1474-75 (citing Kagan, 35 Cal. 3d at 589, and Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1359-62) (reviewing both motion for summary judgment and motion for no-merits determination under a summary judgment standard).

653 See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 23 Cal. 4th 429, 438 (2000) (“Nowhere does the CLRA purport to require a showing of potential success on the merits of the suit before certification may be ordered. Although trial courts are authorized, upon a properly noticed motion, to determine that ‘[t]he action is without merit or there is no defense’ thereto ([section 1781(c)(3)]), that procedure appears independent of the procedure for certification (see [section 1781(c)(1)]).”) (footnote omitted). Another interpretation of section 1781(c), however, is that, in order to certify a CLRA class action, a court must address all four points enumerated under section 1781(c), including that the action has merit, or that it is not without merit. However, this is not how the majority of courts, including the California Supreme Court in Linder, have construed section 1781(c).

654 See, e.g., Leonhardt, 2005 WL 240428, at *10 (“Once [the trial court] determined that the CLRA claim could not be maintained, it clearly did not have to determine whether a class could be certified to pursue the nonmeritorious claim.”); Bacon v. Sasaki, No. B158908, 2003 WL 23096504, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003) (“Postponement of class action treatment until a determination of liability has been made should not prejudice potential class members. If the named plaintiffs lose, the potential class members will not be bound by the judgment, and if the plaintiffs win, potential class members still will be able to opt out of the litigation if they desire.”). Courts prefer, however, for a summary judgment motion or other merits determination to follow a ruling on class certification and notice to the class. See Fireside Bank, 40 Cal. 4th at 1074 (“A largely settled feature of state and federal procedure is that trial courts in class action proceedings should decide whether a class is proper and, if so, order class notice before ruling on the substantive merits of the action. The virtue of this sequence is that it promotes judicial efficiency, by postponing merits rulings until such time as all parties may be bound, and fairness, by ensuring that parties bear equally the benefits and burdens of favorable and unfavorable merits rulings.”) (citations omitted); Miller v. Bank of Am., N.A., 213 Cal. App. 4th 1, 9 (2013) (affirming denial of class certification where plaintiff “failed to show that any means exist to identify a class of bank customers who had been subjected to unlawful setoffs”).

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C. Class Action Rules

The CLRA specifies unique class certification standards and procedures which must be applied to CLRA claims. In enacting these unique rules, the Legislature was guided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which sets forth federal class action standards, and the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. The standards for certifying a CLRA claim for class treatment are set forth in California Civil Code section 1781(b), which provides:

The court shall permit the suit to be maintained on behalf of all members of the represented class if all of the following conditions exist:

1. It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court;
2. The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members;
3. The claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
4. The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.

Courts have no discretion to deny class certification if these factors are satisfied.

While similar in many respects, the standards for certification under section 1781 are not identical to those used for other California class actions authorized by California Code of Civil Procedure section 382. For example, “[u]nlike a plaintiff proceeding under [section 382], a plaintiff moving to certify a class under the CLRA is not required to show that substantial benefit will result to the litigants and the court. Thus, unlike [section 382], the CLRA does not require that a plaintiff show a probability that each class member will come forward and prove his separate claim to a portion of the recovery.” The CLRA permits and, indeed, encourages class actions when individual recovery might be minimal.

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656 67 Cal. 2d 695 (1967); see David E. Roberts, Review of Selected 1970 California Legislation, 2 PAC. L.J. 343, 346 (1971); James S. Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider’s Analysis of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1971) (because the conditions precedent to maintenance of a class action under section 1781 are “almost identical” to those contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), “[t]he federal experience would, therefore, seem to be good authority in construing the California statute”).
659 See Hogya, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 138 (noting that section 1780(a)(1)’s authorization for class awards as low as $300 (now $1,000) “implies some consumer class actions might go forward even though the individual claims of class members would be minimal” and that section 1781(a)’s language regarding “other” relief contemplates class actions where no damages are sought).
Although courts in practice often apply the same class action procedures to CLRA claims that they use under section 382 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the CLRA sets forth its own requirements. Section 1781(c) requires notice and a hearing before any class certification determination. The CLRA expressly permits class notice via publication if personal notification is unreasonably expensive or if all members cannot be personally notified. This includes notice pursuant to Government Code section 6064, which requires once-a-week publication for four successive weeks. Individual notification may nevertheless be required when damages are substantial. The CLRA also specifically provides that either party may be forced to bear the cost of class notice. The class notice must include certain elements, including the right to opt out.

Particularly after Meyer, defeating certification of CLRA claims may turn on identifying non-common issues. The CLRA requires “damage as a result of” the challenged practice, which impacts commonality. In addition, the requirement may impact adequacy and typicality. For instance, in Wilens v. TD Waterhouse Group, Inc., the Court of Appeal found that class treatment was inappropriate because it could not be presumed that each class member was harmed by an allegedly unconscionable provision in customer agreements. As the court explained, “[r]elief under the CLRA is specifically limited to those who suffer damage, making causation a necessary element of proof . . . . [Plaintiff] argues that differences in calculating damages are not a proper basis for the denial of class certification. But the individual issues here go beyond mere calculation; they involve each class member’s entitlement to damages.” Accordingly, since the insertion of an unconscionable provision did not by itself cause damage, the court denied class certification.

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660 See Stern v. Super. Ct., 105 Cal. App. 4th 223, 233 (2003) (trial court improperly ruled that action was not a class action nine days after plaintiff filed amended complaint particularly because section 1781(c) requires ten days’ notice and a hearing before the court determines whether a class may be certified).

661 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1781(d) (“The party required to serve notice may, with the consent of the court, if personal notification is unreasonably expensive or it appears that all members of the class cannot be notified personally, give notice as prescribed herein by publication in accordance with Section 6064 of the Government Code in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the transaction occurred.”).

662 Cal. Gov’t Code § 6064. The period of notice under this section commences with the first day of publication and terminates at the end of the twenty-eighth day, including the first day. Id.; cf. Choi v. Mario Bodescu Skin Care, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 4th 292 (June 21, 2016) (section 1781(d) of the Civil Code, which incorporates section 6064 of the Government Code, applies when a court certifies a class for adjudication, but section 1781(f) governs notice of a proposed class action settlement).

663 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1781(d) (“[T]he court may direct either party to notify each member of the class of the action.”). While one early case questioned the constitutionality of requiring a defendant essentially to finance a lawsuit against it, see Cartt v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 974-75 (1975), this issue has not been raised in subsequent CLRA cases.


665 120 Cal. App. 4th at 754-56.

666 Id. (emphasis in original).

667 Several unpublished decisions contain a similar analysis. See Leonhardt, 2005 WL 240428, at *9 (holding that “[t]his case does not lend itself to the presumption that each class member suffered
However, certification of a CLRA claim may be granted without demonstrating that all unnamed class members relied on alleged material misrepresentations. For instance, in *In re Steroid Hormone Product Cases*, the named plaintiff alleged that defendant sold over-the-counter products containing anabolic steroids without requiring a prescription and without notifying customers that the products contained a controlled substance. The trial court denied class certification on the grounds that individualized inquiries would be required into whether the illegality of the substance would be material to each purchaser and whether the defendant’s alleged conduct caused injury to each purchaser. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court incorrectly denied certification. Although “both the named plaintiff and unnamed class members must have suffered some damage caused by a practice deemed unlawful under [the CLRA]” to obtain relief, the court stated that so long as the named plaintiff can show that “material misrepresentations were made to the class members, at least an inference of reliance [i.e., causation/injury] would arise as to the entire class.”

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668 181 Cal. App. 4th at 149.
669 Id. at 153.
670 Id. at 156, 157 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1292–93); *See also In re ConAgra Foods, Inc.,* 90 F. Supp. 3d at 987 (finding an inference of class-wide reliance appropriate for plaintiffs’ California CLRA claims for purchase of cooking oils labeled “100% Natural” that were allegedly made with genetically modified organisms).